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Preface
This volume draws on the expertise of dedicated international researchers who
have collaborated with the IZA – Institute of Labor Economics and the UK For-
eign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO, formerly the Department
for International Development) to enhance our knowledge on how labour mar-
kets in low-income countries can contribute to fostering economic and social
prosperity. Summarizing the main results from selected research projects under
the umbrella of the Growth and Labour Markets in Low-Income Countries Pro-
gramme (GLM|LIC) on behalf of the FCDO, this book also derives important
lessons from the projects for labour market programmes and policies. We wish
to thank all colleagues engaged in this ambitious project who have provided us
with insightful studies on a broad variety of topics.
A wealth of promising new studies are yet to come as the IZA/FCDO initia-
tive proceeds. To further underscore the eminent role of women in low-income
countries’ economies, the project has been renamed Gender, Growth, and Labour
Markets in Low-IncomeCountries Programme (G²LM|LIC). Providing additional
insights on gender issues and the effects of the unprecedented COVID-19 pan-
demic on societal outcomes in the developing world, this new research shall be
presented in a second volume of this important research programme.
This bookwould not have been possible without the untiring advice and support
by our teams at IZA and FCDO. We are particularly indebted to Holger Hinte at
IZA, who played a substantial role in organizing the content of the volume, writing
the chapters, and distilling the key takeaways for the reader. He was supported
by Mark Fallak and Götz Siedler in preparing and condensing the material for
each chapter. Abigail Collins-Carey, RakaDatta, and Lionel AntonioMuñoz Rosas
provided valuable comments on earlier drafts of the book. The views expressed in
this volume are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions
of FCDO or IZA.
Many wonderful colleagues have contributed to the success of the GLM|LIC
initiative since its beginning in 2011 through consultancy, project coordination,
administration, and event management. We would like to thank (in alphabeti-
cal order) Marco Caliendo, Martin T. Clemens, Peter Feinson, Corrado Giulietti,
Viola Hartmann, Sven Kleinert, Benedetta Musillo, Maryam Naghsh Nejad, Jan-
neke Pieters, John Piper, Hilmar Schneider, Dominik Spitza, Lydia Simons, Dawn
Wood, and Klaus F. Zimmermann. We look forward to continuing this important
joint venture and are grateful for the funding provided by the UK government.
vi preface
Thefindings and insights presented here underscore that investing in development
research can yield an important stimulus for sustainable development policies.
David Lam and Ahmed Elsayed
June 2021
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Introduction and Demographic Background
Jobs are the key to economic growth and poverty reduction.The dramatic declines
in poverty in the developing world in the last fifty years (World Bank 2020), a
period in which world population increased by 4 billion (UNDESA 2019a), could
not have occurred without rapid job creation. Whether the job is working as a
subsistence farmer, engineer, schoolteacher, security guard, garment worker, gov-
ernment worker, or market vendor, earnings from labour provide support to most
families in the world and determine whether they are able to meet their basic
needs.
Employment and job creation are key components in achieving economic
growth and sustainable development, particularly in low-income countries (LICs).
Despite the importance of studying labour markets in LICs, and investigating
which policies are more successful, the evidence remained, until recently, rather
limited. Against this backdrop, the joint IZA/FCDO (German IZA – Institute
of Labor Economics and the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office)
Growth and Labour Markets in Low-Income Countries (GLM|LIC) programme
was established in 2011 after identifying an important research gap on labourmar-
kets and growth in LICs. The GLM|LIC programme has taken important steps to
close this gap. The programme supported forty-three research projects until 2018.
In addition to academic papers, the programme also produced policy briefs and
synthesis papers that cover several aspects related to the challenges facing labour
markets of these countries and the policies that are successful in addressing these
challenges.
Starting from 2019, the focus of the programme is mainly on gender issues.
Building on the success of GLM|LIC, a new programme, ‘Gender, Growth and
Labour Markets in Low-Income Countries’ (G2LM|LIC), marks the extension of
the successful IZA/FCDO cooperation and aims to foster research that guides
future gender and labour market policies.
This book provides an in-depth discussion of the Growth and Labour Markets
in Low-Income Countries Programme research findings and the policy lessons
learned from its projects implemented across a diverse set of low-income coun-
tries. The book concentrates on giving the reader a clear picture of the structure
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of the labour markets in LICs, discusses the different policies, and investigates to
what extent, and under what conditions, they could be successful.
1.1 Demographic Background of the Employment Challenge
Any discussion of labour markets in LICs must take into account the dramatic
demographic changes that have affected the growth and composition of the
working-age population around the world in recent decades. As shown in Lam,
Leibbrandt, and Allen (2019), over 1 billion people will be added to the working-
age population of the world between 2020 and 2050. About 70% of the additional
working-age population will be in sub-Saharan Africa, a dramatic change from
previous decades, when Asia accounted for most of the growth of the world’s
working-age population. This rapid growth of the working-age population will
need to be met by equally rapid job creation if countries are to avoid rising
unemployment.
Figure 1.1 shows the size of the working-age population (defined as ages 15–64,
following standard international definitions) for the world and various regions
from 1950 to 2100, based on the United Nations Population Division’s estimates
from 1950 to 2019 and projections from 2020 to 2100 (UNDESA 2019b). The
figure shows the rapid growth of the working-age population that has occurred
in recent decades. The working-age population of the world grew at an annual rate
of over 2% per year in the 1970s and 1980s, doubling between 1970 and 2005—an
addition of 2.1 billion in just thirty-five years. As discussed in Lee (2003), Lam
(2011), and Lam, Leibbrandt, and Allen (2019), this period of rapid population
growth was historically unprecedented. It was primarily the result of rapid de-
clines in infant and child mortality in developing countries, which resulted in
rapid population growth and young populations. Asia experienced very rapid
growth of its working-age population, adding almost 1 billion people in just
twenty-five years between 1970 and 1995. Growth at this speed requires 3.3million
new jobs every month merely to keep up with the expansion of the working-age
population.
As seen in Figure 1.1, Eastern/Southeastern Asia (dominated by China) had
one of the fastest-growing working-age populations in the world in the 1970s and
1980s, with growth reaching almost 3% per year. Due to rapid declines in birth
rates, this rate of growth has fallen dramatically and is projected to become neg-
ative by 2027. Central/Southern Asia (dominated by India), with somewhat later
and slower fertility decline, now has a faster-growingworking-age population than
Eastern/Southeastern Asia and is projected to overtake Eastern/Southeastern Asia
in the size of the working-age population around 2040.
As seen in Figure 1.2, which shows each region’s share of the global working-
age population, Eastern/Southeastern Asia had well over a third of the world’s
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Fig. 1.1 Working-Age Population for the World and Major Regions, 1950–2100
Notes: Based on United Nations World Population Prospects 2019 Revision. Population estimates
from 1950 to 2019. Medium variant population projections from 2020 to 2100. Regions are UN
Sustainable Development Goal regions. For details see United Nations (2019b) and Lam, Leibbrandt,
and Allen (2019).
working-age population in the 1990s, but its share has been falling and will
continue to fall throughout the century. Sub-Saharan Africa, by contrast, ac-
counted for less than 10% of the world’s working-age population until around
2010, but its share will be rising rapidly in the coming decades. By 2050 it will
have over 20% of the world’s working-age population, projected to reach almost
40% in 2100. Sub-Saharan Africa’s working-age population is projected to increase
by 700 million between 2020 and 2050, more than doubling from 600 million to
1.3 billion.
Figure 1.3 shows the projected growth of the working-age population between
2020 and 2030 and between 2040 and 2050 in individual countries in sub-Saharan
Africa, South Asia, and a group of comparison countries and regions. Note that
most of the people included in these projections were already born in 2020, mak-
ing the projections relatively insensitive to assumptions about fertility decline, the
biggest source of uncertainty in demographic projections for this century (Lam,
Leibbrandt, and Allen 2019). Niger, the country with the largest increase, will have
a roughly 50% increase in its working-age population between 2020 and 2030.
This is an increase of 5.8 million individuals, requiring the creation of almost
4 labour markets in low-income countries
































Fig. 1.2 Share of Global Working-Age Population by Region, 1950–2100
Notes: Based on United Nations World Population Prospects 2019 Revision. Population estimates
from 1950 to 2019. Medium variant population projections from 2020 to 2100. Regions are UN
Sustainable Development Goal regions. For details see United Nations (2019b) and Lam, Leibbrandt
and Allen (2019).
50,000 new jobs permonth in order to keep upwith the growth of the working-age
population. The percentage growth between 2040 and 2050 will be smaller, 43%,
the delayed effect of modest declines in fertility in recent years, but the absolute
increase between 2040 and 2050 will be higher—11.2 million working-age people.
The general pattern in Figure 1.3 is that the growth rate of the working-age pop-
ulation will fall in every country and region shown between the 2020–30 decade
and the 2040–50 decade. Growth rates will still be high in most African countries,
however, with sub-Saharan Africa as a whole projected to have a 25% increase in
its working-age population between 2040 and 2050, down from 34% between 2020
and 2030.
For sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the working-age population will increase by
34% between 2020 and 2030—an addition of 205 million people. It will require
1.7 million jobs per month to keep up with this growth of the working-age pop-
ulation. Between 2040 and 2050, the working-age population will increase by 265
million, requiring 2.2 million jobs per month. Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to
hit the milestone of needing 2 million jobs per month by 2037, with the number
not falling below 2 million per month until 2075 based on UN projections. While
labour markets in low-income countries 5
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Fig. 1.3 Growth of Working-Age Population, 2020–30 and
2040–50, Selected Countries and Regions
Notes: Based on United Nations World Population Prospects 2019 Revision.
Population estimates from 1950 to 2019. Medium variant population
projections from 2020 to 2100. For details see United Nations (2019b) and
Lam, Leibbrandt, and Allen (2019).
these numbers are staggering, it is important to keep inmind that the working-age
population of Eastern/Southeastern Asia increased by more than 2 million per
month from 1980 to 1990, reaching a high of 2.2 million per month. The growth
rate of the working-age population of Eastern/Southeastern Asia reached about
2.9% per year in the 1980s. This is very similar to the 3% annual growth rate
experienced by sub-Saharan Africa today, with the growth rate projected to de-
cline slowly in coming decades. In other words, the demographic challenge facing
sub-Saharan Africa’s labour market is similar in both percentage growth and the
absolute number of jobs required as that faced by Asia in the 1980s and 1990s. An
important difference, however, is that Africa will experience these high rates of
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growth for a longer period time, with annual growth in sub-Saharan Africa not
projected to drop below 2.5% per year until after 2040.
One of the striking features of Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.3 is that sub-Saharan
Africa will soon be the only major region with significant growth of its working-
age population. China’s working-age population is already shrinking, with the rate
of decline increasing in coming decades. India’s working-age population will only
increase by 11% between 2020 and 2030, and by 2% between 2040 and 2050. The
working-age population in Latin America is growing very slowly and will soon
begin to decline.
This is a major change in the demography of the global labour force.The growth
rate of the world’s working-age population is falling steadily, with the location
of the growth shifting rapidly from Asia to Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is already
accounting for the greatest part of the growth of the global labour force. Between
2020 and 2030 the world will add 448 million people to its working-age popula-
tion. Sub-SaharanAfrica will add 206million, 46% of the total. From 2040 to 2050,
sub-Saharan Africa’s growth will be equal to 100% of the growth in the world’s
working-age population, withmodest positive growth in some other regions offset
by declines in Asia and most other regions.
The reason that Africa continues to have a rapidly growing working-age popu-
lation, while growth rates have declined in most other regions, is that Africa has
had much slower declines in fertility rates (Bongarts and Casterline 2013; Bon-
gaarts 2017; Casterline 2017). As shown in Lam, Leibbrandt, and Allen (2019),
variation in the pace of fertility decline is the primary explanation for variations
in the rate of growth of the working-age population across countries. Note that
the growth rates of the working-age population shown in Figure 1.3 will not be
significantly affected by assumptions about fertility. Even for 2050, most of the
working-age population has already been born. Faster (or slower) fertility decline
will affect 15–29-year-olds in 2050, but will not affect older groups. While as-
sumptions about mortality will affect these projections, mortality rates are low in
the working ages, and reasonable variations in those rates will have only modest
impact on the growth of the working-age populations.
A related point is that sub-Saharan Africa will soon be the only major region
with a falling dependency rate—the ratio of the number of dependent children and
elderly divided by the number of working-age adults (Lam, Leibbrandt, and Allen
2019). The early stages of fertility decline have the effect of shifting the population
away froma child-dominated population towards a concentration inworking ages.
This has been called the ‘demographic dividend’ or ‘demographic bonus’, creating
a situation in which the share of the population in working ages increases and
dependency rates decline (Lee and Mason 2006; Canning, Raja, and Yazbeck
2015). Eventually the growth of the working-age population is overcome by
the growth of the elderly population, shifting from the favourable demography
of the demographic dividend to an age structure in which the elderly are the
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fastest-growing group and the dependency ratio begins to increase. As shown
in Lam, Leibbrandt, and Allen (2019), most regions outside of Africa, includ-
ing Asia and Latin America, already have rising dependency ratios because of
the rapid growth of their elderly population. Sub-Saharan Africa, by contrast, has
dependency ratios that are falling and will continue to fall for most of the century.
The demography of the labour force creates both challenges and opportunities
for sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand, generating 2 million jobs per month in
the coming decades will be a daunting task. Even this rate of job creation would
only hold constant the proportion of the working-age population that is employed.
Reducing unemployment rates would require even faster job creation. At the same
time, being the only region with a growing working-age population may create
opportunities for international investment, job creation, and economic growth.
How labour markets function will play a critical role in determining whether
low-income countries in Africa and other regions can meet this job creation
challenge. Can Africa reproduce the Asian success story of producing jobs fast
enough to keep up with almost 3% growth of the working-age population? How
effectively will rapidly growing youth cohorts be absorbed into the labour force?
Will education and skills be developed that allow young people to find good jobs
that produce economic growth and poverty reduction? Will the labour force be
able to efficiently match workers to the jobs that are being created? What roles will
rural–urban and international migration play in meeting the employment chal-
lenge? Will women, who are rapidly equalling or surpassing men in education
across the developing world, be effectively and equitably absorbed into the labour
force? What kinds of programmes and policies will help ensure that countries are
successful in all these elements? This book explores these and other issues that
are central to the role of labour markets in driving economic growth and poverty
reduction in the coming decades.
1.2 TheGLM|LICProgramme
With the demographic challenges discussed in section 1.1, employment growth
will need to be extremely robust in the coming decades in LICs, especially those
in sub-Saharan Africa. This will require labour markets that are dynamic and effi-
cient, able to absorb millions of additional workers each month. Recognizing the
importance of the labourmarket inmeeting these demographic challenges, driving
economic growth, and speeding the pace of poverty reduction, the programme on
Growth and Labour Markets in Low-Income Countries was created as a partner-
ship between the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development
(now part of the FCDO) and the German IZA – Institute of Labor Economics
in 2011. The core goal of this joint initiative is to improve worldwide knowledge
on labour market issues in LICs and provide a solid basis for capacity building
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and development of future labour market policies. The GLM|LIC programme
has already taken significant steps to close the research gap on labour markets
and growth in LICs. The programme has contributed to the growing interest
in understanding labour markets in the poorest countries by producing high-
quality research outputs and policy documents, as well as through interactions
with various stakeholders and impacts on programs and policies.
Calls for proposals were widely disseminated around the world. Between 2011
and 2018, 230 proposals were submitted over four rounds, with forty-three
projects selected. Proposals were reviewed through an initial round of peer review
by anonymous reviewers with appropriate expertise. Input from those reviews was
used by a distinguished International Advisory Committee to recommend pro-
posals for funding. Reviewers set a very high standard for rigorous evaluation of
labour market policies and programmes. Many of the projects used a randomized
controlled trial (RCT) design, evaluating treatment effects on participating and
non-participating individuals. The use of RCTs has become increasingly common
in development economics, with the importance of its contributions indicated by
the awarding of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2019 to three economists who
have been instrumental in advancing its use—Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and
Michael Kremer. By the time the GLM|LIC programme began, standards regard-
ing research design, statistical power, and rigorous econometric techniques had
been well established among development economists carrying our RCTs. Similar
high standards were applied to projects using other approaches, such as the use of
national labourmarket surveys or longitudinal household surveys collected by the
projects.
The projects supported by GLM|LIC cover a wide range of countries. Twenty-
five low-income countries were represented in research projects, along with a
number of projects that had a broad cross-country focus. The programme also
focused on including researchers from developing countries in the research
teams. Three research projects of GLM|LIC are run by research teams based
in LICs.
Annual research and policy conferences and workshops are an important com-
ponent of the Growth and LabourMarkets in Low-IncomeCountries Programme.
Conferences and workshops were held in a wide range of countries, including
Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, France, India, Kenya, Mozambique, Nepal,
Peru,Uganda, theUK, theUSA, andZambia.Moreover, the programmeorganized
a number of training programmes that aimed at enhancing the research ability
of southern researchers in Delhi (2012), Nairobi (2013), Dhaka (2015), Lusaka
(2016), Abidjan (2017), and Addis Ababa (2018).
Starting from mid-2019, a new phase of the programme began with a focus
is mainly on gender issues. The new programme ‘Growth, Gender and Labour
Markets in Low-Income Countries’ (G2LM|LIC) marks the extension of the suc-
cessful IZA/FCDO cooperation and aims to foster research that guides future
labour markets in low-income countries 9
gender and labour market policies. The programme aims particularly to enhance
equality of opportunity for women in the labour market.
1.3 VolumeOverview
The following chapters analyse some of the most important issues affecting labour
markets in low-income countries. The chapters build heavily on the new research
evidence that has been provided by the GLM|LIC programme.
Chapter 2 examines barriers to labour market clearing and investigates how to
make it easier for firms and workers to find each other in LICs. The chapter builds
on findings of several GLM|LIC projects that mainly use RCTs to study the role
of different constraints: (1) the distance from residential areas to job hubs con-
straint, and (2) asymmetric information in local labour markets constraint. The
results highlight the importance of job-search constraints as mechanisms for ex-
clusion of themost disadvantaged.They also show thatwhen they arewell targeted,
low-cost interventions can have large impacts, improving both efficiency and eq-
uity in the labour market. A GLM|LIC project in Ethiopia found positive effects of
low-cost programmes designed to help reduce search costs and improvematching,
including a skills certification programme and transportation vouchers.
Chapter 2 also discusses evidence on the impact of improving firms’ knowl-
edge about workers’ characteristics using anRCTdesign fromUgandawhere firms
were randomly given information onnon-cognitive skills of young job seekers.The
chapter also discusses the demand for, and cost of, labour in Africa, building on
a GLM|LIC synthesis paper that uses data from Ghana to analyse firms’ demand
for labour. The chapter also looks at the effect of intra-firm wage disparities on
productivity and absenteeism based on a novel RCT in India.
Chapter 3 looks at skills training, one of most common labour market pro-
grammes run by governments and NGOs to enable individuals achieve better
labour market outcomes. Despite the growing number of training programmes in
LICs,many of these programmes gowithout any rigorous evaluation. Randomized
controlled trials can be highly informative about the effectiveness and efficiency of
these programmes. Considerable evidence suggests that these programmes are of-
ten not very effective, especially considering cost. GLM|LIC research includes new
innovations in this area from a number of countries, including Kenya, Liberia,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Togo, Madagascar, and Senegal. The innovations include,
for example, combining training with cash transfers that aim to relax credit con-
straints and adding behavioural interventions such as behavioural transformation
programmes. Some of the interventions also investigate the role of non-cognitive
skills. The outcomes studied go beyond the regular labour market outcomes of
employment and wages and include other social outcomes such as risk or vio-
lence.The chapter summarizes the findings of these RCTs and discusses the lessons
10 labour markets in low-income countries
learned about what types of trainings and the (geographic and cultural) contexts
in which these programmes would work. Some additional GLM|LIC projects in-
volving training programmes targeted at women are discussed in Chapter 8, which
focuses on gender dimensions of labour markets in LICs.
Chapter 4 discusses challenges in rural labour markets in LICs, a fundamental
issue given that small-scale farming remains the primary source of income for a
majority of the population in LICs. A GLM|LIC project using labour force sur-
vey data from Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia confirms that the rural sector still
dominates employment in those countries, accounting for 60% of employment in
Kenya and Zambia, and almost 75% in Tanzania. GLM|LIC projects spanning a
number of African countries show that labour markets in rural areas often do not
work efficiently, leaving many distortions in the supply of labour. The chapter also
discusses topics related to credit constraints, harvest cycles, and the challenge of
smoothing consumption over time. A GLM|LIC project that uses nationally rep-
resentative data sets from Ethiopia, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda finds evidence
that there may be an excess supply of labour in rural areas, but with substantial
heterogeneity across cultivation phases, genders, and agro-ecological zones. An
innovative GLM|LIC RCT in Zambia finds evidence that credit constraints influ-
ence the decision of many poor farm households to work in the off-farm wage
labour market rather than work on their own farms during the lean season before
the harvest. This suggests that improved access to credit could increase farm
productivity, help maintain food consumption across the agricultural cycle, and
reduce poverty.
Chapter 4 also addresses the important question of whether Public Works Pro-
grammes (PWPs) are effective. PWPs are very important in many LICs, receiving
large amounts of money from governments and international agencies.These pro-
grammes are designed with a number of goals in mind, including employment
creation, poverty reduction, and infrastructure development. A GLM|LIC project
using a randomized design to study the large-scale Malawi Social Action Fund
found that the programme was not successful in its goal of improving food se-
curity. Another project focuses on India’s massive National Rural Employment
Generating Scheme (NREGS), analysing the impact of making payments directly
to women rather than to their husbands, which is discussed in Chapter 8.
Chapter 5 deals with migration, including rural–urban migration and interna-
tionalmigration.A survey of internationalmigration done forGLM|LICnotes that
international migration flows, while large and important, are smaller than they
were in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Today’s migration pat-
terns are quite different, however, with heavy South–North migration movements
that are linked to large remittance flows and other connections that connect low-
income countries to the international economy. The chapter looks at the impact of
credit and information constraints and discusses evidence on how responsive rural
labour markets are to labour demand shocks. An innovative GLM|LIC ‘big data’
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project uses mobile phone records in Rwanda to track seasonal labour migration,
demonstrating the responsiveness of internal migration to regional wage differ-
ences.Mobile phones also feature in aGLM|LIC project that uses an RCTdesigned
to analyse the impact of mobile banking on remittances between rural and ur-
ban areas in Mozambique. A GLM|LIC project using historical data from Malawi
analyses the impact of remittances from South African mines to Malawi, demon-
strating the large impact international remittances can have on labourmarkets and
entrepreneurial activity in sending countries.
Chapter 5 also looks at forced migration, an important form of migration in
many LICs. The impact of forced migration and its effect on education, skills, and
employment are analysed using evidence from a GLM|LIC project looking at the
labour market impacts of forced migration in the case of the Rwandan genocide,
which resulted in 1million refugees entering Tanzania. Using data before and after
the forced-migration shock, the project shows that greater exposure to the refugee
shock resulted in Tanzanians having a lower likelihood of working outside the
household as employees. Several GLM|LIC projects focusing on women’s labour
market migration are discussed in Chapter 8.
Chapter 6 deals with formality, informality, and regulations. The chapter
discusses issues related to sectoral transformation, economic growth, and employ-
ment and builds on findings from GLM|LIC projects that address these topics
across several countries, including Bangladesh, India, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.
The topic of informality is of particular importance because it accounts for thema-
jority of employment in many LICs, yet its role in the process of economic growth
and its links with the formal sector remain poorly understood. GLM|LIC studies
in both Bangladesh and Vietnam show that the informal sector can play an impor-
tant role in economic development and may not always be simply the ‘last resort’
of workers who are unable to secure formal jobs. The Vietnam study shows that
rapid economic growthwas associated with rapid growth of the formal sector, with
younger cohorts driving the transition. Vietnam’s success story is in stark contrast
with the poor economic performance of Zimbabwe in recent decades. Focusing
on formal and informal manufacturing firms in Zimbabwe, a GLM|LIC study us-
ing longitudinal firm data found evidence of considerable allocative inefficiencies
in firms, dampening growth in the formal manufacturing sector and causing the
sector to grow even more slowly than the overall economy.
Chapter 6 also looks at the question of whether labour costs are too high in
Africa and at the possible role of labourmarket regulation. AGLM|LIC study finds
evidence that countries in sub-Saharan Africa tend to have a high ratio of labour
costs toGDPper capita relative to similar countries outsideAfrica and explores the
possible mechanisms at work. Although the proportion of workers in the formal
sector is still small in LICs, the number of formal workers is on the rise, increasing
the importance of labour market regulations. Chapter 6 discusses two important
types of regulation—social insurance mandates and minimum wages—based on
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evidence fromnew research projects. AGLM|LICproject in Ethiopia evaluated the
impact of a recent pension reform on employment, wages, and other labour mar-
ket outcomes. The study found a decline in employment in smaller firms, a shift of
low-skilled labour into informality, and a shift of larger firms towards higher-
skilled workers. A GLM|LIC analysis of minimum wages across sub-Saharan
Africa found that the minimum wage relative to the mean wage is higher in Africa
than in middle-income countries, though there are large variations across coun-
tries in the extent of coverage, the nature ofminimumwage policies, and the extent
of compliance.
Chapter 7 focuses on children and youth, a critical topic given the young age
structures in many LICs. Drawing on a GLM|LIC synthesis paper, the chapter
analyses trends in child labour across LICs and discusses the links between child
labour and economic growth. Widespread child employment can dampen future
economic growth through its negative impact on child development and depress
current growth by reducing unskilled wages and discouraging the adoption of
skill-intensive technologies. Child employment also appears to be a result, as well
as a cause, of slow economic growth. Rising incomes are associated with a greater
demand for children’s education and leisure and with improvements in the fam-
ily’s ability to buffer economic shocks without child labour. All these factors lead
to declines in the economic activity of children when income levels are on the rise.
The chapter also discusses the challenges to youth employment in LICs, particu-
larly in Africa. While the large cohort of youth entering Africa’s labour force is
better educated than previous cohorts, jobs remain elusive in the formal wage sec-
tor, given the limited success in African economies in structural transformation
from low-productivity agriculture to higher-productivity non-agricultural sectors.
Chapter 8 focuses on the gender dimensions of labour markets in LICs.
Achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls is one of the Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDGs), and gender inequality in the labour market
has been a central theme of theGLM|LICprogramme from the outset.This chapter
presents results from a number of GLM|LIC projects that focus on gender dimen-
sions of labour markets. As discussed in a survey of trends in women’s labour
market activity commissioned by GLM|LIC, labour force participation rates of
women remain low in many low-income countries. While women’s employment
rates tended to increase with economic development and falling fertility rates in
Latin America and some other regions, there has been little or no increase in South
Asian countries, with the notable exception of Bangladesh. A variety of factors ap-
pear to be at work, including rising incomes of husbands, social norms, and the
sectoral composition of economic growth.
A GLM|LIC project analysing the impact of globalization on fertility and
women’s employment found that trade liberalization tends to reduce fertility
in countries with a comparative advantage in sectors with high proportions of
women but found little effect on women’s labour force participation rates. A
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GLM|LIC project in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan analysed the extent to which public
transfer programmes and migrant remittances had a negative impact on women’s
employment. Longitudinal survey data in Kyrgyzstan found low rates of female
labour force participation, with some evidence that transfer programmes reduced
employment, while longitudinal survey data from Tajikistan found no significant
effect of migration and remittances on female labour force participation.
Chapter 8 also looks at the impact of training and employment programmes
targeted at women. As discussed in Chapter 3, training programmes are popular
among governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but the small
proportion of programmes in LICs that have been rigorously evaluated have often
had disappointing results. GLM|LIC has supported novel training programmes
with rigorous evaluation and a number of innovative features, including projects
specifically targeted to women. An example of a programme with positive re-
sults is the Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescents programme in Uganda,
in which vocational and life skills training was found to increase women’s em-
ployment while reducing teen pregnancy and early marriage. A GLM|LIC project
designed to encourage micro-franchising among young women in Nairobi slums
showed promising short-term results but had disappointing long-term outcomes,
perhaps indicating that micro-franchising may not be the economic activity for
these young women.
Chapter 8 also describes GLM|LIC research demonstrating that women’s em-
ployment is affected by their control over finances and access to safe trans-
portation. A GLM|LIC project focusing on India’s National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme, the largest public works programme in the world, found that
women increased their labour force participationwhen theywere given the combi-
nation of bank account, direct deposit of their earnings into the account, and basic
financial instruction. The results suggest that women’s empowerment through
control over finances may increase employment and improve other outcomes.
A GLM|LIC project in Lahore, Pakistan, is analysing the impact on women’s
employment of improved transportation options, with demand assessments in-
dicating that both men and women are more supportive of women working when
women-only transport is available.
Finally, Chapter 9 focuses on the lessons of GLM|LIC research for labour mar-
ket policies and programmes. The chapter addresses the question of what type of
programmes works, and under which conditions. Lessons from projects that had
disappointing results are, in many ways, as informative as lessons from projects
that had positive results. The chapter recaps key points from Chapters 2 to 8
regarding labour market interventions including training programmes, public
works programmes, and programmes designed to reduce labour market frictions
due to imperfect information, transport costs, and barriers to access. The chapter
discusses the lessons fromGLM|LICprojects about theways inwhich social norms
may limit economic activity of women, including examples of howwomen’s labour
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force activity can be increased by removing restrictions on women’s physical mo-
bility and giving women greater control over their own finances. The chapter
also discusses some of the important lessons from GLM|LIC projects about the
importance of rigorous programme evaluation, especially evaluation that allows
long-term follow-up of programme participants. The chapter concludes with brief
overviews of the final round of projects supported by the GLM|LIC programme.
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Barriers to LabourMarket Efficiency
in Low-IncomeCountries
A major challenge in the labour markets of many developing countries is the
difficulty of finding jobs due to a lack of information on where to find them or
how to apply and signal relevant skills. Large disparities in information often exist
between rural and urban areas with respect to the visibility of job openings and
both access to and knowledge of application procedures.
A lack of available information on workers’ hard and soft skills can particularly
affect young workers with less work experience and lower ability to signal their
skills. Other obstacles include a lack of financial resources to cover application
costs, and mobility constraints due to transport infrastructure deficits. Psycho-
logical costs can particularly affect the job searches of women if social norms are
against female labour and pose a risk of harassment. These barriers can lead to
inefficient matching of labour supply and labour demand and restrict economic
growth.
Similar barriers exist on the other side of the market: identifying the best can-
didates can mean high search and screening costs for firms, when applications
are incomplete or simply missing. These costs can prevent firms from gaining
sufficient knowledge of the supply side in general, and of individual workers’ char-
acteristics in particular. This may affect firms’ hiring behaviour, wage setting, and
staff development. Smaller firms may also have limited knowledge or ability to
select the best applicants, or to engage recruitment agencies.
Technological deficits and absence from sectoral recruitment platforms can pre-
vent firms and job seekers matching efficiently through smooth (virtual) job ads
and application processing. Barriers can also restrict small firm expansion if capi-
tal markets are inefficient and the capital is more expensive for smaller businesses
to access. At the other end of the scale, a lack of information may cause larger
firms to use a more capital-intensive production technology, thus reducing their
demand for labour.
Lastly, barriers to market clearing may enlarge the informal labour market; if
workers and firms cannot match efficiently, job seekers may search for job oppor-
tunities outside the formal labour market, which in turn can hamper economic
growth. In this respect, low attendance may severely constrain firms if workers
Labour Markets in Low-Income Countries. David Lam and Ahmed Elsayed, Oxford University Press.
© David Lam and Ahmed Elsayed (2022). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192897107.003.0002
16 labour markets in low-income countries
decide voluntarily to take up informal work on a day-to-day basis or are hindered
by transport inefficiencies.
Therefore, examining the barriers to market clearing and job matching in
low-income countries is not only of theoretical interest—it also serves to bet-
ter understand the basic needs labour markets have if they are to function well.
Active labour market policies and other policy interventions aiming to fight
poverty and enhance poor households’ welfare risk failure if these fundamental
market relations are dysfunctional.
The Growth and Labour Markets in Low-Income Countries Programme has
addressed these issues in a number of research projects that enrich our picture of
market-clearance barriers and strategies to overcome them. The available studies
evaluate existing interventions to improve labour market efficiency and equity in
several LICs. Their main findings are summarized in this chapter.
2.1 The Impact of Information Frictions in Incomplete
LabourMarkets
Constraints on information are among themost prevalent barriers tomarket clear-
ing in low-income economies. If firms are not able to get relevant information
about the skills of job applicants due to incomplete or missing applications, this
will necessarily affect their personnel strategies. In the absence of conclusive ap-
plications, skill certifications, or otherwise clear signals about workers’ abilities,
firms are forced to base their hiring decisions on job referrals and previous work
experience.
If (young) workers lack these signals, they are at high risk of being pushed
outside the formal market. A lack of opportunity or ability to signal their gen-
eral qualifications and job-specific skills will inevitably affect not just their actual
application chances, but eventually their search behaviour, their choice between
formality and informality, their mobility patterns, and their education decisions.
There is therefore a substantial danger of information barriers aroundworkers’
skill profiles restricting the efficient allocation of resources.
There are also information frictions in the opposite direction. Potential job ap-
plicants, especially new entrants to the labourmarket, may have difficulty learning
about available jobs, discovering about the process of applying for jobs, and may
face high costs searching for jobs.
GLM|LIC research projects illustrate how overcoming informational con-
straints, in terms of workers’ hard (i.e., specific and technical) and soft skills
(i.e., those dealing more with personality traits, e.g., communication, time man-
agement, team work, etc.) does not necessarily require costly policy interventions.
Supported by GLM|LIC, a set of studies evaluated two job-search support and
skills-signalling programmes, as well as the outcomes of job fairs for urban youth
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in urban Ethiopia (Addis Ababa). Its aim was to identify ways to help young
workers in large low-income cities find and secure jobs (Abebe et al. 2017, 2020a,
2020b). Young workers at the entry level are faced with special challenges in
accessing firms that often base their selection criteria on work experience or
written applications, while many young people in large cities do not even know
about job openings due to less extensive personal networks, spatial distance, and
other information barriers. As a result, many young people leave large cities to be
precariously self-employed in nearby peripheral or rural areas.
A number of studies have shed some light on obstacles—such as job search costs
and information deficits—that prevent young urban job seekers from signalling
their skills to the market (see, for example, Card et al. 2011; Pallais 2014). Yet little
is known so far about overcoming such barriers under the special conditions of
low-income urban societies facing high population growth rates and high youth
unemployment (see, for example, Kluve 2016; McKenzie 2017). More intensified
research in the field would be highly relevant in order to evaluate and modify
existing policy strategies in this context. This may also contribute to addressing
poverty traps and weakening crime and emigration incentives, and thus deserves
full policy attention.
So far, research has been mostly focused on programmes that aim to connect
rural workers to jobs in developing countries’ urban areas. Here, search support
and information have been evaluated as a useful and effective strategy to reduce
search frictions (see, for example, Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak 2014; Jensen
2012). Do such strategies also work in congested urban centres with widespread
informality and precarious employment? There is also the growing research con-
sensus that traditional active labour market policies based on an overall ‘average’
do little to influence whether participants take up a job or not. Can better targeting
help to overcome this deficit?
Franklin (2018) showed that a transport subsidy offer had at least positive short-
term effects on young job seekers in Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa. Building on
these findings, Abebe et al. (2017, 2020a) used a randomized sample of more than
3,000 young inhabitants of the same city to study the effect of direct transport
subsidies, as well as the results of a workshop designed to assess and certify cogni-
tive abilities and improve their job application skills. These analyses are the first to
simultaneously quantify the relative importance of two different types of frictions
and compare the effects of two active labour market interventions.
According to the studies, both of these rather simple and cheap treatments
substantially increased the short-term chances of a worker taking up a new or
better job under the specific, highly challenging conditions of a rapidly expand-
ing urban labour market. The studies further show that job application training
may induce sustainable effects on formal employment, job duration and work
satisfaction, while the impact of transport subsidies seems to dissipate over
time.
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The experimental interventions were aimed at reducing spatial and informa-
tional barriers to improve employment for the most disadvantaged groups in the
labour market. The transport subsidy was designed to induce more frequent visits
to urban centre job vacancy boards by reimbursing the costs. Baseline survey data
revealed that those living 10 km closer to the urban centre screened city job boards
almost seven times more per year and applied for permanent jobs more often.
The application training aimed to improve workers’ ability to signal their skills.
Better signalling ability is among the most effective factors in enhancing the em-
ployability of lower-educated workers, enabling them to overcome unemployment
and poorly paid temporary, casual or self-employment.
Such poorly paid roles are widespread inAddis Ababa, as inmany growing cities
in low-income countries: roughly 65% of the young people surveyed in the stud-
ies were employed, but only 25% had a formal contract, and less than 20% were
permanently employed. The vast majority of this group is living on informal, inse-
cure, or precarious employment,mostly lackingwritten contracts, regular working
weeks, and social security, while about 20% are unemployed.
Abebe et al. (2017, 2020a) conducted two follow-up surveys eight months and
four years after treatment to explore changes in workers’ individual job search
and employment situations. Attrition was rather low, with more than 90% of par-
ticipants taking part in the first follow-up and over 85% remaining after four
years.
Thetransport subsidy treatment:Given that job searching is costly, forcing job
seekers in LICs to either rely on social networks or to travel to find information
on local job openings, the programme offered a modest daily transport subsidy
to the participants (up to three times per week and lasting a median of sixteen
weeks between September 2014 and January 2015 for each recipient). Recipients
were required to pay for the first journey themselves and collect the daily subsidy
at a disbursement office in Addis Ababa, close to a central bus station and in the
neighbourhood of major job vacancy boards that represent one of the most pop-
ular job search methods. Around 50% of the participants randomly selected into
the transport subsidy treatment group made use of the subsidy at least once; 81%
of them did so at least once again and intensified their travelling in search of jobs.
Overall, 74% took the subsidy at least once a week during the entire study period,
resulting in an average total of sixteen subsidy-collections. The marginal costs of
the intervention per individual were below 20 USD, based on a per-day subsidy
of around 1 USD that roughly equalled 10% of the overall median spending all
participants had for themselves in a week.
The job application treatment: The training workshop was designed in close
cooperation with the School of Commerce at Addis Ababa University—an
institution offering personnel selection services which are widely accepted and
trusted among many medium and large firms in the city. In addition, a number
of qualitative interviews with firm managers were conducted to better tailor the
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content of tests administered to the participants. During the first one-day session,
job seekers took tests to assess their cognitive abilities as well as a work-sample
test (for example, taking minutes during a meeting, working on tasks under
time pressure). The resulting certificates could be personally collected later at the
School of Commerce.The secondworkshop day was dedicated tomaking effective
job applications, focusing on CV and application letter writing, and preparing
for job interviews. Out of the group of randomly identified participants, 61%
attended the workshop (September–October 2014) while 80% of the workshop
participants picked up their certificates. However, not all certified participants
made use of the certificate: only 42% of those who collected the certificate and
sent their applications to one or more positions reported including the certificates
and receiving a positive reaction from firms. Marginal costs for each participant
were around 18 USD.
2.1.1 Significant Short-Term Effects on Job Quality,
but not on Overall Employment
Abebe et al. (2017, 2020a) applied rigorous evaluation methods to assess the
effectiveness of both treatments in the short and long term. It should be noted that
neither the transport subsidies nor the training workshop had a significant short-
term impact on employment probability, work hours, earnings, or job satisfaction.
The modest average increases in employment probability, by 3.8 percentage points
for transport subsidy recipients, and by 2 percentage points for workshop par-
ticipants, are both statistically insignificant. These results align with other recent
studies in finding that conventional strategies of active labourmarket programmes
in developing countries often fail to establish more than very modest effects on
overall employment (see Groh et al. 2012; Jensen 2012; McKenzie and Woodruff
2014; Crépon and van den Berg 2016).
However, the conclusion is not that the interventions did not fulfil their purpose;
they were not intended to increase overall employment, but rather to foster formal
and permanent employment, especially for disadvantaged groups. In this regard,
the interventions led to noticeable improvements within a couple of months: the
analyses show impressively large positive effects on the probability of finding a sta-
ble permanent or formal job (with a written contract), and a remarkable increase
in employment rates and earnings among the most disadvantaged job seekers.
Both the transport support and the workshop gave workers the incentive and
momentum to look for work more frequently and more efficiently in the short
term.
What were the short-term outcomes of the project?
1. The job application workshop did not affect the probability of searching
for a job or the number of applications sent out to potential employers.
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Prevailing financial constraints not targeted by the workshop prevented
participants from searching with more intensity (see Figure 2.1).
2. Training of job application skills had a large effect on job quality through
increased search efficacy and certificationof skills. Eight months after the
workshop, participants were almost 60% more likely to work in a perma-
nent job, and roughly 30% were more likely to have a job in the formal
labour market. In the control group, 17% had a formal job; this value was
5 percentage points higher in the treatment group. That is, workshop par-
ticipation did not intensify job search but it did make job search more
successful.
3. This job quality effect is concentrated among low-educated workers.
High-school graduates without further education received an offer of a per-
manent job every 4.6 applications—hence theywere farmore successful than
control group individuals, who received a job offer for every 10.5 appli-
cations. The workshop apparently elevated the quality of applications and
hence the likelihood of success.
4. The transport subsidy treatment had similar short-run effects on a lower
level. Making use of the transport subsidies stimulated the probability of
permanent employment, as well as formal employment, by around 30%.
This can be explained by the fact that most formal and permanent jobs
are announced on the job boards, which were screened more frequently by
transport subsidy recipients.
5. Receiving transport subsidies reduced the urgent need towork for a daily
living and thus induced more intensive job search activities. While sub-
sidized, the programme participants were 12.5% more likely to engage in
any job search activity and showed a 9 percentage-point higher probability
to search for a job at the vacancy boards compared with the control group,
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representing an increase of about 30%. This effect decreased at a steady rate
after stopping the transport subsidy programme (see Figure 2.2).
6. Asaresultofworkshopparticipation, youngerand less experiencedwork-
ers partially caught upwith older workers. The gap in permanent employ-
ment between young and older workers fell by roughly 20%.
7. Both treatmentswere cost-efficient at rather low costs per participant. An
approximate calculation reveals rather modest costs of, on average, about
365 USD for each job seeker helped into a formal job by transport subsidies,
and 344USD for placedworkshop participants.The estimated costs for help-
ing a worker into a permanent job through workshop attendance are about
264 USD. According to the authors, these figures are equivalent to 2.7–3.7
times mean wage monthly earnings.
8. Disadvantaged groups benefited most from both treatments. The short-
term effect on job quality was largest among participants who had not yet
actively searched for a job, had no earlier work experience, or only low sav-
ings. While better-educated programme participants hardly benefited at all,
the impact on lower-qualified workers (high school) and women was very
strong. The probabilities of women finding permanent and formal work
both increased by 35% when they received transport subsidies; attending
the workshop raised their chance of finding permanent employment by 45%
and the likelihood of securing a formal contract by 35%. At the same time
individualswith no education beyond a high-school diploma saw their prob-
ability of finding permanent employment increase by 10 percentage points
after workshop participation, and by 5 percentage points after using finan-
cial transport support. In other words, the workshop tripled the chances
of a permanent job for this group while the transport subsidy doubled it.
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The probability of being formally employed increased by above 30% for the
low-qualified.
9. Indirect effects of the treatment approachmay occur in so far as changing
the search behaviour of non-participants with the same characteristics living
in clusters assigned to the programme, when the proportion of treated job
seekers is low in a cluster (these effects may turn negative as the proportion
increases).
Abebe et al. (2017) further investigated a variation of effects depending on
the distance of participants from the town centre. In cities like Addis Ababa
employment opportunities decreased with the spatial distance from the city cen-
tre, resulting in a high prevalence of self-employment in the periphery. The
programme—the transport subsidy in particular—proved to address this prob-
lem. Upon receiving the transport treatment, respondents who reside far from the
centre were less likely to be self-employed and become as likely to be self-employed
as individuals who lived close. These results can be viewed as suggestive evidence
that spatial barriers influence the occupational structure of urban labour markets
and that enhancing mobility can help unravelling such spatial patterns.
2.1.2 Do the Positive Effects of Application Training Last?
Expanding the findings of their first study, Abebe et al. (2020a) investigated the
longer-term impact of both treatments over a period of four years. The signalling
effects of workshop participation not only persisted but extended to a positive
impact onworkers’ earnings and job satisfaction.The transport subsidywasmean-
while limited to short-term effects and had no significant impact in the longer
term. Both the inability to signal skills and the cost of job searching presented
temporary barriers to formal employment, but only the signalling constraints had
a lasting impact on labour market outcomes.
1. Employment duration and utilization of workers’ skills increased over
time. Job duration was 10% longer for workshop participants, while they
were 8 percentage points more likely to be in jobs suited to their skills four
years after treatment.
2. Thepositive impactonworkers andfirmspersistsover time. Match quality
increased through workers’ better search focus and firms’ better targeting of
job offers.
3. This higher match quality translated into higher earnings. Four years
after workshop participation workers earned 25% more than individuals in
the control group, indicating a clear advantage from learning how to apply
for a job and how to signal skills to the market. Over time, permanent and
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formal employment were increasingly correlated. These earnings effects are
mainly due to higher productivity andwages, rather than driven by selection
into a specific employment. In other words, learning how to signal skills led
to better job match quality.
4. Lower-educated workers experienced larger effects on job quality and
earnings than higher-qualified workers. The intervention thus reduces the
earnings gap between lower- and higher-educated workers, illustrating the
gains improved signalling has on labour market outcomes.
5. The long-term earnings effects far outstrip the costs of the treatment.
Hence scaling up is a policy option.
6. Job satisfaction increased by 7 percentage points on average, hinting at
better job quality of workshop participants.
7. Rates of formal and permanent employment aligned between workshop
participants and control group, showing some catch-up effect among the
control group over time.
8. The initial effects of transport subsidies on job quality eroded over time
with no statistically significant difference to the control group in terms of
permanent and formal employment.
Abebe et al. (2020a) argued that, given the strongly dissipating effects of the
transport subsidy, the financial cost of job search do not seem to constrain effi-
cient job searching and job quality over the long term. This conclusion might well
be doubted, even if the treatment did by definition not contribute to increasing
firms’ screening abilities and did not affect match quality. In fact, the subsidy was
very limited in scope and still achieved a significant short-term impact on job-
search behaviour. Extending it over a longer period could actually lead to different
outcomes in the longer run than those observed in the experiment. Furthermore,
the findings implicitly reveal that combining different treatments—application
training, job search subsidies, and other interventions—might result in synergistic
effects.
This begs the question of whether scaling up application trainingwould increase
the positive effects, and overall welfare, through more efficient matching in the
labourmarket. Based on the empirical evidence, Abebe et al. (2020a) rightly stated
that the share of lower-educated workers who would face the risk of being pushed
aside in a labour market more reliant on skills certification or signalling would be
rather small, given the frequency of job opportunities for lower-educated work-
ers. Inflation of applications should not be a concern either, as the experimental
findings clearly indicate that job search intensity does not change significantly.
Lastly, the research results on job duration contradict the concern that over-
selling skills could lead to reduced match quality in the event that firms have
limited ability to screen candidates. Statutory probation periods—as required by
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law in Ethiopia—could further reduce this risk. The core finding that experimen-
tal workers obtained more permanent and more formal jobs in the short term and
observed higher earnings in the long term, should give policymakers reason to
pursue this promising and cost-efficient approach.
2.1.3 Are Job Fairs a Useful Tool for Addressing Matching Constraints
in Incomplete Labour Markets?
One potential accompanying approach for addressing informational barriers with
respect to workers’ skills has been examined by Abebe et al. (2020b). In random-
izing participation in job fairs among 1,000 young educated job seekers and some
250 representatives of large firms, this study complements the findings provided
by Abebe et al. (2017, 2020a).
For the experiment, two job fairs were organized in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in
2014 and 2015. To facilitate interaction and to distinguish treatment effects, job
seekers participating in the first fair were given concrete recommendations on
which firms would suit them best. To prepare for the second job fair, job seek-
ers also received a complete list of job vacancies among all firms represented at
the fair. In addition, firms received a list of job candidates’ skills profiles, allow-
ing them to indicate their selection of favourites. Detailed surveys were conducted
prior to the first fair and some months after the second.
Take-up rates of 60% among job seekers and roughly 70% among firms were
low compared to the workshop and subsidy treatments described above. Despite
a high interaction rate—75% of workers had at least one interview with a firm
representative—the overall employment impact was disappointing: a total of four-
teen hires from seventy-six job offers made to forty-five job seekers, presumably
due to a mismatch of expectations. More jobs (fifty-five) were offered to low-
skilled workers. Firms stated that a lack of work experience was a key constraint
to offering more jobs to high-skilled job seekers at the fairs.
Nonetheless, the experiment revealed some positive indirect learning effects
with regard to workers’ and firms’ expectations and search behaviour. At the time
of the endline survey, both firms and workers were found to have adjusted and
increased their search efforts. Workers also revised their wage expectations. It was
mainly low-skilled workers, reducing the minimum wage they were willing to ac-
cept, who visited the job vacancy boards more often and experienced a substantial
increase in their probability of taking up a formal job. The study once more illus-
trates that a mismatch of expectations on both sides of the market may be a severe
constraint that must be addressed to increase the effectiveness of active labour
market policies in low-income countries.
In summary, Abebe et al. (2017, 2020a, 2020b) provided convincing evidence
that spatial and informational barriers are highly relevant factors determining
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employment outcomes in rapidly growing urban regions of LICs, thereby confirm-
ing and building on findings in Franklin (2018). Overcoming these obstacles may
primarily benefit the most disadvantaged groups in city societies: women, youth,
and peoplewith lower qualifications. Taking part in a job applicationworkshop en-
ables disadvantaged participants to better signal their abilities and find a job. Using
modest transport subsidies to overcome distance barriers meanwhile helps to in-
crease mobility as well as formal employment, and helps reduce self-employment
levels, at least in the short-term. Improving workers’ ability to signal their skills
should then be seen as a key tool for addressing inequality in the labour market.
Furthermore, the results underline the high value and cost efficiency of inter-
vening at the entry-level of workers. Such programmes are likely to have indirect
treatment effects (though this is not yet thoroughly evaluated) of accelerating job
matching, due to increased job applications, and reducing job turnover due to
stronger qualification signals. Active labour market policies should pay explicit
attention to such simple interventions that reduce skill information and matching
frictions and could work in many developing countries.
The outcomes of the job fair and job application treatments emphasize the point:
information barriers are hampering market clearing. If valuable skills go unseen
by firms, this disadvantages the most vulnerable groups in the labour market.
At the same time, the findings reveal how policy interventions could tackle these
constraints, for example by supporting skills certification, implementing suitable
information channels, or facilitating the acquisition of work experience and firm
contacts for workers by certifying internships.
To investigate this topic further, GLM|LIC supported a research project on the
role of informational barriers in the low-income economy of Uganda (Bassi and
Nansamba 2020). The authors conducted a large field experiment in an urban set-
ting, revealing that both sides of the market react positively to the provision of
additional information about skills in the absence of certifying institutions, and
that the probability of a job offer increases with the level of certified soft skills. The
analysis concludes that introducing a mandatory certification policy on soft skills
might offer a policy strategy to tackle information frictions, but at a significant risk
of welfare losses for the lowest-skilled workers.
The field experiment was conducted in 2015 and addressed two important as-
pects of informational constraints in incomplete labour markets: (1) a matching
component randomly selected potential employees for job interviews with a firm,
to address the deficits in information on each other; (2) a signalling component
provided certification of applicants’ soft skills, in terms of work ethics and inter-
personal skills, to measure the impact of disclosing additional information not yet
available to both workers and employers.
The impact of the signalling approach is, by and large, in line with research
findings on the positive effect on hiring probabilities and welfare among higher-
performing workers (see Pallais 2014), that results from the certification of skills
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on job search activities, employment, and earnings (see Carranza et al. 2020), as
well as the disclosure of additional information on workers’ abilities in an online
labour market. Reference letters—as another form of signalling—may have posi-
tive employment outcomes for youth and female workers (see Abel, Burger, and
Piraino 2020). Collectively, matching frictions—further constrained by informa-
tional barriers—are particularly relevant in developing countries (see Donovan,
Lu, and Schoellman 2018).
To begin with, it should be noted that the target group of Bassi and Nansamba
(2020) were not unemployed disadvantaged young people but instead medium-
skilled vocational training graduates. To allow this entry-level group to suffer
information frictions in the labour market poses an even larger risk of wast-
ing human capital by impeding job matching. Conversely, a successful signalling
intervention should result in larger employment returns compared with other
groups.
The set of soft skills measured and certified during the experiment was based on
the preferences firm owners stated in the baseline survey, and included the follow-
ing five characteristics: attendance, communication skills, creativity, trustworthi-
ness, and willingness to help others (see Figure 2.3—pro-sociality and discipline
were excluded for attention constraints). Notably, attendance was explicitly clas-
sified by firm managers as a soft skill that they find difficult to observe yet value
highly. This hints at significant levels of absenteeism—a frequent phenomenon in
the developing world (see Chaudhury et al. 2006).
Each skill was graded on an A–E scale—mirroring the Ugandan educational
grading system—by the trainees’ teachers and authors’ assessment based on a
questionnaire (creativity), and a trust game with real money (trustworthiness).
This innovative experimental setting allowed the authors to examine reactions
on both sides of the market, and to assess whether: (1) managers alter their re-
cruitment behaviour, and (2) whether workers’ employment opportunities change
based on the provision of soft skills certificates.
In cooperationwith the non-profit organization BRACUganda—a key player in
development and micro-finance programmes in many developing countries—the
research team selected almost 1,100 eligible small and medium firms in seventeen
urban areas in Uganda. Each operated in one of six selected sectors (carpentry,
catering, hairdressing, motor mechanics, tailoring, and welding) with at least two
employees. The researchers also selected more than 1,000 eligible young workers
who had completed their vocational training in one of the six sectors. The selected
sectors represent a large share of theUgandan labourmarket, withmost vocational
training institutes (VTI) offering related courses. The focus on young workers is
motivated by the higher likelihood of information frictions among this group, and
also the high—and growing—share of the youth labour force in Uganda.
Most firms in the study sample were formally registered, employed at least
four workers, and required market experience of at least five years. Those who
















































Fig. 2.3 Information on Applicants’ Soft Skills Valued Most Among Firms in Uganda
Note: Data from baseline survey of 422 firms interested in being matched. Firm owners were asked to
rate on a 0–10 scale (not important at all/extremely important), how important it would be for them
to be provided with additional information on different soft skills of job candidates during
recruitment. Figure depicts mean importance given to each skill.
Source: Bassi and Nansamba (2020)
completed a baseline survey were invited to participate in a BRAC programme
that facilitated job interviews with ‘fresh’ VTI graduates, without being told of
the detailed nature of the experiment. Of the survey sample, 422 firms agreed
to participate. The authors’ indicator variables show that smaller firms in male-
dominated sectors such as welding, motor mechanics, and carpentry were more
likely to participate, indicating a larger demand for labour in these sectors.
Firm owners mostly acted as personnel and hiring managers. Managers with
higher cognitive ability (tested as part of the survey) headedmore profitable firms,
according to the authors. On the whole, they declared a substantial interest in the
non-cognitive skills of potential employees, despite believing them difficult to ob-
serve, and relatively scarce. They ranked soft skills second after practical skills,
viewing them as more relevant than numeracy and literacy from the firm’s per-
spective. Difficulties in assessing job applicants’ soft skills were reported as more
important than general problems with finding employees or evaluating their prac-
tical skills. In contrast, firm managers reported low expectations of the likelihood
of finding employees with solid soft skills, while judging worker theft themost im-
portant firm constraint, above a lack of access to capital or a lack of demand (see
Figures 2.4 and 2.5).














































Fig. 2.4 Returns to Various Skills as Perceived by Firm Owners in Uganda
Note: Data from baseline survey of 422 firms interested in being matched. Firm owners were asked to
rate on a 0–10 scale (not important at all/extremely important) the importance of workers’ skills for
their businesses. Figure depicts mean importance given to each skill. Column ‘Soft Skills’ reports the
average value of five skills.
Source: Bassi and Nansamba (2020)
Importantly,more than one-third of employees—among all firms in the baseline
survey—were hired through an informal channel without any formal assessment
or referral (see Figure 2.6). Typically, job offers are made at the end of the job
interview, reflecting the risk of additional costs for the firm if it later proves difficult
to contact applicants due to inadequate communication technologies.
Eligible vocational training graduates had a median age of 20 with eleven years
of education prior to a two-year programme of vocational training (with hair-
dressing and motor mechanics being most popular). Of them, 60% planned to
search for a formal sector job in a smaller business, 10% already had a job of-
fer, and 25% had some previous work experience. Vocational training in Uganda
does not usually include soft skill components and is limited in terms of job place-
ment activities. There are no private institutions offering soft skills assessment and
certification.
All trainees were informed that BRAC would arrange job interviews and mea-
sure cognitive and non-cognitive skills, before offering these measurements to
potential employers. Of the trainees, 787 confirmed their interest, and took part
in a cognitive test and questionnaire to measure their soft skills. The authors’































































































Fig. 2.5 Importance of Business Constraints as Perceived by Firm Owners in Uganda
Note: Data from baseline survey of 422 firms interested in being matched. Firm owners were asked to
rate on a 1–5 scale (not important at all/extremely important) the importance of these potential
constraints workers’ skills for their businesses. Figure reports percentage of firm owners that
answered 4 or above on the scale for each constraint.
Source: Bassi and Nansamba (2020)
statistical analysis shows that trainees with a higher level of non-cognitive skills,
as captured in the experiment, were more likely to remain in the sample, which
reveals some self-selection of participants. Trainees with very low levels of soft
skills were the least likely to be interested in the experiment, while workers with
higher levels of soft skills apparently expected greater returns from signalling their
soft skills to potential employers. More generally, this indicates the role of self-
selection of potential workers as a primary driver determining the outcomes of
labour policy programmes (see Hardy and McCasland 2017).
With this setting, Bassi and Nansamba (2020) allocated workers and firms to
sectoral and regional ‘submarkets’, and randomly separated treatment and con-
trol groups within each of these. Grouped firms and workers were then randomly
matched again for over 1,200 face-to-face job interviews, where 50%of the trainees
and firms corresponded to the control group. In the end, 515 (42%) job interviews
took place, with 32% of workers not attending due to their loss of interest and
30% of the firms withdrawing themselves also due to lost interest. The final survey
sample remained balanced, though; the study found no evidence of out-selection
of a specific group of firms and/or workers.
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Fig. 2.6 Most Frequent Recruitment Channels among Surveyed Firms in Uganda
Note: Frequency of recruitment channels for the workers employed at baseline in the sample of
firms included in the matching–signalling experimental intervention.
Source: Bassi and Nansamba (2020)
Both the treatment and control groups took part in the matching module of
the experiment, while only workers and firms in the treatment groups received
signalling about workers’ soft skills, in the form of an ‘official’ signed certificate
stating the degree in each of the five workers’ soft skills.
A random half of all job interviews took place without workers and firms be-
ing given any prior information on soft skills scores. Instead participating trainees
received a placebo document only confirming programme participation. For the
other half of interviews, a detailed soft skills certificate was given and explained to
each participating trainee on the day of interview by BRAC staff members. BRAC
staff also showed the transcript to the employer at the start of the interview (which
then proceeded unobserved). The original document remained with the workers
for further use. Its high value among workers is underlined by the fact that con-
trol group participants reported a willingness to pay 44% of their average monthly
earnings to receive one.
To examine the impact of the signalling experiment, firm owners were surveyed
again sixmonths after treatment, while workers took part in two follow-up surveys
after twelve and twenty-six months.
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2.1.4 Does Signalling Skills Positively Affect Job Matching,
Employment, and Welfare Outcomes?
The outcomes of this experiment are enlightening in that they underline the im-
portance of removing informational barriers on both sides of the market that
restrict efficient job matching:
1. On the demand side, signalling of skills increased belief in workers’ abili-
ties. Firm owners with higher cognitive abilities, as noted by a further survey
on their abilities undergone by the researchers, reported that access to soft
skills information helped them to view applicantsmore positively, and above
their expectations. Controlling formanager heterogeneity confirms that this
effect is not limited to the highest-score experimental workers but applies
also to average workers. As downward revisions of beliefs in the abilities
of the lowest-certified applicants were limited, the signalling intervention
provided, on the whole, positive information to higher-ability managers.
This revision of beliefs can have positive side effects in the recruitment pro-
cess, even if the certified applicant did not get a job offer, or if they rejected
it. Low-ability firm managers, however, revised their beliefs to a far lower
extent.
2. The cognitive and managerial ability of firm managers appears to be
closely related to the size of informational barriers. Higher-ability man-
agers already: employed more skilled workers prior to the experiment;
showed a strong tendency to update their belief in workers’ skills and re-
sponsiveness following the signalling experiment; and were 13 percentage
points more likely to hire a worker after the job interview. Low-ability firm
owners, by and large, did not change their hiring behaviour in response to
information disclosure; on average their workforce was less educated than
the experimental trainee. This finding indicates a strong need for additional
training in managerial skills among firm owners.
3. On the supply side, the signalling intervention led high-scoring trainees
to revise theirbelief in their employability and searchbehaviourupwards.
In the two years following the treatment, they reported: 7% higher expected
earnings; 5% higher expected employment likelihood; a higher willingness
to bargain for job contracts and wages; fewer problems to signal their skills
to potential employers; and a stronger orientation towards larger firms and
the public sector. At the same time, they were 15% less likely to be casu-
ally working. That is, while search intensity did not increase on average, the
direction of job search changed significantly.
This change in beliefs and behaviourwas apparently not based on learning
their soft skills, but on the value of the certificates in signalling such skills.
Awareness of soft skills scores remained high in the two-year survey. Over
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90% of all participants reported they still had the certificate two years after
treatment, while 74% stated they were using it in job search activities. In a
divergence from traditional firm-based job test schemes that do not disclose
results to job applicants, the experiment denied firms an informational ad-
vantage by signalling test scores to both sides of the market. This allowed
applicants to reach out to other job opportunities as well.
4. Thelevel ofmanagerial abilities of firmowners seems to be closely related
to the role firms can play in reducing or retaining informational barriers
in the labour market. If managers do not respond to signalling, the out-
comes for workers are doubtful. This finding hints at the need for better
training in managerial skills.
5. The signalling treatment led to a higher probability of acquiring ad-
ditional human capital. While low-scoring workers benefited most
from a rise in wage employment, high-scoring workers were roughly
4 percentage points more likely to have invested in additional education
or training compared to the control group. This indicates a complementary
dynamic between the certifying and acquiring of skills.
6. Positive assortativematchingwas increased through the certificates. Hir-
ing intensity among the participating firms did not change on average, but
higher-ability managers were more likely to employ workers with certifi-
cates. This was based on the managers’ better judgement of qualifications
and the positive self-selection of applicants in recognizing their soft skills.
7. Thecertificates didnot affect overall employmentbutdid induce a change
in the allocation of workers to firms. While higher-scoring workers were
more likely to be employed in firms with higher-ability managers, their
employment likelihood in lower-ability firms was reduced given that the
applicants significantly increased the minimum wage they were willing to
accept. Employment gains reported by job applicants in the follow-up sur-
veys stemmed from workers having found jobs in other firms (see Figure
2.7). Overall, workers were no more likely to be wage workers or self-
employed at the time of the follow-up surveys, nor did the treatment affect
the number of hours worked in the last job. Fewer than fifty workers were
hired as a result of the treatment, while even fewer were still employed at the
matched firm two years after treatment.
8. The research did not find any impact of the signalling treatment on self-
employment probability, suggesting that skills certification makes its im-
pact by proving skills to potential employers, rather than by increasing
self-confidence, risk behaviour, and entrepreneurship willingness among
workers.
9. Average earnings increased due to the transition of workers tomore pro-
ductive jobs. According to the authors’ statistical analysis, the certification
treatment led to an 11% rise in monthly earnings relative to the control


































Fig. 2.7 Impacts of Soft Skills Certificates on Paid Employment and Earnings in
Uganda
Note: Estimated impacts averaged over two years post-intervention (percentage increase over the
control mean). The black bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
Source: Bassi, Nansamba, and Rasul (2018)
group average (see Figure 2.7).This can be explained byworkers successfully
searching for better job opportunities in the post-intervention period, by en-
gaging in further education and retreating fromcasualwork.On the demand
side, the availability of soft skills information, and the fact that higher-ability
firm owners with more productive businesses respond stronger to the cer-
tification, may induce higher wages for certified applicants. This finding
confirms the role of beliefs and behaviour, and the importance of tackling
informational barriers in terms of workers’ unobserved skills.
2.1.5 Is Mandatory or Voluntary Country-Wide Certification of Skills
a Realistic Policy Option?
Given that the outcomes of the skills certification programme described above
were overall rather positive, and at a low cost of 19 USD per worker, the study
assumes cost-effectiveness of the intervention even under a conservative scenario.
Self-reported advantages in worker screening through the certificate, extension
of job interview duration, and an upward revision of the ideal size of the firm’s
workforce among higher-ability managers, provide some indication of potentially
lasting effects on firms’ recruiting behaviour. Thus, to discuss upscaling a cer-
tificate intervention or even adopting mandatory soft skills certification appears
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plausible initially. However, Bassi and Nansamba (2020) have advised caution, as
the impact on overall welfare may be ambiguous.
The additional information provided by the certificate allows firms to identify
more appropriate workers but can also make hiring them more expensive as they
become aware of alternative options. The certificate appears to incentivize high-
scoring workers to find a job on their own initiative or gain further education,
and to help lower-scoring workers get hired. In fact, the most significant gains
of the signalling programme in terms of job offers and hires were found in the
middle of the skills distribution: high-scoring workers did not enjoy a substantial
increase in job offers, yet they faced large incentives to change their search and
education behaviour, while lowest-scoring workers partially self-selected out of
the programme.
If these groups were included in a voluntary or mandatory scheme, undesired
effects would presumably occur. Both schemes would have similar effects with re-
spect to ‘outing’ low-scoring workers. Not being able to provide a certificate would
give a negative signal to firm managers, independently of voluntary or mandatory
requirements. Firm managers showing a high interest in certain soft skills would
sift out the workers with the lowest-certified additional skills, thus decreasing their
job opportunities and potentially pushing them into the informal job sector.
Hencemandatory or voluntary skills certificationmay induce a better allocation
of labour, produce net welfare gains, and increase inequality among workers at the
same time. Policies aimed at overcoming information barriers in the recruitment
process need to take account of the trade-off between (1) a better allocation of
resources based on additional information, and (2) the risk of disadvantaging or
even stigmatizing workers.
On the other hand, as Bassi and Nansamba (2020) argued, upscaling a certifi-
cation programme may be the best answer to this trade-off between efficiency and
equity. The study revealed positive effects on human capital formation among par-
ticipating workers that could be enhanced, if the certification programme served
as a systematic incentive to increase education, independently of the programme.
Upscaling a skills certification scheme would imply the provision of indepen-
dent, reputable certification institutions. The authors rightly note that it would
need significant effort to establish the credibility of new institutions, while entrust-
ing vocational training institutes with this task could affect enrolment decisions
among low-skilled trainees in the event that their expectations on their soft skills
as signalled by a certificate are too low.
The low take-up rate in the experimental setting, in terms of hires resulting from
jobmatching, deserves further research as it aligns with other research confirming
rather weak responses to matching treatments (see for example Alfonsi et al. 2017
for a youth employment experiment in Uganda). While low take-up should not be
viewed as an indicator of low treatment relevance, it remains uncertain whether
upscaling would substantially increase employment outcomes.
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Apart from that, the results of this GLM|LIC research project underline that
information barriers at the point of recruitment can help to explain the lim-
ited success of policies aimed at jobmatching in developing economies (see for
example Groh et al. 2015; Beam 2016; Alfonsi et al. 2017; Abebe et al. 2020a).
Distributing skills information to both sides of the job market, and positive self-
selection of applicants, can help to better target such policies and to facilitate job
market screening by firms. As a secondary measure, supporting training in man-
agerial skills and the setting up of firm-based assessment modules for soft skills
could further enhance the efficiency of this approach.
2.2 What Constrains LabourDemand for Firms in Sub-Saharan
Africa?
Barriers to market efficiency may result from imbalances in the distribution of
labour between small and larger firms in low-income countries. If labour supply
is more driven to smaller businesses with less productivity and lower wages, or to
small-scale self-employment, total economic growth and workers’ welfare may be
negatively impacted, especially given population growth in the developing world.
Whether such a trend towards small firms can be observed in Ghana’s manu-
facturing sector has been examined in a research project supported by GLM|LIC.
Teal (2017) explored rich census and panel data to identify employment expan-
sion patterns among small and large firms, finding that the latter are capital
intensive and thus fail to expand employment, whereas small firms experi-
ence high returns on labour with very low capital intensity. As a result of
financing constraints and small firms offering only lower wages, transition-
ing to informal self-employment instead of formal wage work is a widespread
alternative.
The authors base their analysis on the 1962, 1987, 2003, and 2014 census data
for Ghana’s urban manufacturing sector. Descriptive figures—including an es-
timate for self-employed enterprises with employees—show that the number of
large firms (one hundred or more employees) increased 2.5 times from 1962 to
2014. For medium-size firms (ten to ninety-nine workers) the increase was 3.3
times, while the number of small firms (fewer than ten employees) increased 5.6
times over the same period.The shares of total sectoral employment reveal a differ-
ent picture: the employment share of small firms doubled from 32% to 64%, while
the shares of medium-size and large firms fell sharply, from 30% to 15%, and from
37% to 20%, respectively. Although small firm growth slowed between 2003 and
2014, it is this segment that clearly dominates the manufacturing sector in urban
Ghana (see Figures 2.8 and 2.9). More than 95% of all manufacturing firms in the
data sample have fewer than ten employees; the average size was three employees
in 2003.
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Fig. 2.8 Number of Manufacturing Firms and Self-Employed Enterprises with
Employees in Urban Ghana
Note: See Teal (2017), p. 5, table 1 for detailed information on data sources. Small firms (S) with 1–9,
medium firms (M) with 11–99, large firms (L) with 100, self-employed enterprises (SEE) with 1–4
employees.
Source: Teal (2017)
Notably, the figures for small firms include household-based self-employment
enterprises with up to four employees. Trends in this segment appear to be the
most important driver in terms of both small firm and total sector expansion.
The number of self-employed businesses more than tripled from 1987 to 2003;
a faster growth rate than regular firms during this period. Self-employed enter-
prises represented 63% of all small firms with up to nine employees in 2014, and
72% of firms with four or fewer employees. Among all firms in the sector, 63%
were self-employed enterprises that same year. The share in sectoral employment
of self-employed firms meanwhile increased to 36% in 2014.
This hints at the core role of self-employment in urban manufacturing in
Ghana, but it stands in strong contrast to another striking figure: even when self-
employment is taken into account, large firms are dominating in terms of value
added, with a share of 63% among the largest 1% of manufacturing firms.
The study aimed to understand why significant employment growth in Ghana’s
manufacturing sector is due to small firms and household-based enterprises,
which may not yield an optimal allocation of resources. It did so by merging
1991–2003 panel data on workers’ and firms’ characteristics and modelling the
relationship between firm size and labour productivity per worker. The findings
hint at the presence of market distortions leading to a sub-optimal allocation of
labour:
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Fig. 2.9 Employment in Manufacturing Firms and Self-Employed Enterprises with
Employees in Urban Ghana
Note: See Teal (2017), p. 5, table 1 for detailed information on data sources. Small firms (S) with 1–9,
medium firms (M) with 11–99, large firms (L) with 100, self-employed enterprises (SEE) with 1–4
employees.
Source: Teal (2017)
1. There is a clear positive link between labour productivity and firm size.
Larger firms utilize more capital-intensive production technologies, have
lower capital costs, observe higher productivity, and thus pay higher wages.
Conversely, the growing presence of small firms in Ghana’s urban manufac-
turing sector indicates that the average productivity of firms has fallen.
2. Thenegative linkbetweenprofit rate (profits relative to thevalueof capital
stocks) and firm size is equally evident. Smaller firms in the sample have a
far higher profit rate.This seems due to larger firms facing lower capital costs
along with productivity growth.
3. Profits per employee and median real annual earnings are three times
larger for large firms than for small firms. Firm size is a driver of both
trends (see Figures 2.10 and 2.11). Larger firms choose higher-skilled work-
ers and benefit from the product of their unobserved and unpaid skills.
4. However, on average, larger and more productive firms did not grow in
terms of employment. Older firms are not larger, when controlling for
productivity. This points to the existence of significant barriers tomarket
clearing and the expansion of larger businesses that may restrict overall
economic growth.
What can explain the puzzling result that employment has rebalanced in favour of
enterprises with low productivity and relatively low wages? In the case of Ghana’s








Fig. 2.10 Median Real Annual Profits per Employee in Ghana’s
Manufacturing Sector







Fig. 2.11 Median Real Annual Earnings per Employee in
Ghana’s Manufacturing Sector
Note: See Teal (2017), p. 5, table 1 for detailed information on data sources.
Constant USD prices.
Source: Teal (2017)
urban manufacturing industry, Teal (2017) concluded that the lack of employ-
ment growth in larger firms is closely related to the intensive formation of small
firms. Put more technically, the high returns to physical capital investment in
small firms raise the opportunity costs of additional labour to larger businesses.
As a worker is faced with the opportunity to open up a small-sized enterprise
and be self-employed, while rendering comparatively high returns to the wage
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that could be earned in a larger firm, the latter are confronted with an upward-
sloping supply curve of labour, where hiring an additional worker becomes very
costly.This ‘blockage’ to the employment growth of larger and older firms thus acts
as a further incentive to establish small firms or additional household-based self-
employment.
The study found little evidence that efficiency wages or rent capture of actual
workers in larger firms had increased their wages above those available elsewhere,
thus hampering the expansion of other firms. Instead, the author suggested an-
other major barrier to employment expansion was posed by the higher profit of
small firms and self-employed businesses. Profit per worker for small firms (with
an average of three employees, in the study sample) may be substantially above
the median wage in all but the largest firms. The study calculated the returns to
small firms’ capital to be roughly 900 USD as compared to median wages in the
same firms of 500 USD. In such a scenario, forming a small firm or becoming an
entrepreneur may be more attractive to workers than wage work. This aligns with
Blattman and Dercon’s (2016) finding that self-employment is viewed as a realistic
alternative to wage jobs among entry-level job applicants in Ethiopia.
Relieving financial constraints would certainly help to disrupt these relation-
ships. Better access to credit markets would lower the average capital cost for
smaller firms, thus setting them on the road to productivity growth. At the same
time, the increase in smaller firm wages would facilitate employment growth in
larger, more productive firms.
Yet, as Teal (2017) remarked, the inefficiencies of capital markets in low-income
economies make small-firm labour and self-employment a persistently attractive
option. In the case of urban manufacturing in Ghana, the GLM|LIC study showed
that simple economic modelling needs to be carefully amended to better capture
the ambiguous outcomes of barriers to market clearing.
2.3 DoesWageDisparity Interfere withMarket Clearing?
As discussed earlier in this chapter, attendance is—from the firm’s perspective—
among the most valued of workers’ ‘soft skills’ in vulnerable low-income labour
markets, where worker absenteeism appears to be widespread (see Chaudhury
et al. 2006; Bassi and Nansamba 2020). High absenteeism produces uncertainty
andproductivity losses in the formal labourmarket. At the same time, given that
paying wages in cash on a daily or weekly basis is quite common in many coun-
tries lacking reliable banking infrastructure, absenteeism may well be a sign that
absent workers take up other casual and informal job opportunities instead. In this
respect, increasing attendance in regular jobs could contribute to reducing market
imbalances and increasing labour productivity in the formal sector.
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Supported by GLM|LIC, a study by Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani (2018) on
workers’ relative-pay concerns showed that workers’ productivity and attendance
are related to perceived wage inequality or unfairness. In a number of behavioural
experiments with manufacturing employees in India, the authors found that pro-
ductivity drops and attendance substantially decreases if co-workers perceive
their pay to be less than that of their peers. This is particularly the case when
differences in productivity are difficult to observe.
Productivity differentials were meanwhile difficult to observe. Pay inequality
can then even interfere with social cohesion among workers—this may come at a
high cost, particularly in developing economies where many economic activities
are rooted in social connections.
To test the effects of different settings of relative pay on attendance, output and
cohesion, the research team partnered with local contractors in the semi-rural pe-
riphery of Bhubaneswar—the capital and largest city of Odisha state, in Eastern
India. Most workers in this region are engaged in agricultural work and are thus
dependent on the seasonality of labour in this sector. That is, they are usually
forced to search for jobs during the lean season (see Chapter 4 in this volume).
These jobs, if available, are mostly short-term contract employment in industrial
sectors such as construction andmanufacturing, However, unemployment is quite
common among agricultural workers in the lean season.
The experiment employed 378 adult male workers for thirty-five days in three
low-skill manufacturing sites producing rope, brooms, floor mats, and other
items (only one product per unit). Work was supervised and measured by hired
‘managers’, before local contractors sold the output on the local market. During
the employment period, the experimental job was the main source of earnings for
the workers’ households—on average they had been unemployed for fifteen of the
thirty days prior to the experiment. Workers received a flat daily wage for each
day of attendance, at the same level as other short-term daily pay outside the ex-
periment. All participants had previous experience with flat daily pay, as it is the
typical pay structure for short-term contracts in the area. Almost half of the par-
ticipants had previously worked under piece rates (whereby workers are paid for
each item they produce).
For each round of the experiment, fifteen to thirty workers were selected from
different villages and randomly assigned to the different product units with three
workers per unit. Units were physically separated from each other to ensure a
closed reference group. Workers’ tasks remained unchanged for the entire em-
ployment period and were strictly individual, with no joint production at any
time.
Payment conditions were announced on the first working day: during the four-
teen days of training all workers received the same daily wage. There were no
minimum output requirements, but workers were strictly fired for absences of
three subsequent days or disruptive behaviour. Workers were told they would
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Table 2.1 Experimental Wage Design to Assess Workers’ Attendance, Output and
Cohesion Behaviour in India






Low Productivity WLow WLow WMedium WHigh
Medium productivity WLow WMedium WHigh
High productivity WHigh WLow WMedium WHigh
MediumW
Note: Randomization design; key comparison groups are marked with a box.
Source: Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani (2018)
receive feedback on their productivity, and that daily pay in the subsequent pe-
riod of twenty days would be be subject to a one-time pay rise, depending on the
productivity ranking of each worker within their unit. After the initial training
period all workers were randomized into one of four wage treatments, including
unequal wages for all three co-workers according to their productivity rank, as well
as three different levels of compressed wages (see Table 2.1).
Importantly, while workers were privately told of their wage increases by their
managers, learning about co-workers’ wages depended entirely on self-disclosure.
The effect of absences on productivity was not shared with the workers (one day’s
absence was ignored, the second was recorded as zero production; no participants
had three subsequent days of absence). Each worker was presented with their in-
dividual wage calendar on each day of attendance, as a reminder of their wage
evolution. With wages raising by 4, 8, or 12%, all groups of workers were then paid
above the level of external employment options.
The effect of increased wages on output and attendances was directly measured,
whereas the extent of conflict or social cohesion was examined through a set of co-
operative games on the final day of employment (‘fun farewell’) and by a separate
survey on trust among co-workers, perceivedwage fairness, andworker happiness.
The final survey revealed a very high level of worker learning within their produc-
tion unit: over 90% of workers with identical wages, and over 75% of workers with
differential pay, correctly reported the wages of their co-workers. In contrast, less
than 8% knew wage levels in other production units, showing that comparison
took place mainly within units.
Attendance and Productivity of Workers Responds to Wage Schemes
What are the main outcomes of this experiment on workers’ output and
attendance?
1. The study reveals that output of workers in units with differential pay de-
creasedsignificantly, relative toworkers of the same rank and absolutewage
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Fig. 2.12 Effects of Pay Disparity on Worker Output in an Experimental Setting in
India
Note: Y-axis shows residuals of standardised output after removing individual fixed effects in the
pre-period. Each plot compares workers of the same rank who earn the same wage, but are in
compressed vs. pay disparity production units. Day 0 marks the beginning of the wage separation
treatment.
Source: Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani (2018)
level in the three groups with low, medium, and high compressed wages.
After experiencing similar upward trends in productivity due to learning,
workers with differential wages performed worse than workers with com-
pressed wages across all productivity levels, and reduced their output by
22% on average (see Figure 2.12). Quality of production did not change
significantly.
2. This decline in output was mainly driven by a substantial decline in at-
tendance, which accounted for more than half of the slowdown. The at-
tendance of a worker who was paid less than both of their co-workers was
12 percentage points lower. Remarkably, earning a higher wage than unit
peers did not change the picture: median wage workers in pay disparity
groups reduced attendance by 13 percentage points, while high-wage work-
ers observed a slightly lower decline of 10 percentage points. This decline
for all ranks is from a base of 94% attendance among workers in units with
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compressed wages. That is, while the experimental design clearly served as
an incentive for high attendance, it was in decline from the verymoment pay
inequality was introduced (which was disclosed among co-workers within a
few days).
3. While workers receiving lower wages than their peers reduce both their
work effort and attendance, the negative impact on the productivity of
higher-earning workers is entirely through attendance. The study did not
find evidence of reduced output during the days when workers in medium
and high-wage pay disparity groups were present. This indicates that fac-
tors such as resentment at work may induce workers’ absence. The negative
effects of pay inequality on attendance strengthen over time.
4. Thehigh levels of absenteeismareonlypartially causedbyworkers choos-
ing other short-term jobs on days of absence. According to a survey,
workers who applied for the experiment but were not hired took up ca-
sual work on less than 25% of days. Applying this rate to workers tak-
ing part in the experiment suggests that they waived 9% of their wages
(and hence gave up more than the experimental wage premium over and
above external options) in order to avoid a job with pay inequality schemes
in place. Even when assuming that workers find other work every day they
are absent, the foregone earnings amount to 7% of the respective earn-
ings of workers outside the experiment. It should be noted, though, that
the experiment did not capture potential welfare losses and excludes home
production.
5. Wage disparity is not in itself problematic, but perceived wage fairness is
a driver of attendance. The study did not find evidence that aversion to
inequity affects output and attendance when different levels of productiv-
ity within a unit were large and easy to observe for workers. In contrast,
perceptions of wage unfairness caused all experimental workers to reduce
attendance and even forego earnings, regardless of whether they were paid
more or less than co-workers.
6. If wage disparity is not justified from a worker’s perspective, coopera-
tionwithin the productionunit and reportedhappiness is reduced. While
higher-paid workers in pay disparity units considered their earnings fair,
on average, being forced to work under disparity conditions apparently
decreased their work satisfaction, attendance, and willingness to cooper-
ate. This hints at an increase in resentment and reduced social cohesion in
the work environment, stemming from discontent among lower-paid co-
workers (which was confirmed by play games that showed better results for
workers matched to external instead of unit partners).
7. In an imperfect labour environment, dissatisfaction with wage inequal-
ity may induce distrust and perceptions of employer favouritism, if the
reasons for disparity of earnings are not obvious. Workers’ relative-pay
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concerns could thus affect wage scheme decisions in firms and give employ-
ers a reason to focus on wage compression instead of productivity-oriented
wages.
Together, these findings illustrate the complex interrelationships between firms’
wage structures, work satisfaction, output, and attendance. Given the high preva-
lence of flat-cash pay for daily and casual labour in low-income countries, and the
importance of social networks for gaining access to jobs, insurance, and credit, it
is not surprising that wage compression is prevalent in developing economies.The
social cost of wage disparitymay outweigh its benefits inmany settings.
However, wage compression brings its own cost and distorts market clearing
by depressing high-skilled workers’ wages below the market-clearing level, while
lifting low-skilled workers’ earnings above this level. As a result, involuntary un-
employment or informal labour among the low-skilled will increase, while labour
supply of the high-skilled will decrease (see Akerlof and Yellen 1990).
Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani (2018) suggested a threefold approach to tackle
this problem and grow worker support for wage disparity schemes. Potential tools
could include structuring organizations in team-oriented ways. This approach
could match workers to reference groups more effectively, raising the work morale
by increasing output transparency, and establish wage differentials for certain visi-
ble subgroups (for example, to foster gender equality). Yetmany firmswill not have
the ability to implement demanding wage schemes (which would need systematic
productivity screening) in a vulnerable economic environment. Supporting firms
to reconsider their wage structures may thus be a useful policy strategy.
2.4 Tackling theMobility Constraint: DoTransport Subsidies and
Gendered Public TransportHelp?
Barriers to market clearing in LICs are multifaceted and may also occur on a very
practical level. For instance, the cost, availability and reliability of public trans-
portation may present a severe barrier to job and education attendance. Excess
labour supply in rural areas can persist, if travelling to urban areas with (poten-
tially) better job opportunities is hampered by deficient transport infrastructure
and prohibitively high costs. This may depress living conditions of rural work-
ers during the lean season (see Chapter 4 in this volume). Furthermore, transport
barriers can deter temporary labour migration, or even act as a driver of gender
inequality.
While the benefits of better public transport infrastructure and punctuality are
self-explanatory, the impact of transportation costs and the positive outcomes of
relieving this barrier have been shown by recent research. Franklin (2018) and
the above mentioned GLM|LIC studies by Abebe et al. (2020a), while Abebe et al.
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(2017) examined the effects of temporary transport subsidy interventions on job
search activities and employment in Ethiopia.
The latter studies highlight the temporary activation effect of transport subsi-
dies among low-skilled young workers and women (see Chapter 3 in this volume).
In a randomized experiment, a modest subsidy incentivized job seekers to look
for job openings more frequently, with more focus, and with greater success. In
this respect the transport subsidy had a dual effect: it allowed workers to use pub-
lic transport more intensively to search for a job closer to the urban centre, and
screen job vacancy boards there. Search activities and the probability of formal em-
ployment both increased by roughly 30% on average, compared to control group
participants. The transport subsidy did not raise the absolute number of applica-
tions, but it allowed participants to search for jobs more efficiently and to focus on
higher-quality work. At the same time the subsidy apparently helped reduce the
need to engage in subsistence labour instead of looking for a better job or engaging
in additional education.
However, these positive outcomes did not last. In the experimental setting, with
a transport subsidy offer in place for a maximum period of twenty weeks, a survey
among participating workers four years after treatment revealed that the positive
effect had completely dissipated. Nevertheless, this is not to say that continuous
transport subsidies could not result in more sustainable outcomes, while they still
remain a relatively cheap intervention.
The findings provided by Abebe et al. (2017) also shed light on the relation-
ship between the proximity to job markets and the prevalence of informal self-
employment. The transport subsidy reduced self-employment among job seekers
living further from the nearest urban centre.
Hence supporting mobility through better public transport infrastructure and
subsidies for workers may help to overcome geographical barriers to market clear-
ing. Conversely, these results indicate that financial constraints limit the intensity
and ambition of job search activities among lower-qualified men and women,
thus aggravating social inequality and leading to informal work. Relieving these
constraints may thus represent a cost-efficient tool for improving the equity of
opportunities in developing labour markets.
Notably, female participants experienced the strongest increase in employment
probability. This finding hints at explicit deficits in female labour mobility that
could be addressed by the subsidies—at least in the absence of strong social norms
against working women.
In fact, transport barriers in developing countries may take a different direc-
tion that reaches beyond the scope of financial support. Primarily in SouthAsia,
prevalent social norms severely interfere with free mobility and economic ac-
tivities ofwomenoutside their households (see Chapter 8 in this volume). Using
public transport unaccompanied bymen is often stigmatized, andwomen risk sex-
ual harassment and violence when travelling alone. As a result, female immobility
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rates are extremely high (see Adeel and Yeh 2018 for Pakistan)—a severe bar-
rier to an autonomous role for women in the labour market, and to their training
enrolment, employment prospects, and social status.
Against this demanding background, GLM|LIC supports research exploring the
impact of gendered transport modes (women’s compartments in trains and buses
or women-only transport) on women’s socio-economic outcomes (see Sajjad et al.
2018 and Chapter 8 of this volume for first results). This topic is highly relevant
from a gender perspective but has not captured much research attention until
today.
Collectively, mobility constraints—whether they stem from a lack of finan-
cial resources, deficient and unreliable public transport infrastructure, or social
norms—must not be underestimated with respect to labour markets in low-
income countries. Improving labour mobility at the local and regional level may
contribute substantially to raising employment opportunities among disadvan-
taged groups.
Key Takeaways From This Chapter
• Inefficient matching of labour supply and demand impedes growth and
development in LICs.
• Job search support and improved skills signalling can reduce information
frictions in both directions.
• Job application training and transport subsidies are cost-effective pro-
grammes to help disadvantaged workers find stable, formal employment
in urban labour markets.
• Active labour market policies must also address the mismatch of expecta-
tions among job seekers and employers.
• Certification of hard and soft skills can reduce information barriers,
though at the risk of disadvantaging or even stigmatizing workers.
• Barriers to market clearingmay impede total economic growth and work-
ers’ welfare by driving labour supply to smaller businesses with lower
productivity and wages.
• Relieving financial constraints and improving access to credit markets
would lower smaller firms’ average capital cost and facilitate productivity
growth.
• Supporting firms to implement wage structures with higher perceived
fairness of pay could reduce absenteeism and increase worker output.
• Improving mobility through better public transport infrastructure and
subsidies for workers may help to overcome geographical barriers to
market clearing, especially for women.
barriers to labour market efficiency 47
References
Abebe, G., Caria, S., Fafchamps, M., Falco, P., Franklin, S., and Quinn, S., 2017.
Anonymity or Distance? Job Search and Labour Market Exclusion in a Growing
African City. GLM|LIC Working Paper No. 34.
Abebe, G., Caria, S., Fafchamps, M., Falco, P., Franklin, S., and Quinn, S., 2020a.
Anonymity or Distance? Job Search and Labour Market Exclusion in a Growing
African City. Review of Economic Studies, 88(3): 1279–1310.
Abebe, G., Caria, S., Fafchamps, M., Falco, P., Franklin, S., Quinn, S., and Shilpi, F.,
2020b. Matching Firms and Young Jobseekers through a Job Fair: A Field Experi-
ment in Africa. Working Paper. Available from: https://web.stanford.edu/~fafchamp
/JobFair.pdf
Abel,M., Burger, R., andPiraino, P., 2020.TheValue of Reference Letters: Experimental
Evidence from South Africa. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 12(3):
40–71.
Adeel, M., and Yeh, A. G. O., 2018. Gendered Immobility: Influence of Social Roles
and Local Context on Mobility Decisions in Pakistan. Transportation Planning and
Technology, 41(6): 660–78.
Akerlof, G. A., and Yellen, J. L., 1990. The FairWage-Effort Hypothesis andUnemploy-
ment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105(2): 255–83.
Alfonsi, L., Bandiera, O., Bassi, V., Burgess, R., Rasul, I., Sulaiman, M., Vitali, A.,
2017. Tackling Youth Unemployment: Evidence from a Labour Market Experiment
in Uganda. STICERD - Development Economics Papers, eopp64.
Bassi, V., and Nansamba A., 2020. Screening and Signaling Non-Cognitive Skills:
Experimental Evidence from Uganda. USC-INET Research Paper No. 19–08.
Bassi, V., Nansamba, A., and Rasul, I., 2018. The Labor Market Impacts of Soft Skills
Certificates. GLM|LIC Policy Brief No. 21.
Beam, E. A., 2016. Do Job Fairs Matter? Experimental Evidence on the Impact of Job-
Fair Attendance. Journal of Development Economics, 120: 32–40.
Blattman, C. J., and Dercon, S., 2016. Occupational Choice in Early Industrializing
Societies: Experimental Evidence on the Income and Health Effects of Industrial
and Entrepreneurial Work. IZA Discussion Paper No. 10255.
Breza, E., Kaur, S., and Shamdasani, Y., 2018. The Morale Effects of Pay Inequality.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133(2): 611–63.
Bryan, G., Chowdhury; S., and Mobarak, A. M., 2014. Underinvestment in a Profitable
Technology: The Case of Seasonal Migration in Bangladesh. Econometrica, 82(5):
1671–1748.
Card, D., Ibarrarán, P., Regalia, F., Rosas-Shady, D., and Soares, Y., 2011. The La-
bor Market Impacts of Youth Training in the Dominican Republic. Journal of Labor
Economics, 49(2): 267–300.
Carranza, E., Garlick, R., Orkin, K., and Rankin, N., 2020. Job Search and Hiring with
Two-sided Limited Information about Workseekers Skills. CSAE Working Paper
WPS/2020–10.
Chaudhury, N., Hammer, J., Kremer, M., Muralidharan, K., and Rogers, F. H., 2006.
Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20,(1): 91–116.
Crépon, B., and van den Berg, G., 2016. Active Labor Market Policies. Annual Review
of Economics, 8(1): 521–46.
48 labour markets in low-income countries
Donovan, K., Lu, J., and Schoellman, T., 2018. Labor Market Flows and Development.
Meeting Papers 976, Society for Economic Dynamics.
Franklin, S., 2018. Location, Search Costs and Youth Unemployment: Experimental
Evidence from Transport Subsidies. Economic Journal, 128(614): 2353–79.
Groh, M., Krishnan, N., McKenzie, D., and Vishwanath, T., 2012. Soft Skills or
Hard Cash? The Impact of Training and Wage Subsidy Programs on Female Youth
Employment in Jordan. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6141.
Groh, M., McKenzie, D., Shammout, N., and Vishwanath, T., 2015. Testing the Im-
portance of Search Frictions and Matching through a Randomized Experiment in
Jordan. IZA Journal of Labor Economics, 4(7).
Hardy, M., and McCasland, J., 2017. Are Small Firms Labor Constrained? Experimen-
tal Evidence From Ghana. PEDL Research Papers.
Jensen, R., 2012. Do Labor Market Opportunities Affect Young Women’s Work and
Family Decisions? Experimental Evidence from India. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 127(2): 753–92.
Kluve, J., 2016. A Review of the Effectiveness of Active Labour Market Programmes
with a Focus on Latin America and the Caribbean. ILO Research Department
Working Paper No. 9.
McKenzie, D., 2017. How Effective are Active Labor Market Policies in Developing
Countries? A Critical Review of Recent Evidence. World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper No. 8011.
McKenzie, D., and Woodruff, C., 2014. What Are We Learning from Business Train-
ing and Entrepreneurship Evaluations around the Developing World? World Bank
Research Observer 29(1): 48–82.
Pallais, A. 2014. Inefficient Hiring in Entry-Level Labor Markets. American Economic
Review, 104(11): 3565–99.
Sajjad, F., Anjum, G. A., Field, E., and Vyborny, K., 2018. Overcoming Barriers to
Women’s Mobility: Improving Women’s Access to Public Transport in Pakistan.
GLM|LIC Policy Brief No. 24.
Teal, F., 2017. What Constrains the Demand for Labour in Firms in Sub-Saharan
Africa? Some Evidence from Ghana. GLM|LIC Synthesis Paper No. 6.
3
TheRole of Employability Training
and Behavioural Change
A major challenge that faces young people in developing countries is their lack
of relevant skills needed by employers. Governments and NGOs design initia-
tives to enable individuals in developing countries to bridge their skills gap and
achieve better labour market outcomes. Among the most common tools are train-
ing programmes that stimulate the acquisition of qualifications and associated
skills. Despite the growing number of such training programmes in low-income
countries, many lack any rigorous evaluationwith respect to their targeting and ef-
fectiveness. Considerable evidence suggests, however, that these programmes are
often not very effective or cost efficient.
Given the severe constraints in LICs that prevent individuals from entering
the labour market, taking up good jobs, or achieving positive outcomes as en-
trepreneurs, a better understanding and focusing of skills training programmes
is critical to any growth strategy. Apart from efforts to enhance vocational and
on-the-job training, as well as entrepreneurial abilities, skills training must ad-
dress the basics: if informational barriers and behavioural issues are not solved
first, vulnerable and incomplete labour markets may not be able to fully benefit
from traditional skills training schemes. With the youth labour force on the rise in
most LICs, a key responsibility for governments is to create favourable conditions
for skills acquisition and job matching.
Supported byGLM|LIC, several research projects shed new light on this topic by
evaluating innovative employability training as well as preparatory interventions
to rehabilitate disadvantaged groups. This chapter presents the core findings—
with a focus on the impact of signalling interventions—and draws some policy
conclusions.
3.1 How Should Training Programmes BeDesigned forWorkers?
Today, skills training is at the heart of most development aid strategies world-
wide. The United Nations Development Programme identifies skills training
as a highly relevant measure in the pursuit of sustainable economic growth
Labour Markets in Low-Income Countries. David Lam and Ahmed Elsayed, Oxford University Press.
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(United Nations Development Programme 2016). Empirical evidence on the im-
pact of training on the people in low-income regions is scarce but growing.
Meanwhile, several studies—see Attanasio, Kugler, and Meghir (2011) for a good
example—have proven the relevance of skills training as a means to succeed in the
labourmarket. Research has frequently evaluated the impact of randomized train-
ing programmes that offer training to some individuals, while excluding others, by
studying the different, similar, or identical effects on both groups.
By using this method of randomized controlled trials (RCT), economists aim
to identify the effectiveness of a given programme for a treatment group when
compared with similar control groups sharing the same characteristics. As
Attanasio, Kugler, and Meghir (2011) have shown in the case of Colombia, such
programmes may generate much larger net gains in lower-/middle-income coun-
tries than those found in high-income countries: the effect of additional skills
should be stronger for treatment groups with lower qualifications or those who
lack access to formal education. A training programme for disadvantaged young
people was proven to significantly raise earnings and employment for young
women, mainly in formal-sector jobs, in Colombia after 2005.
Nonetheless, not every training intervention is likely to work, depending on
the country or regional context and the treatment concept. Brooks, Donovan, and
Johnson (2018) demonstrated that inexperienced female microenterprise owners
in a Kenyan slum substantially benefited from informal mentorship by an expe-
rienced entrepreneur in the same community, while a formal business education
intervention showed no effect on profits despite changes in business practice. As
Groh et al. (2012) have pointed out in evaluating a programme to help female
community college graduates in Jordan to find a job, soft-skills training failed to
result in a positive average impact on employment, while wage subsidies generated
short-term effects only.
These findings emphasize that missing information and mis-shaped informa-
tion channels are a barrier to profitability and sustainable economic success.
The type of information matters: it seems access to localized, specific knowledge
(or implementing an alumni model, for example Lafortune, Rothstein, and
Schanzenbach 2018), may stimulate economic success; abstract, general informa-
tion from the classroom does not necessarily work in the same direction.
The body of evaluation literature focusing on training efforts in developing
countries is growing continuously, but most of the training programmes in the de-
veloping world have not been thoroughly evaluated. According to McKenzie and
Woodruff (2014) and McKenzie et al. (2020), who discussed a number of exist-
ing business training and entrepreneurship evaluations at the level of small firms
in developing countries, these studies are often of limited use and do not allow
for generalized conclusions due to small sample sizes, short measurement peri-
ods, and survey attrition. Hence, evaluation results seldom clearly reveal whether
a strong or modest effect is due to training or is more likely the result of other
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circumstances. One of the few findings to be distilled from the existing business
training evaluations over a short time horizon is that training effects on existing
firms and their probability of survival seem to be rather modest, while stronger
training effects are seen with respect to entrepreneurs launching new firms more
quickly.
Evaluation studies would be incomplete if they failed to consider potential
hidden and secondary effects that are not easy to measure yet could influence
the overall evaluation effect—positively or negatively. Skills training and other
programmes may result in behavioural and societal changes that should not
be underestimated. Some programmes may not only affect the group of eligible
households but also reach beyond. That is, research limiting its focus to the direct
effect of the treatment could very well underestimate the true positive impact. For
instance, as Angelucci andDeGiorgi (2009) have noted, cash transfer programmes
at the local levelmay also indirectly affect ineligible groups living in the same target
region who receive loans or reduce their savings. In such a scenario a full evalua-
tion set needs to analyse the effects on the entire local economy, rather than being
limited to selected treatment and control groups from the same community.
However, the opposite may apply: the treatment effect could be far less positive
or even turn negative if undesirable side effects such as free-rider behaviour or
windfall effects result from an imprecise definition of treatment groups. At the
same time, positive effects may shrink or disappear when it comes to scaling.
Field experiments on skills training showing a clear positive impact may lift hopes
for larger-scale effects that could be deceptive, depending on the nature of the
treatment (see Berge et al. 2012). Effects of training programmesmay also be over-
estimated because the programmes simply change which individuals are getting
jobs, without any increase in overall employment. For example, a skills programme
that gives participants a credential may cause those in the programme to be prefer-
entially hired by employers, even though they did not actually acquire additional
skills and without any overall positive impact on employment or productivity.
Last, but not least, the evaluation of skills training should consider whether its
effects could be changed by combining direct interventions aimed at qualification
with treatments such as cash transfers or other behavioural incentives. Weak re-
sults from an existing skills training programme do not necessarily rule out more
positive results being achieved when the programme is combined with additional
treatments.
Given this picture of training programmes, policymakers often face substantial
uncertainty on how to design (or redesign) skills training programmes in low-
income countries, which may lead to undesirable cost inefficiencies under budget
constraints.
The Growth and Labour Markets in Low-Income Countries Programme ex-
plicitly aims to overcome these deficits by adding careful RCT evaluations of
promising training innovations in low-income countries, thus enriching the body
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of relevant research findings. Novel GLM|LIC studies provide in-depth evalua-
tions of a number of training interventions across several countries, including
Kenya, Liberia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Togo, Madagascar, and Senegal. The inno-
vations include, for example, combining training courses with cash transfers and
behavioural interventions aimed at reshaping attitudes that deter people from ed-
ucation. Some of the interventions also investigate the role of non-cognitive skills.
The outcomes studied often go beyond the regular labour market outcomes of
employment and wages, and include other social outcomes such as risk attitudes
or violence. In the following subsections, we summarize the findings of some ex-
emplary evaluations and discuss the lessons learned about the types of training
and the contexts (geographic and cultural) in which these programmes are likely
to work.
3.1.1 Personal Initiative Training vs Traditional Training
One promising approach in skills training has been to incorporate insights from
other fields like behavioural economics, marketing science, and psychology. These
approaches may replace the need for traditional business training or complement
at the margin their effects.
A GLM|LIC-funded project (Compos et al. 2017, 2018, 2020) investigated the
importance of alternative skills by comparing two types of training: traditional
managerial training, and a psychology-based personal initiative training pro-
gramme. The traditional business training focused on four core topics: accounting
and financial management, marketing, human resource management, and for-
malization, while the personal initiative training focused on teaching self-starting
behaviour, innovation, identifying and exploiting new opportunities, goal-setting,
planning, and feedback cycles.
The authors conducted a randomized controlled trial with 1,500 microenter-
prises in Lomé, Togo, 53% of them female entrepreneurs, to compare the impacts
of standard business training to personal initiative training. The microenter-
prises came from a variety of industries (27% manufacturing, 48% commerce,
25% services). The 1,500 microentrepreneurs were randomly assigned into three
groups, each of 500 firms: a control group, a traditional business training treatment
group, and a personal initiative training treatment group. Both training courses
were held for a total of thirty-six hours in three half-day sessions per week in April
2014, followed by a trainer visiting the businesses individually once a month over
the following fourmonths to reinforce the concepts. Four rounds of follow-up sur-
veys were collected between September 2014 and September 2016, enabling the
tracking of business outcomes for over two years after the training.
The personal initiative had very large effects on innovation and capital invest-
ment, but also on business practices learnt in traditional programmes, including
record keeping and HR management. The evaluation showed that entrepreneurs
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who took the personal initiative training saw their profits rise by an average
of 30% relative to the control group (40% for female entrepreneurs), compared
with a statistically insignificant 11% effect for traditional training (5% for female
entrepreneurs). The training is cost effective, paying for itself within one year.
The traditional business training led microentrepreneurs to increase their use
of standard business practices, such as accounting, marketing, and stock control.
However, even without explicitly teaching these practices, microentrepreneurs
who received personal initiative training adopted almost asmany of these practices
as those in the traditional business training programme.
In addition to higher profits and increased use of standard business practices,
business owners who received personal initiative training were more innovative,
introduced more new products to their businesses, and were more likely to di-
versify into a new product line than those in traditional training. After personal
initiative training, business owners borrowed more and made larger investments.
Personal initiative training was particularly effective for female-owned businesses
(Compos et al. 2018), for whom traditional training has often been ineffective.
Women who received personal initiative training saw their profits increase by 40%
compared with the control group and as against a 5% impact for traditional busi-
ness training. Personal initiative training increased error competence (ability to
recover from errors) and entrepreneurial passion, which led to strengthened busi-
ness success of female entrepreneurs. While both the traditional business training
and the personal initiative training cost around 750 USD per participant (a cost
subsidized by the study), the personal initiative approach paid for itself within one
year given the increase in participants’ monthly profits following the training.
This study’s findings make a strong case for the role of psychology in sup-
porting profit growth for women entrepreneurs by helping them to develop an
entrepreneurial mindset. Based on these promising results, the personal initia-
tive training has been implemented in programmes in several other countries
including Ethiopia and Mexico, where it was combined with a traditional business
training programme and is being developed in other locations such asMauritania,
Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Research underway in
these contexts will reveal whether this training can develop more successful en-
trepreneurs in other settings as well and will inform if other target groups such as
rural communities can benefit from this training.
3.1.2 Demand for Professional Training Interferes with Practical
Constraints
Two studies supported by GLM|LIC evaluated training programmes within the
ready-made garments (RMG) industry in Bangladesh—a major, rapidly growing
sector in the country’s emerging economy with over 4 million employees and
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a share of over 80% of total export earnings (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics,
2021, p. 98).
Given the high economic—and social—relevance of the Bangladeshi garments
industry, skills training at the firm and individual level is an obvious strategy to
fight poverty and labour shortages at the same time. But which approach is the
more promising and efficient? What does the evaluation of firm-level training re-
veal when compared to a policy aimed at helping jobless individuals overcome
extreme poverty by gaining the qualifications to obtain jobs in the garments indus-
try? While Macchiavello, Rabbani, and Woodruff (2015) analysed the market for
training services using a demand experiment with garment factories, Shonchoy,
Raihan, and Fujii (2017) studied a local NGO’s training programme components
aimed at workers.
Promoting managerial skills could help overcome deficits with respect to pro-
ductivity and poor labour relations in low-income countries’ core industrial
sectors. This consideration led Macchiavello, Rabbani, and Wodruff (2015) to
study the demand for professional training of line supervisors in the garments
market in Bangladesh, which has around 3,000 exporting factories. Accord-
ing to the authors, a regular market for training services is almost non-
existent so far—less than 10% of supervisors completed any job-related formal
training.
In cooperation with local training centres, the German Technical Cooperation
Agency (GIZ), and a local marketing service provider, three six-day external train-
ingmodules were developed and offered to a sample of almost 300 exporting firms,
135 of which were finally reached. All potential customers, most of them human
resource (HR) managers, were approached via phone and offered training courses
at discount prices. Detailed information about the initiative was offered through
a bilingual brochure and a descriptive video. The experiment allowed firms to
choose and buy training session slots at randomly varied prices (60–100% of the
full training costs) and to test the programme and training quality and conve-
nience via free slots in a chosen module. The modules consisted of training in
productions planning, quality enhancing, and human resources practices around
leadership and social compliance.
A high number of firm managers—120—requested further information on the
programme,with a higher probability of a request for additional details on process-
ing and quality enhancement training (independent from pricing information),
while interest in further HR training information declined when price informa-
tion was given. The marketing experiment proved a lower, more price-sensitive
potential demand for HR and social compliance training, with the exception of
larger, quality-orientated firms.
However, at the next, more concrete stage—the offer of a free slot test—the
initial high response rate declined to just eighty-six firm decision-makers who re-
sponded to a phone call. Of these, only sixteen (less than 6% of the whole sample)
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ultimately accepted a free training slot.The study found the treatment options and
prices had no effect on the probability of taking up a free slot.
The experiment further revealed the reasons for rejecting the training offer:
• 25% of the firm representatives refused the offer due to high production
pressure.
• 20% said their firms could not spare active supervisors for six days.
• 15% doubted the effectiveness of the training.
• 15% refused to send their employees to external training.
• 10%were afraid to lose their employees to other firms after completion of the
training.
Remarkably, only two factories cited their own training initiatives as a reason
not to ask for further information or a free test slot.
These results clearly show that even professionally organized and firm-
tailored training programmes aimed at strengthening productivity and
better workplace conditions may be directed into a vacuum and miss their
targets. In the case of the Bangladeshi garments industry, high production
pressures resulting from severe competition, just-in-time processing, and fast-
track deliveries apparently make firms hesitant to train up their lower-level
managers. As the study shows, pricing is not a core factor in decisions, indicating
that a market solution for training courses without long-term subsidies could
nevertheless work. Future research might demonstrate that certified measures—
training programmes that have proven their firm-orientated effectiveness—could
overcome existing obstacles.
3.1.3 Targeting Worker Skills Training to Firms’ Demands
and the Low-Educated
If firm-level skills training faces substantial barriers, what about directing train-
ing programmes at workers instead? A GLM|LIC study by Shonchoy, Raihan, and
Fujii (2017) employed RCT techniques to explore which components of a selected
training programme of a local NGO in north-eastern Bangladesh helped individ-
uals to take and keep jobs in the ready-made garments industry or manufacturing
sector, and thus reduce their families’ extreme poverty. The programme was lo-
cated in one of the poorest regions of Bangladesh—one that has not been a major
location for garment factories. The authors collected detailed information about
a total of 2,215 eligible participants’ households, before randomly assigning each
participant to one of four treatment groups or a control group, then surveying
them six, twelve, and eighteen months after the training.
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Fig. 3.1 Employment Rate in First Follow-up Survey (six months)
Source: Shonchoy, Raihan, and Fujii (2017), survey data
The free-of-cost training included different components for each treatment
group: group i received a day-long job-related information session; group ii was
given one month of residential skills training; group iii received the month of
residential skills training along with a stipend to finance the costs resulting from
joining the training programme (migration from another region and foregone in-
come); while group iv received the same as group iii plus four weeks of on-the-job
training during a paid internship in a factory (full treatment). The study evaluated
the outcomes for each treatment in terms of job take-up, success, and continuation,
and assessed the effects on the families’ socio-economic conditions. Interestingly,
the study did not suffer from a high attrition rate—on average, across all surveys,
just 5% of participants did not respond.
The training programme experienced a take-up rate of overall 66.5% with a low
drop-out rate of roughly 5% (due, for example, to seasonal labour demand or non-
economic factors). Six months after the treatment, the survey showed an overall
employment rate of 21.8%—driven by very high rates for those who passed a full
treatment including on-the-job-training (group iv) (see Figure 3.1). Almost 50%
of this group were employed in the RMG industry, compared with 4.4% for the
group that only received information (group i), 11.3% for those that received one
month of residential skills training (group ii) and 16.2% for those that received the
training and a stipend. At the same time, just 3.2% of the control group managed
to find employment without any training.
Unsurprisingly, the employment rates fell over time: one year after training, the
overall employment in any sector fell to 12.2% (overall), while for the RMG sec-
tor it fell to 10.5% (full treatment), 6.6% (training with stipend), and about 4% for
the other groups including the control group. These numbers are still remarkably
high and underline the effectiveness of the programme. Training and accom-
panying support definitely made a difference, since employment in the manu-
facturing sector also remained significantly above the control group level (see
Figure 3.2).
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Fig. 3.2 Employment Rate in Second Follow-up Survey (twelve months)
Source: Shonchoy, Raihan, and Fujii (2017), survey data
In general, the study shows how useful skills training initiatives may be when
orientated towards industry demands and well targeted towards the poor. How-
ever, mere information strategies hardly show any sustainable effect, whereas
combining skills trainingwith on-the-job learning and/or stipends reveals sub-
stantial and lasting effects on employment and socio-economic status. These
findings include a clear policy message for LICs’ emerging industry sectors: skills
training offered to individuals should facilitate networking between participants
and factories to secure the largest positive effects.
3.2 Using Training toAddress Risky Behaviour
in Times of Social Instability
Skills training may represent a chance to escape a vicious circle of low qualifica-
tion, unemployment or precarious income, and crime, that is present—especially
for young men—in many LICs, hindering economic growth and fostering social
instability. In the worst cases, fragile societies mobilize this disadvantaged group
for rioting or rebellion. Policy strategies for cognitive abilities training thus need
rehabilitation efforts to first lay the groundwork for shaping values, behaviour, and
non-cognitive abilities. Blattman, Jamison, and Sheridan (2017) undertook a field
experiment in Liberia to evaluate whether adulthood non-cognitive investments
and interventions can influence and change behaviour, a topic with little empirical
evidence so far (see Heckman and Kautz 2014).
The authors recruited 999 high-risk men (from a sample of around 1,500) aged
18 to 35 in Liberia’s capital Monrovia, mostly involved in dealing and consum-
ing drugs, and in theft and violence. Given the country’s recent history—two civil
wars, combat, and displacement of the population’s majority—the selected group
had spent several years in chaos, without functioning social and labour market
structures. At an average age of 25, most members of the target group worked in
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low-skill and illicit labour market segments with an average monthly income of 68
USD, for roughly fifty hours per week.More than one-thirdwere formerly engaged
in armed groups.
The interventions programme took a dual approach. One quarter of the par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to an eight-week cognitive behaviour therapy
(CBT) addressing anger, impulsivity, depression, and other behavioural barri-
ers. The CBT group therapy, ‘STYL’ (the Sustainable Transformation of Youth in
Liberia), was developed by the local community organization NEPI (Network for
Empowerment & Progressive Initiative) and conducted by former street youth,
ex-criminals, and ex-combatants. The programme aimed to foster patience, self-
control, and a non-criminal attitude as a community member, by giving guidance
that focused on reflection andwillingness to change, goal-setting, and cooperation.
The workshop sessions were held three times per week for three to four hours,
engaging around twenty participants in role-playing, experience exchange, and
stimulation of behavioural change regarding social norms. Homework lessons in-
cluded visits by advisors as well as a focus on goal identification and planning of
steps towards resocialization and employment. An extended literature has shown
that social identity can be changed through therapies targeted at reshaping prefer-
ences and values (see for example Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Almlund et al. 2011).
But does it also work for the most disadvantaged in a fragile low-income society?
To test this, another random group received an unconditional cash offer of 200
USD (equalling three months’ wages) via a lottery run in partnership with a non-
profit organization that distributed the cash. A second group received CBT and
cash. The last group of participants received no support and thus served as the
control group.On average, both treatments amount to around 530USDper partic-
ipant. The survey included pre-interviews, with follow-up interviews a few weeks
and a full year after the programme. Two-thirds of the participants (among them
the most likely higher-risk individuals) attended most or all therapy sessions, with
98% collecting the cash grant.
The experimental findings clearly indicate that a targeted intervention may
deter high-risk individuals from their former risky behaviour as a first, but po-
tentially decisive, step on the way to focused skills training later on. They signal
as well, though, that undertaking such a strategy—which seems inevitable for de-
veloping societies shaken by violence—will need patience and continuous focused
interventions.
As a result of receiving therapy followed by a cash grant, participants changed
their anti-social behaviour (violence, crime, and related behaviour). Compared
to the control group, drug-dealing and theft shrunk by a third within weeks.
One year later, the participants reported a lower likelihood of exhibiting ag-
gressive and hostile behaviour, thus revealing a lasting programme effect. The
likelihood of carrying a weapon and engaging in criminal activities even fell by
half. While the control group reported stealing to be an almost weekly activity,
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on average, the recipients of therapy and cash showed substantially lower rates. It
seems the behavioural therapy succeeded in generating non-cognitive changes
with respect to self-control, time preferences and values. The cash, meanwhile,
strengthened, stabilized, and prolonged this effect by sending reinforcing sig-
nals and allowing for some saving and activity changes, at least for a limited
period.
For those not receiving the cash support, the therapy effects diminished step
by step over the course of the study year. An isolated cash intervention resulted
in a similar, rather transient, effect in encouraging individuals away from illicit
behaviour. Although the study did not find evidence that the cash was wasted, its
effect on enhancing chances of reducing criminal activity was limited (although
stealing was considerably reduced), again due to high-risk levels in the absence
of functioning security provided by the state in the neighbourhoods targeted
individuals lived.
The study is an important addition to existing research, in transferring results
that have so far only been shown for rehabilitation programmes in developed
countries such as the USA (see Heller et al. 2017) to the framework of low-income
countries. Reducing anti-social behaviour within a high-risk treatment group
by up to around 50% looks to also be an achievable policy goal for developing
societies thataimto lay the foundations forefficientskills trainingprogrammes.
In an ongoing GLM|LIC project Hicks et al. (2011) compare and contrast the
relative efficacy of providing vocational training and small business start-up grants
in Kenya. The project builds on an earlier randomized evaluation of a vocational
training voucher programme in Kenya that included nearly 2,200 youths. In the
previous programme, a randomly selected half of programme participants were
awarded a voucher that covered the cost of vocational training. The project will
support the analysis of the near-term impacts of vocational training, including an
evaluation of the differential returns between private and public training and the
impacts of training in the informal sector. Furthermore, the project will support
an additional intervention which will randomly select half of the voucher winners
and half of the non-winners to receive an unconditional cash grant that is sufficient
to purchase toolkits or provide seed capital for their entrepreneurial ventures.
The randomized cross-cutting design of this project will enable the researchers
to simultaneously estimate the impacts of vocational training, start-up grants, and
the combination of both interventions. The use of randomization in treatment as-
signment will circumvent concerns about selection bias and confounding factors.
Furthermore, detailed longitudinal data (the Kenya Life Panel Survey) covering
nearly fifteen years is available on all programme participants, which will enable
the exploration of heterogeneous treatment effects on different sub-populations
in the sample. This panel data will also allow the researchers to closely exam-
ine the dynamics and patterns of youth employment outcomes. In addition to
providing rigorous evidence on the near-term and medium- to long-term returns
to vocational training forAfrican youth, a key contribution of this project will be to
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provide some of the first experimental evidence on the complementarities between
vocational education and financial capital in Africa, by combining randomized
interventions with high-quality longitudinal data.
GLM|LIC supported a number of skills training programmes specifically tar-
geted to women. These projects are discussed in Chapter 8, which focuses on
gender dimensions of labour markets in LICs. These training programmes in-
cluded many of the features discussed here, including cash transfers, soft skills,
and behavioural interventions.
Overall, the research initiated by GLM|LIC on skills training, skills signalling,
and adjacent fields supports the assessment of whether subsidies that facilitate
job search and public transport in low-income societies should accompany skills-
orientated intervention strategies targeted at disadvantaged groups. The findings
show that skills signalling interventions, in particular, offer a cost-efficient means
of overcoming information barriers and supporting better jobmatching, as well as
increasing job quality and earnings.
At the same time, internship programmes may be a simple but effective tool
when combined with external skills training. This dual treatment, according to
GLM|LIC results, may facilitate matching between disadvantaged job seekers—
with limited ability to signal their employability—and potential employers in
large low-income cities. Rehabilitation strategies may also offer an instrument for
reshaping the values of the socially excluded towards employability.
Key Takeaways from this Chapter
• Training programmes do not necessarily increase overall employment as
they may improve the prospects of some job seekers at the expense of
others.
• Through behavioural and societal changes, positive effects as well as
undesirable side effects of skills training may extend beyond eligible
households.
• Promotingmanagerial skills could help increase productivity and improve
labour relations in LICs’ core industrial sectors.
• Practical constraints in high-pressure work environments make firms
hesitant to engage in training their employees.
• Skills training offered to individuals generate larger positive effects when
networking between participants and factories is facilitated.
• Behavioural therapy combined with cash grants has proven successful
at reducing high-risk individuals’ anti-social behaviours, thus paving the
way for efficient skills training.
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4
Challenges in Rural LabourMarkets
Despite some remarkable economic growth in recent years, most low-income
countries are still widely agriculture-orientated societies, while facing challenges
rooted in the expansion of urban areas and the resulting large gap between rural
and urban labour market conditions. Given that small-scale farming remains the
primary income source for a majority of the population in developing countries,
while extreme poverty is widespread, policies need to be informed by the com-
plex mechanisms that affect the efficiency and prospects of rural labour markets
in developing regions.
Economic research may contribute to the understanding the characteristics of
rural labour markets in low-income countries. However, collecting data in this
sector is rather difficult. Even more importantly, the dependency of rural markets
on harvest and lean seasons, climate conditions undergoing substantial change,
and natural catastrophes, on the one hand, and—on the other hand—a mostly
constrained access to financial resources, credit, or modern banking technologies,
pose huge challenges to governments and international development aid policies.
Strategies need to simultaneously address poverty reduction, employment cre-
ation, and infrastructure enhancement within the constraints of limited public
budgets and relative uncertainty as to which policies induce sustainably positive
effects. What are the challenges of correctly measuring labour demand and supply
in rural settings? Does facilitating access to credit markets improve the efficiency
of labour allocation, and alleviate income inequality among poor households that
largely depend on the agricultural calendar and face high risks during the hungry
or “lean” season? Under which circumstances do expensive PWPs produce lasting
positive outcomes for participating population groups?
Research initiated and supported by the Growth and Labour Markets in Low-
Income Countries Programme evaluates existing interventions and discusses new
approaches with the aim of expand our knowledge about the fundamental drivers
of rural labour market development.
4.1 TheHighRelevance of the Rural Sector Prevails
Agricultural employment has played a dominant role in the labour markets of
most LICs. In many cases, however, the available data on rural labour market
Labour Markets in Low-Income Countries. David Lam and Ahmed Elsayed, Oxford University Press.
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structures and the labour force attachment of selected groups is rather incomplete,
for example lacking completed time-series or reliable surveys. This may lead to
researchwhich either underestimates or overestimates policy effects, or whichmay
be unable to evaluate them at all without additional data. While recent progress
in scientific data collection has widened the scope for socio-economic research,
there is still a significant lack of comparable cross-country data and more detailed
statistics on specific labour market segments.
Modelling labour markets based on imperfect data poses a challenge for
economists. Furthermore, existing models going back to the dual sector model
(traditional rural vs. modern non-agricultural sector), originally shaped by Lewis
(1954), may fail to fully map the actual range of today’s labour markets in LICs.
According to the basicmodel, a decrease in agricultural labour demand as an econ-
omy industrializes produces an excess labour supply that drives cheapworkers into
the emerging non-rural sector. However, as the excess supply in the rural sector
dissipates, the non-agricultural segment must pay higher wages—thus stimulat-
ing further movement of labour supply from the rural sector. This mechanism
will, overall, enhance economic development in disadvantaged regions, according
to this theory.
Despite offering an enhancement of this simple model (for example, the im-
portant contribution by Fields (2006), current economic modelling does not
necessarily capture the complete status quo of low-income labourmarkets, a study
by Bhorat et al. (2017) argued. Supported by GLM|LIC, the authors undertook a
thorough analysis of the de facto segmentation of the sub-Saharan labour markets
of Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia, based on an evaluation of existing survey data.
Their findings underline that a better understanding of these segments will help to
target policy interventions and increase cost efficiency. The study presented a de-
tailed comparative view across the three countries, illustrating differences in terms
of labour market segmentation. This reveals interesting insights into the hetero-
geneity of economic development that need to be considered when identifying
effective policy options.
For instance, the extents of urbanisation and poverty seem to be positively cor-
related: the most urbanized country of the three, Zambia, has the highest poverty
headcount. This suggests that the change in labour supply depicted in the classic
model does not necessarily lead to a rise in occupational quality, but instead to
precarious employment or even unemployment. Contrary to common thinking,
further decomposition reveals that unemployment in sub-Saharan Africa, as tra-
ditionally measured (that is, individuals reporting that they were not working but
were actively looking for work in the previous week or month), is not a negligible
factor. It reaches a substantial level in most urban areas while being relatively low
in rural regions. Youth unemployment ismeanwhilemostly concentrated in urban
areas.
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Only Kenya showed a substantially higher level of urban unemployment for
females than males. There it was more than double the male rate, yet was com-
parable to the male rate in Zambia and Tanzania. Rural–urban labour migration
can collide with constrained labour demand and inflexible urban wages resulting
in a lack of appropriate urban jobs.
Other factors in which the three countries differ include the ratio of employ-
ment to the size of the rural population. The survey data analysed by Bhorat
et al. (2017) show that a large rural sector with a high level of agricultural em-
ployment correlates with high labour-force participation and low unemployment.
This was the case in Tanzania, where unemployment was clearly below the sub-
Saharan average, while Kenya andZambia showed a different pattern, with roughly
15% points lower employment in agriculture and a 5 percentage point higher
unemployment rate.
The most reasonable explanation seems to be the existence of an extended sub-
sistence sector in rural Tanzania. The agricultural sectors in Kenya and Zambia,
by contrast, are comparatively less traditional but more industrialized and com-
mercialized, and do not offer subsistence jobs to the same extent in the absence of
urban job opportunities.
There may also be other influencing factors, such as different preferences for
avoiding subsistence labour, access to social transfers, or scarcity of available rural
land. This aligns with the fact that almost 90% of Tanzanians employed in agricul-
ture are self-employed, while in Zambia (76%) and Kenya (66%) the percentage is
significantly lower.
Consequently, labour force participation rates of the low educated are higher in
Tanzania than in Zambia and Kenya. At the same time, Zambia and Kenya reveal
a substantial lack of job opportunities for the better educated, resulting in higher
unemployment.This finding contradicts the assumption of prevailing labourmar-
ket models that, in general, suggest a higher likelihood of the better skilled to be
employed. Thus, better skilled workers may face a higher unemployment risk.
Clearly, the shortfall in skilled jobs may be traced back to an underdeveloped
manufacturing and secondary sector in many African countries.
Against this analytical background, Bhorat et al. (2017) identified six core seg-
ments that reflected the heterogeneity of labourmarkets in sub-Saharan countries,
reporting the relative employment shares of each segment (see Figure 4.1). Besides
the traditional segments of rural agriculture and non-agricultural urban private-
sector employment, the segmentation depicts urban agriculture as well as both
urban and rural non-agricultural work in the public sector.
The shares presented here show that the rural sector still dominates the region,
accounting for roughly 60% of the overall employment in Zambia and Kenya, and
almost 75% in Tanzania. But agricultural employment was not limited to rural
sectors; in Tanzania, agricultural jobs in urban areas accounted for a remarkable
66 labour markets in low-income countries










Fig. 4.1 Employment Shares of Labour Market Segments in Zambia, Tanzania, and
Kenya
Note: Labour Force Survey data for Zambia (2012) and Tanzania (2006); Integrated Household Budget
Survey data for Kenya (2005/2006); no consistent comparable data available at the time of the study.
Source: Bhorat et al. (2017)
7% of the total employment. Furthermore, rural non-agricultural employment in
the private sector had reached a level (about 19% in Kenya, as the less urbanized
country, 10% in Zambia, 8% in Tanzania) that should no longer be overlooked
by economic modelling. Within this segment, more than 40% of Kenyan workers
were employees; in Tanzania and Zambia the level was just half this. In contrast,
the urban non-agricultural private sector showed high rates of self-employment
(above 62% in Tanzania, 52% in Zambia, 35% in Kenya). Undoubtedly this re-
flects a substantial urban informal sector which also needs to be captured by
modelling.
In Zambia and Kenya, 60% of total employment was in the primary sec-
tor, which consisted almost entirely of agriculture with a lesser role for min-
ing. In Tanzania the corresponding figure was 80%. Across all three coun-
tries, secondary-sector employment (mainlymanufacturing and construction)
made up less than 10% of the total. This is important, as policies tradition-
ally focus on manufacturing as the key to economic growth in sub-Saharan
Africa.
The tertiary sector accounted for roughly one-third of employment in Zambia
and Kenya, and 16% in Tanzania. Wholesale and retail trade in the informal
economy made up a large portion of this sector, while the share of public-sector
employment was below 4% in Tanzania, and 7% in Kenya and Zambia. Given the
high share of agricultural employment, it is no surprise that the majority of the
labour force across the three countries were employed in low-skill occupations. In
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Zambia, the most urbanised country, 65% were in low-skill occupations. In Kenya
and Tanzania, the shares were 76% and 80%, respectively.
Turning to wages in the defined labour market segments, the study draws
a rather clear picture: those employed in the rural non-agricultural private or
public segment earned consistently higher wages than those offered in the rural
agricultural segment in Kenya and Tanzania. To be publicly employed in non-
agricultural segments in Kenya may bring double the income of rural segment
employment (around 45% more in Tanzania and Zambia), while private non-
agricultural employment promised awage approximately 55%higher inKenya and
66% higher in Tanzania. Similar wage advantages resulted from urban agricultural
employment. The wage impacts of education differed as well, if compared across
the six labour market sections. An additional year of schooling induced higher
average wage returns in the urban private segments than the rural agriculture
segment.
Together, these data evaluations show the plausibility of a more detailed seg-
mentation of low-income countries’ labour markets, which confirms the absolute
domination of the rural sector while highlighting its heterogeneity and link
to urban labour. Most importantly, the existence of a substantial segment of
non-agricultural labour in rural areas needs to be taken into account, as it
represents a substantial share of employees as well as the self-employed. Dual
sector-oriented assessments fall short of the mark in view of an increasing market
heterogeneity that deserves the full attention of multifaceted economicmodels. To
distinguish between private and public segments seems to be instructive, as they
exhibit a different demand for skills. Furthermore, unemployment should not be
ruled outwhen studying rural labourmarkets—the findings hint at rather high
unemployment in the absence of an extended subsistence agriculture sector,
and persistently high unemployment among urban young people, even when
well educated.
Lastly, the study called for the collection of more solid data sets for future
research. The cross-country analysis was limited, in so far as surveys of the het-
erogeneous labour market structures in developing countries often suffer from
some weaknesses with respect to question precision, sample representativeness,
plausibility of responses, and missing variables that might explain outcomes in
depth. With respect to studying labour market outcomes across countries, a few
deficits hamper analysis, including a lack of harmonization and detailed infor-
mation on the formal or informal nature of employment. Refining economic
modelling in the field of development economics needs to rely on stable data
foundations if it is to facilitate sound evidence-based policy advice. Enhancing
the data availability for economic research is a topic that merits additional efforts.
Nevertheless, letting the data shape the baseline assumptions of economic mod-
elling in the case of low-income economies appears to be an inspiring research
strategy.
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4.1.1 Heterogeneous Rural Sectors Call for Asymmetric
Economic Modelling
Another approach has been taken by Dillon, Brummund, and Mwabu (2017,
2019). Their 2017 study, supported by GLM|LIC, aimed to shed new light on
the incompleteness of rural labour markets in East Africa, and the asymmetric
responses of agricultural labour to changes in household composition (see also
Chapter 3 in this book). It built on classic separation model tests for complete and
competitive markets in rural areas (fundamentally based on Benjamin 1992) by
controlling whether excess demand or supply of labour exists and whether wage
adjustment brings both sides of the market into equilibrium.
Detecting market asymmetries and potential market failures is highly relevant
when tailoring policy responses to challenges in rural regions. In well-functioning
markets, the amount of labour used on a farm should not depend on how many
workers belong to a household, since labour utilization should be based purely on
equating the marginal product of labour to the market wage. The family’s labour
supply decision should be separate from their labour demand decision, as long
as labour can easily move between on-farm and off-farm work and additional
labour can be hired from the labour market. When labour markets are incom-
plete or missing, however, households cannot increase their working hours and
are restricted to relying on their own farming work (non-separation). This creates
a clear connection between the number ofworkers in a household and the intensity
of farming.
Using panel data, the study shows that a variation of the separation test can
sometimes provide insights into the state of rural labour markets. If at one point
in time households face a binding constraint on the number of hours it can work
in the market, this could lead to a situation of non-separation, with household
members working on the family farm up to a point at which the marginal rev-
enue product of farm labour is below the market wage. If, over time, the situation
changes and someone exits the household, this reduction in the household’s labour
endowment would relieve the binding constraint on market work, and therefore
separation becomes possible. This would be the case because farm labour falls
only to a level that makes it optimal. However, the opposite is not true: if the
household labour endowment increases over time, the constraint continues to
bind, and therefore non-separation persists with increase in farm labour. The im-
plication is that in a large sample, a binding labour demand constraint predicts
a specific pattern of asymmetric average responses to increases vs. decreases in
labour endowments.
The study developed variations of the separation model to test for this asym-
metric non-separation and to better predict labour responses and the effect of
market failures in rural areas. This setting includes heterogeneity of agricultural
seasons, gender composition, and the influence of different agro-ecological zones.
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By applying this approach to representative survey data in Ethiopia, Uganda,
Tanzania, and Malawi, Dillon, Brummund, and Mwabu (2017) showed that dif-
ferent outcomes across countries cannot be identified from standard survey data
without allowing for asymmetries.The lesson is rather clear: generalizations of ini-
tial country-specific findings will mislead policies. The multifaceted structures of
sub-Saharan labour markets mean the results from one region cannot simply be
taken as representative of all settings.
In the context of this chapter, the overall descriptive findings once again
highlight the complexity of the rural sector in low-income countries.
1. Labour supply to the household farm is more variable over the course of
the year and larger than labour supply to themarket.
2. Farmwork, in contrast tomarketwork, also includesoldhouseholdmem-
bers beyond classic retirement age. For instance, 80-year-olds work the same
average number of farm days as 40-year-olds and work more hours than
20-year-olds.
3. Labour endowment within households is continuously changing. Be-
tween survey waves, 40–80% of all households (depending on the count
of children who age into the labour force) had to adapt to a change in the
number of working-age members.
4. Since there is no clear pattern of how variability in household size may be
correlated within villages, it is difficult to predefine source anddestination
villages for internalmigration.
5. Newly arrived internal migrants spend similar time working on the farm as
existing household members.
Empirical findings based on the enhanced separation model—that allows for
asymmetric non-separation and variation through the agricultural seasons—show
rather similar patterns of excess labour supply (labour demand constraints) in
the rural areas of all four countries. But there is substantial heterogeneity across
the agricultural calendar, genders, and agro-ecological zones. Longer periods of
labour underutilization are followed by intensive farm work. Labour supply con-
straints seem to be more binding for women than men, in that it is less likely for
female farm work to be replaced in the market. Rationing of working hours in the
market, for example in the face of inflexible (‘sticky’) wages preventing job oppor-
tunities for the household, leads to non-separation: household members engage
in family farm work as long as their labour continues to generate returns (more
technically, their marginal revenue product) above the market wage.
Interestingly, the opposite appears to be true for the poorest households in
Ethiopia where binding labour supply constraints seem to be present, caused by
financial market deficiencies rather than a physical shortage of workers. This hints
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at specific labour market failures in Ethiopia that need further investigation and
would not have been easily detected without asymmetric modelling.
The policy conclusions suggested by Dillon, Brummund, and Mwabu (2017,
2019) require that policies be better tailored to a country’s specific conditions.
Given the widespread shortfall in non-farm opportunities in rural areas, strategies
to avoid strong non-separation in less-intensive phases of the agricultural cycle
would be very useful. In non-mechanized agriculture, the over-supply of labour in
the lean season is difficult to avoid, since harvesting is still very labour-intensive
in many developing countries. More mechanization would reduce labour demand
and could, in principle, redirect rural excess labour to the private market.
Initiatives to encourage mechanization would fail, however, if policy inter-
ventions did not tackle the issue of how to extend the availability of low-to-
medium-skilled jobs in non-farm sectors.The latter seems the better strategy, since
mechanizationwould then bewidely adopted in response to shrinking rural labour
supply.
4.1.2 Do Rural Households Allocate their Labour Efficiently?
This argument leads to the question of whether rural households in low-income
regions are able to allocate their working time optimally between farm and non-
farm activities, and which factors may act as barriers to time-allocation efficiency.
Recent research on the allocation of labour (see for example Berg 2013; Karlan
et al. 2014) has made it clear that estimations of marginal products of labour
(the return for an extra hour worked) need to account for market failures in terms
of informational or financial constraints, or excessive risks, that are widespread in
the labourmarkets of LICs. In this case, households fail to properly distribute their
labour input between the fields of activity and miss opportunities to increase their
labour income. To have a clear judgement on this topic is important with regards
to strategies aimed at enhancing sector productivity, which could yield positive
outcomes if households respond by reallocating their labour supply along these
productivity lines.
Supported by GLM|LIC, Brummund and Merfeld (2016) undertook a case
study for Malawi which shows one of the lowest rates of non-farm business cre-
ation among rural households (see Nagler and Naudé 2014 in the sub-Saharan
region. With a share of just 17% in 2014, Malawi ranked far below Ethiopia (30%),
Tanzania (41%), Uganda (45%), Nigeria (51%), and Niger (59%). Despite this,
Malawi is the only country that contributes comprehensive data on non-farm
activities to the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study (Integrated
Surveys on Agriculture, LSMS-ISA); its 2010 and 2013 data were the basis for the
study.
While only data on the number of workers is available for other sub-Saharan
countries, the LSMS for Malawi includes information on worker characteristics
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as well as days and hours worked. The survey reveals that Malawian house-
holds that are engaged in non-farm and agricultural activities are older and
less educated than all households with non-farm enterprises, but younger and
more educated than all households operating farm businesses, to cite only a few
characteristics. The authors note, though, that the survey data still include sub-
stantial weaknesses (for example, lacking detailed information on other inputs into
non-farm production apart from household labour).Therefore errors in the speci-
fication of the non-farm production function cannot be ruled out, whichmay lead
to its overestimation.
Even against this background of imperfect data, the results are noteworthy and
highlight the range of potential future research in this field. In all four specifi-
cations of the applied model, the financial returns of an extra hour worked are
larger in non-farm activities than in agriculture. Reallocating labour from farm
to non-farm enterprises could thus increase overall household income.
These kinds of discrepancies between productivity in farm versus non-farm
activities may indicate dysfunctional labour markets and the presence of risks,
mainly in agricultural production, that cause household allocation decisions to
be less than completely optimal. If agriculture is riskier than any non-farm activ-
ity, households will allocate more labour resources to safer non-farm work. As a
result, the marginal revenue generated by labour will fall relative to that of labour
in agriculture.
Interestingly, however, in the case of households that operate both types of busi-
nesses in the same survey wave, the difference in the marginal revenue generated
by labour in farm and non-farm work was no longer significant: these house-
holds seem to allocate their resources efficiently. Or, put more carefully, there is
no evidence that these households are inefficient in allocating their labour.
Conversely, this finding suggests that simply reconsidering howmuch time to
spend on rural or non-farmwork, and switching resources to increase income,
will not be a realistic option for many low-income households. Any income
advantage would need to stem from the increased returns the households may
generate from both fields of activity. This points to the need to stimulate produc-
tivity across sectors to enhance poor households’ income prospects. It is certainly
not a new debate, but the study provides some evidence that raising productivity
will increase the efficiency of labour (re-)allocation in low-income countries.
4.1.3 Measuring Farm Labour Input in Agriculture
Amajor challenge in the field of agricultural economics is the difficulty to precisely
measure labour inputs. This is particularly the case for the small-scale farm sec-
tor, which represents the majority of agricultural projects in developing countries.
These farms employ mostly family members; thus, there is no wage income in
which to anchor recall estimates. Written records are rarely kept and the respon-
dents have to rely on recall to report on past events. To arrive at the total amount of
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labour allocated by a household to farming, the household must accurately report
the plots under cultivation, the specific household members who worked on each
plot, the activities performed, and their timing and duration.
Given that farming is a seasonal activity and work patterns are irregular dur-
ing the season, reporting average time farming after the completion of the season
requires remembering distant events and making complicated calculations. Alter-
natively, reporting hours worked over the last seven days at any single point during
the agricultural season will not necessarily be indicative of total labour during the
season especially when labour inputs vary considerably across weeks during the
season.
A GLM|LIC study by Arthi et al. (2017, 2018) examines this issue. To assess
the degree of recall bias in household farm labour, the authors conducted a survey
experiment in Mara region, Tanzania, over the long rainy season between January
and June 2014. Households were randomly assigned to one of the following three
alternative survey designs:
1. Weekly visit (benchmark): weekly face-to-face surveys for the duration of
the season.
2. Weekly phone (alternative): weekly phone surveys for the duration of the
season.
3. Recall modules (business-as-usual): single face-to-face survey at the end of
the agricultural season.
The authors find recall bias in the reporting of family farm labour. Labour data
collected on a weekly basis, whether in person or by phone, are similar, albeit
sometimes moderately statistically different. There are, however, striking and
economically meaningful differences between the weekly and recall data. Respon-
dents in recall modules report working up to about four times as many hours per
person per plot, compared with respondents reporting labour on a weekly basis.
However, they tend to under-report both the number of household members and
plots active in farm cultivation. Evidence suggests that these sources of recall bias
are driven not only by failures in memory, but also by the mental burdens of re-
porting on highly variable agricultural work patterns to provide a typical estimate.
All things equal, studies suffering from this bias would understate agricultural
labour productivity.
A main result that comes out strongly in this study is encouraging the perfor-
mance of the phone surveys, which show little difference from the results obtained
in the benchmark weekly visit design. The results of this project have implications
for the debate on why value added per worker is so much lower in the agricul-
tural sector than in the non-agricultural sector—and how such a difference can
be sustained in the long-term. The findings suggest that measurement and data
quality may be especially important here. Studies suffering from similar recall bias
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would overstate how much people work on farms, which, ceteris paribus, leads to
underestimates of labour productivity on these farms.
4.2 Seasonality, LimitedAccess to FinancialMarkets,
and the Challenge of SmoothingConsumption
As touched on in the section 4.1, financial constraints and the absence of for-
mal credit markets are among the most important barriers to further economic
development in rural areas, as well as households’ ability to allocate their work-
ing resources more efficiently. Although growing quickly, the literature has not
yet fully covered all aspects of this important topic. GLM|LIC is supporting an
innovative, still-ongoing research project to investigate the impact of relaxing sea-
sonal fiscal constraints on rural labour supply, productivity, household income,
and private consumption.
The research project, supported by GLM|LIC, by Fink, Jack, and Masiye (2014,
2017, 2020) focused on small-scale farming households in Zambia, as the most
common form of agricultural activities in sub-Saharan Africa, and revealed un-
der which circumstances relieving credit constraints may be an efficient measure
to allow poor farming families to secure their living. These households face a sig-
nificant challenge every year. A long dry season and a lack of irrigation allow for
only one harvest per year, while ownership of livestock, which could help diversity
production, is limited. Crop yields and sales revenues from theMay to July harvest
season must last for the rest of the year, including the difficult ‘lean’ or ‘hungry’
season from January to March. Natural disasters and climate effects may further
aggravate these households’ living conditions and socio-economic prospects.
Many rural households in Zambia (and the entire sub-Saharan region) are likely
to be confronted with increasing food shortages during the lean season, indicating
a lack of the liquidity needed to buy additional food (see Figure 4.2). Selling rural
land or livestock, if owned, in times of urgent need will not work efficiently due
to the likelihood of price erosion during the most challenging seasonal periods
and could even further reduce families’ medium-term welfare. Changing produc-
tion plans (for example crop mix) will mostly not provide a short-term solution
either andmay even result in additional risks, including income loss and increasing
vulnerability to external (climate and weather) shocks.
Farming households have, in theory, four options to cover immediate liquidity
and consumption needs: rely on their own savings, if they exist; raise short-term
bridging credit; migrate for the season in search of employment; or generate in-
come from alternative local farm or non-farm labour. Sustainable savings are
frequently absent in poor rural settings, despite cautious household behaviour.
Relying on credit is not a viable option for many households because access to
banking products is still very limited in many rural areas. Borrowing would also





























































Fig. 4.2 Seasonal Increase of Food Shortages among
Small-Scale Farming Households in Zambia
Source: Fink, Jack, and Masiye (2014), authors’ 2012 survey data
require suitable collateral which poor farmers are often unable to provide. The
migration option poses large risks for household members left behind, and un-
certain returns on investment that may not offset the absence of a primary (male)
worker.
This leaves many rural households at risk, with the only option being to of-
fer their labour to other farm enterprises or the non-farm market to generate
additional short-term wage income. Independent of their chances of repeatedly
obtaining such jobs in order to avoid running out of savings and food, this strat-
egy has the disadvantage that it requires households to reduce the labour put into
their own farming activities.
These pressuresmay also induce a seasonal increase in child labour (see Chapter
7 in this volume). As a GLM|LIC study by Galdo, Dammert, and Abebaw (2018)
has discovered through timed surveys in rural Ethiopia, child labour levels vary
substantially through the agricultural seasons, with high rates of 45% to 76% in
the rainy and harvest periods.That is, child labourmay serve as ameans to enlarge
labour intensity on families’ own farms and be viewed by farming households as
insurance to alleviate constraints in the lean season.
If households cannot manage to enlarge their internal labour supply, they face
a high risk of jeopardizing the subsequent success of sowing and harvesting on
their own land. Reducing labour input will most likely result in less harvest output,
which in turn implies fewer resources to invest in the forthcoming season, putting
farming households in even greater danger of staying trapped in a vicious circle.
Regardless, selling their labour appears to be the most common choice of
Zambian households at risk. Similar to the increasing share of families reporting
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Fig. 4.3 Seasonal Increase of Short-Term Work on Other
Farms (Ganyu) among Small-Scale Farming Households in
Zambia
Source: Fink, Jack, and Masiye (2014), authors’ 2012 survey data
food shortages shortly after the harvest season, but on an even higher level, farm-
ing households surveyed stated they were increasingly engaged in so-called ganyu
work (short-term, cash-paid labour on other private farms) over the course of the
agricultural year (see Figure 4.3).
These survey findings, presented by Fink, Jack, and Masiye (2014, 2020), are
consistent with other studies depicting different levels of consumption across
agricultural periods. However, the existing literature has not yet thoroughly
established the connection between seasonally varying household income and
consumption smoothing.
For example, Chaudhuri and Paxson (2002) noted different findings in an
earlier case study on Indonesia based on simulation modelling that suggested
a ‘buffering behaviour’ (p. 9) as a coping strategy for households. Indepen-
dently of substantial variation in the timing of income flows, the households
under study showed similar and rather smooth seasonal consumption patterns.
According to the study, this may indicate that precautionary savings (cash
and grain) could replace credit markets or the external labour of household
members in supporting necessary consumption under the constraints of highly
seasonal income. To assume that such a buffering ability to save resources
could apply to a significant extent in the sub-Saharan setting—where extreme
poverty is widespread—seems questionable but may deserve further research
attention.
A study by Dercon and Krishnan (2000) based on data from rural Ethiopia re-
vealed a high variability in poverty and consumption, not only across agricultural
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seasons but also over years. Consumption levels react to shocks such as natural
disasters and crop failure, and families respond to seasonal incentives regarding
market prices and changing labour demand. It appears that more households are
vulnerable to shocks than previously thought, and their consumption patterns
depend largely on the agricultural season.
In a randomized experiment in Mali, Beaman et al. (2014) modified a micro-
credit programme to promote agricultural investments via unconditional grants
or loans, observing that participating farmers significantly increased their invest-
ments and revenues when benefiting from the cash grant, whereas the loan did not
show an impact at all. Labour supply effects were not studied.
Karlan et al. (2014) have shown that incomplete insurance affects agricul-
tural investment decisions—and will of course also influence other economic
behaviour—with the example of Northern Ghana, where farmers were randomly
offered either a cash grant, rainfall index insurance, or a combination of both.
Access to insurance led to an increase in investments, facilitated the access to
additional financial resources, and made farmers more likely to take risks with
production. The study concluded that broadening the range of insurance, and tai-
loring it to the special needs of farmers while making insurance affordable, may be
more important than credit-based inflow of capital in fostering agricultural invest-
ment. Although Karlan et al. (2014) did not control for any effects regarding the
allocation of labour, it may be assumed that a wider reach of agricultural insurance
would impact rural working decisions as well.
Khandker (2012) addressed seasonal food shortages and differences in poverty
levels in rural Bangladesh, concluding that these are mainly due to the seasonality
of households’ income and consumption. Besides encouraging seasonal migra-
tion, policy interventions should thus focus on granting targeted loans to reduce
negative seasonal effects on poverty.
The impact of such seasonal loan programmes has been analysed by, among
others, Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak (2014), with a focus on encouraging
longer-distance seasonal labour mobility through grants and credit. These ap-
peared to fail in the experimental setting, given risk aversion and limited access
to additional credit. The loan incentive did not increase mobility to welfare-
maximizing levels. This issue will be investigated further by ongoing GLM|LIC
research on seasonal migration and agricultural labour markets in Nepal, which
will focus on whether subsidies encouraging temporary labour migration in the
lean season positively affects labour supply and demand as well as the seasonal
food insecurity. This research project has two goals: (1) to experimentally test
whether a seasonal migration subsidy programme adapted to the setting of ru-
ral Nepal shows similar promise in addressing seasonal food insecurity there, and
(2) to tackle previously unexplored questions on how migration may transform
rural, agricultural labour markets by studying the effects of seasonal migration on
both rural labour supply and labour demand. This requires a more sophisticated
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experimental designs that also target the labour demand side, which was never
done in Bangladesh.
The optimal timing of financial transfers to enhance rural welfare has been the
focus of two recent studies. Bazzi, Sumarto, and Suryahadi (2015) confirmed that
delayed transfers matter with respect to household consumption, based on the
example of a large-scale unconditional cash transfer programme run in Indonesia.
More interestingly in our context, Burke, Bergquist, and Miguel (2019) anal-
ysed the timing and seasonality of microcredits against the empirical evidence
that regular seasonal grain price variation does mostly not lead Kenyan small-
scale farmers to systematically buy at low prices. The study found that credit
constraints prevent farmers from exploiting opportunities for arbitrage. Timing
access to credit products along seasonal lines could therefore enable farmers to
buy and sell near the optimal price, which would in turn increase revenues and
household income, and raise microcredit efficiency.
4.2.1 Do Cash or Grain Loans Tackle Lean-Season Constraints?
This instructive finding leads us back to the studies by Fink, Jack, and Masiye
(2014, 2020), which ran loan experiments with some 3,000 farming households
in 175 rural villages in Eastern Zambia between 2013 and 2015. These were based
on an RCT rolled out in January 2014, right at the beginning of the lean season.
One group of participants was offered a cash loan of 200 Kwacha (33 USD), repre-
senting roughly one-third of the averagemonthly expenditure of rural households.
Another group received an equivalent value of 150 kg of maize (Zambia’s staple
crop) to cover the basic food needs of a five-person family for a minimum of two
months during the hungry season.
Both loans were announced during initial village meetings, to be repaid at the
end of the harvest season in July at an interest rate of around 30% over fivemonths
(though the actual interest rate for the maize loan depended on grain price fluctu-
ation). This interest rate is far lower than the rates offered by local credit markets,
of around 40% on average, as self-reported in the baseline survey. Eligible par-
ticipants received information about the terms of the loan (but not the duration
of the programme) and had to sign a consent form before being given the loan.
Repayment dates were notified in advance to the villages; cash or grain was
collected at central locations.
The experiment was carried out over two years, with the second loan period
starting in January 2015. This allowed the study team to rotate the treatment
groups in the second year, so that control group households thus far untreated
were assigned to one of the active groups, while some treated households rotated
into the control group. Participants who had not fully repaid their loans in the first
year were excluded from the programme (the only punishment included in the
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approach). By applying this experimental strategy, the study aimed to identify the
persistence of results and the different impact of repeat and first-time treatments.
In addition, timing effects weremeasured: in the second programme phase, half of
the treated villages were told about the loan offers in September, at the beginning
of the planting season, the other half were told in January.
Descriptive statistics from the authors’ baseline household survey and also ad-
ministrative data confirm that a detailed assessment of seasonal loan programmes
is highly relevant: low cash and grain reserves at the beginning of the lean sea-
son were anticipated by 75% of participating farming households. Cash savings
in a bank were reported by just 5%, beyond 75% saved money at home, if at all.
Average cash savings at the beginning of the planting season were just 80 Kwacha
(40% of the cash loan offered during the experiment). Notably, some 60% of the re-
spondents reported saving via grain storage (200 kg on average), but also reported
storage losses during the past season at the same rate.
Access to formal cash loans frombanks or other public sources was very limited,
reported by only 5% of households. Informal loans were low as well, with around
7% using moneylenders and roughly 8% taking money from other households.
These informal cash loans came at a fairly highmonthly interest rate of around 30%
(though less than the reported average rate for non-family/friend loans). Take-up
peaked during the planting and harvest season at 40% of households, dropping
to 15% during the hungry season. Hardly any households (1%) used alternative
loan programmes offered bymicrocredit institutions or local associations. In-kind
input loans of seeds or fertilizers were more common (40% in the baseline survey)
than borrowing of cash or food.
Evaluating the data further reveals that working ganyu on other rural farms
is the most common strategy for coping with food shortages. While seasonal
migration is nearly non-existent in rural Zambia, more than half of the survey
participants reported favouring ganyu over borrowing from their social network
(28%), using their savings (22%), or selling livestock and assets (17%). Roughly
two-thirds reported having sold their labour supply in the season prior to the ex-
periment, and also anticipated resorting to this in the coming season. Ganyu work
is usually organized in the local village labour markets, with some farms rotating
from a seller to a buyer role during the season. Last but not least, limitations to
land access do not seem to constrain households’ rural production.
In summary, the experimental design of Fink, Jack, and Masiye (2014, 2020)
yields a number of enlightening findings and policy-relevant insights. High
acceptance of the loan programme resulted in average take-up rates of 98% and
97% for the cash and grains treatments in both years, with remarkably high rates
of full repayment of 95% and 80% (see Figure 4.4).The study explains lower repay-
ment rates in the second year mainly through worsened harvest incomes due to a
lack of rainfall in 2015. However, it also finds some behavioural patterns and learn-
ing effects: villages where at least one farmer failed to repay in the first year without

































Fig. 4.4 Take-up and Repayment Rates of Cash and Grains
Loan




































Fig. 4.5 Average Impact of Cash and Grains Loan Relative to
Control Group
Source: Fink, Jack, and Masiye (2017)
any consequences besides being excluded from further participation, showed a
strong decline in repayment rates of roughly 30 percentage points. Other villages
revealed rather low repayment defaults of 6 percentage points.
Beyond these figures, the overall impact of the programme can be considered
positive in many respects (see Figure 4.5):
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1. Increased agricultural output and income. Participating households
increased their total output by an average of 8% across both interventions,
with a larger, but statistically insignificant effect resulting from the cash loan
(11%) than the grain loan (5.6%). This may be partly due to behavioural ef-
fects with regards to early notification of programme extension at the start of
the planting season. Even with a conservative view, an output increase of at
least 5%—corresponding to about ten days of additional labour earnings—
underlines the effectiveness of the stimulus in increasing families’ labour
income.
2. Increased household consumption. The loan programmes resulted in a
significant reduction in food insecurity. For both loan types, participating
householdswere roughly 37% less likely to face food shortages, and extended
the frequency and quality of their daily meals, while the loans did not affect
consumption in the harvest season. Thus, the treatment helped to reduce
seasonal variation in consumption.
3. Increased labour onown farms. Eligible households were 10% less likely to
sell labour and engage in ganyu work on other farms during the lean season.
Hours worked on external land fell by an average of 23% across the pro-
gramme. Consequently, farmers were able to spend seven additional work
hours per week on their own farms, on average. At the same time, treated
households were 25% more likely to hire ganyu labour for their own farms.
4. Decreased dependency on informal or private loans. The loan programme
significantly reduced the need to borrow money on the informal market (at
average monthly interest rates of 40%) or take loans from friends or family.
5. Unclear persistence of effects. The level of participants taking up a second
loan in year two of the programme (98%) suggests a very high acceptance
of the loan offers, even though they were at a substantial interest rate. How-
ever, the overall impact of the loan programme seems to be mostly down
to first-year effects. Second-year effects were mostly substantially lower or
insignificant, and the study does not find clear evidence of persistence.
This result, though presumably due in part to drastically worse weather
conditions in the second year, deserves further research attention.
Some core policy implications stem from the outcomes presented by Fink, Jack,
and Masiye (2014, 2020):
1. Timing of liquidity support is important. Policies to relieve financial (and
food) constraints during the lean agricultural season are effective in the
presence of underdeveloped financial markets. They may lead to less con-
sumption fluctuation and thus help households to escape from poverty
traps.
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2. Targeted loan schemes address income inequality. Resolving barriers to
financial resources may contribute to reallocating labour towards more
constrained farming households, and away from external activities. In the
absence of functioning labourmarkets,more efficient investment of families’
resources on their own farms will lead to improvements in the productivity,
food-security, and total well-being of disadvantaged rural households, thus
alleviating income inequality.
3. Small-scale loans at moderate interest rates are efficient. If well targeted,
even low levels of loans may serve to substantially improve living conditions
and increase agricultural output, while the willingness and ability of farmers
to pay interest rates should not be underestimated.
4. Lean season shortages may be further eased through tailored savings
mechanisms. In rural areas of developing countries, credit constraints are
frequently accompanied by limited access to savings facilities and electronic
banking technologies. Establishing trust in reliable banking infrastructure
and shaping savings products to the needs of small-scale farmers may
complement the loan approach well.
4.3 Are PWPs Effective in Rural Settings?
In the absence of functioning market solutions, many low-income countries op-
erate large-scale public works—or workfare—programmes (PWPs) as a tool for
increasing social protection and labour market attachment among the most vul-
nerable population groups in urban and rural areas.These programmes, frequently
supported by international development aid, are based on a strict cash-for-work
principle and are designed with a number of goals in mind, including employ-
ment creation, poverty reduction, and infrastructure development. They are not
field of policy intervention unique to developing countries, though. Many devel-
oped countries run similar programmes to provide incentives to take up jobs and
thus escape dependency on social transfers in the long run.
Whether such programmes are cost efficient and sufficiently well targeted to
achieve the desired outcomes depends on their design and the (strong or weak)
incentives to take part in the labour force provided by a country’s socio-economic
conditions. Subsidizing public work separately from the private markets may gen-
erate completely different overall effects than a strategy to support take-up of
regular jobs by raising market wages to a level that workers will consider ac-
ceptable. However, defective labour market structures in most LICs leave only
limited opportunity to pursue the latter strategy. Furthermore, developing coun-
tries’ PWPs need to maintain a set of objectives that reach beyond the labour
market attachment of workers, to tackle issues such as basic food security and
fundamental social stability.
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Against this general background, economic research has evaluated exist-
ing public work programmes in developing countries. The two largest PWPs
worldwide—India’s ‘Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme’ (NREGS) and Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)—
have captured researchers’ attention.
According to Berg et al. (2018), average agricultural wages among the poor
increased significantly after the Indian NREGS programme was introduced at
the district level, implying that its impact reaches beyond just active partici-
pants. Ravi and Engler (2015) found that participation in NREGS raised the
probability of savings existing in poor households, while increasing both con-
sumption and food security. Imbert and Papp (2015) showed indirect effects of
the programme; higher private welfare gains appeared to result from a crowding-
out effect of public sector hiring that in turn increased wages in the low-skill
private sector. Indirect effects were also studied by Zimmermann (2020), pro-
viding evidence that the NREGS serves as a safety net without distorting the
labour market, for example making self-employment less risky for the poor. Azam
(2012) conducted a natural experiment, documenting the substantially positive
impact of India’s PWP on overall labour market participation. According to the
study, which has been confirmed and enriched by GLM|LIC research (see Field
et al. 2017, 2019, and Chapter 8 in this volume), this positive outcome is mostly
driven by gender effects showing a larger increase in female participation rates
and wages. Afridi, Mukhopadhyay, and Sahoo (2016) revealed that greater par-
ticipation of mothers in the programme led to increased educational success
for their children, whereas fathers’ participation negatively affected children’s
education.
Turning to the second largest public works programme in Ethiopia, Hoddinott
et al. (2012) investigated short-term food security effects as well as the longer-term
impact on agricultural productivity, and the combined effect of participating in the
PSNP and accompanying public programmes addressing food security and house-
hold asset building. Isolated PSNP participation showed no effect on productivity,
while combined transfers were more effective in this respect. Berhane et al. (2014)
revealed that longer PSNP participation yielded clearly positive outcomes, with
respect to the length of households’ lean season and livestock holdings. The study
found that combined transfers through additional participation in the food- and
asset-orientated programmes increase these effects even further.
4.3.1 The Malawian PWP Missed Its Goals
Research supported by GLM|LIC (Beegle, Galasso, and Goldberg 2017) enriched
this picture by studying Malawi’s PWP, which has operated under the Malawi So-
cial Action Fund (MASAF) since the mid-1990s. The programme ranks just after
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India’s and Ethiopia’s in terms of the size of the eligible population and aims to
enhance food security as well as the use of agricultural inputs (for example fer-
tilizers) by offering short-term employment to poor households. As of 2004, the
programme has been directly linked to a fertilizer coupon intervention (Farm
Input Subsidy Programme) available during the planting season. Unlike oth-
ers, the Malawian PWP’s timing does not focus on the lean season. Since 2012
it has covered roughly 500,000 households per year. Labour, allocated to eligi-
ble village households through a multi-stage decision process, mainly consists of
construction, road rehabilitation, irrigation, and afforestation.
Work projects are segmented into two twenty-four-day cycles, with the first cy-
cle aligned with the planting season of October to December, while the second
cycle of public work projects is scheduled for June and July, immediately after
harvest. At the time of the study, the daily wage rate was 300 Malawian Kwacha
(0.92 USD), to be paid in four twelve-day intervals. Participants could thus earn a
maximum of 44.16 USD over forty-eight total PWP working days. Given low na-
tional income in Malawi, this sum is not negligible. It is rather low, however, when
compared to existing social protection transfers.
For the randomised control trial conducted by Beegle, Galasso, and Goldberg
(2017) during the 2012–2013 agricultural calendar, selected villages were assigned
to a control and four treatment groups. These were treated identically in the first
cycle but differently in the second cycle. The research team varied both the tim-
ing of the programme (lean season replacing the standard timing aligned with
the end of harvest) to capture buffer and consumption smoothing effects, and
the schedule of payments (split payment after each three days of public work,
instead of the standard arrangement of lump sum after twelve days) to examine
changes in consumption patterns. The combined effects were studied to identify
possible effects with regards to higher investment, when receiving lump-sum pay-
ment in the planting season, or smoothed consumption due to split payment in
the lean season. Four survey waves investigated how households responded to the
intervention.
The findings presented by Beegle, Galasso, and Goldberg (2017) are mostly
rather disappointing with respect to the programme’s main objective of improving
food security.
1. Treated households workedmore for the programme than the control group
did, and this did not crowd out labour supply to the private sector. However,
the study does not find evidence for any positive effect on food security in
the lean season when compared to households in villages without access to
PWP jobs. There is also no indication that PWP households were enabled
to use more agricultural input via the programme, or that they transferred
PWP income to savings. This cannot be traced back to households using
programme earnings to purchase durable goods instead of food, according
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to the study.Ownership of durable goods did not increase, andmarket prices
did not change.
2. The Malawian public works programme did not lead to tightening of
labour markets. The study did not find evidence of increased reservation
wages (the lowest wage a worker will accept) and reduced labour supply.
3. Rescheduling the second cycle of public work to the lean season did not
generate any considerable improvements in food security. This lack of any
positive effects from shifting half of the forty-eight-day PWP to the lean sea-
son undermines the argument that raising the level of income provided by
the PWP would result in a different impact. Varying timing and payment
frequency does not seem to induce changes in behaviour.
4. Furthermore, even the desired interlinkage effect with the specific fertil-
izer subsidy scheme was not present, thus suggesting no complementary
relationship. The programme neither increased short-term food security
through additional household income, nor did it generate any such effect
in the longer term through intensified use of fertilizers.
5. Instead, the study finds some indication of anegative indirect effectofPWP
participationon the food securityofneighbouring, untreatedhouseholds
in villages with PWP presence. This undesired outcome may at least partly
be explained by untreated households’ immediate reaction to changes in
the consumption of PWP participants after receiving payment. Assum-
ing that untreated households increase their consumption along the lines
of their PWP neighbours, they would need to reduce consumption later
on and thus may suffer greater food insecurity. Which variables explain
this effect remains unclear, though studies on other PWPs do find rather
positive spillover effects, for example on the casual wage rate (for India,
see for example Deiniger and Liu 2013; Imbert and Papp 2015).
6. The study does not exclude the possibility that small-scale effects, not de-
tected in the data, may have occurred and increased participants’ welfare to
a certain extent, even if the PWP failed to achieve its main goals. This would
explain why the take-up rate of the programme is rather high. Financial
diaries could provide a way for future studies to investigate this.
Overall, the results provided by Beegle, Galasso, and Goldberg (2017) seem to
strongly contradict most of these studies on the public works programmes in India
and Ethiopia. However, it should be noted that the Malawian PWP significantly
differs from these more positively evaluated programme settings. Both the Indian
and Ethiopian PWPs are designed as insurance schemes guaranteeing work and
income over an extended period and at a higher intensity of transfer. It is possible
that the magnitude of earnings in the Malawi programme, given the low wage and
limited number of days of work provided, was simply too small to have measur-
able effects on food consumption, especially if households spread the income over
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many weeks. A programme with longer duration and higher wages might be more
successful. Designers of PWPs should carefully evaluate the magnitude of earn-
ings and the duration and flexibility of work in order to be sure that programmes
have a significant impact on participating households.
Given that thirty-nine out of forty-eight sub-Saharan countries run PWPs,
and that research has not yet been able to deliver an in-depth cross-country
analysis of their socio-economic reach (due to constraints in comparable data),
the reminder by Beegle, Galasso, and Goldberg (2017, p. 22) that ‘PWPs
will not always have significant and measurable welfare effects’ should not go
unheard.
Key Takeaways from this Chapter
• Due to underdeveloped manufacturing and secondary sectors in many
African countries, better skilled workers may actually face higher unem-
ployment risks.
• Labour market policies should not focus solely on manufacturing as key
to economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa.
• More mechanization would reduce farm labour demand, which is often
highly seasonal, but must be paired with policies to improve non-farm
opportunities in rural areas.
• To enhance poor households’ income prospects, productivity needs to be
stimulated across sectors as switching from farm to non-farm work is not
always an option.
• Timing access to credit along seasonal lines could allow farmers to buy and
sell near optimal price, thus relieving their financial constraints during the
lean season.
• Loan schemes targeted to small-scale farmers could be complemented
with better access to savings facilities and electronic banking technologies.
• Public works programmes, though often positively assessed, may fail to
achieve better food security if the duration is too short and the timing not
flexible enough.
References
Afridi, F., Mukhopadhyay, A., and Sahoo, S., 2016. Female Labor Force Participa-
tion and Child Education in India: Evidence from the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme. IZA Journal of Labor and Development, 5(7).
Arthi, V., Beegle, K., De Weerdt, J., and Palacios-López, A., 2017. Not Your Average
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The Impact ofMigration on Employment
Outcomes
Migration flows caused by precarious living conditions, civil wars, or environ-
mental shocks in low-income countries are widely discussed in policy debates in
the countries receiving migrants. Many development aid programmes focus on
overcoming so-called push factors that drive emigration, especially among young
people. While the reasons behind emigration are manifold, a key aim for poli-
cymakers is the creation and stabilization of employment conditions and labour
market structures, in order to offer better local prospects to potential emigrants.
However, securing better prospects for higher-qualified and employed people
does not guarantee a reduction in migration incentives. On the contrary, many
studies reveal that it is mostly the better qualified that aim to emigrate when faced
with a lack of prospects, or with uncertainty about their societies’ future prospects.
Most of these migrants, though, remain in the region or move to a neighbouring
country—only a smaller share migrate internationally. For this group, better qual-
ifications, information, and networking lead to the rising power of economic ‘pull
factors’ in destination countries. ‘Brain drain’ effects, with respect to a country’s
stock of human capital and supply of qualified labour, may exacerbate the deficits.
At the same time, positive effects of emigration from low-income regions to
developed-destination countries should not be underestimated. It is not only mi-
grants who may benefit from employment and education abroad; their families
and entire societymay gain from the returningmigration of better-qualified work-
ers as well as from money sent home while working in a developed country. Also,
emigration of qualified workers faced with ineffective labour markets, high un-
employment or social upheaval may relieve tension from a society, at least for a
limited period of time, while increasing the chances of ‘brain gains’ later on. Un-
der certain conditions,migrationmay also be seen as a stepping stone for emerging
and developing countries to better integrate into the world economy, as they ben-
efit from migrants’ networking. ‘Brain drain versus brain gain’ is a lcontroversial
topic in migration economics and the debate is ongoing.
Policymakers should not overlook another aspect. From most developing and
low-income countries’ perspectives, migration presents a dual challenge: interna-
tional migration is often accompanied by rural–urban migration. This migration
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on the national level may bring economic and social benefits to disadvantaged
population groups, as well as overall economic gains, and thus should be advanced
and well organized. But it may also aggravate unemployment and generate precar-
ious employment scenarios in metropolitan areas in the absence of functioning
regular labour markets. Policies aimed at controlling or stimulating internal
migration flows need to take this into account.
Furthermore, many less-developed countries have experienced long-lasting or
repeated violent conflicts that have caused massive forced migration and refugee
flows into neighbouring LICs. Both the host and the origin societies are faced
with severe challenges: how to host refugees without generating social tensions
and labour market frictions, and how to later reintegrate returning migrants with-
out the creation of economic disadvantages and a new vicious circle of conflicts.
Supported by GLM|LIC, a number of studies and ongoing research projects are
shining new light on this important research area.
5.1 Migration andGlobalization:WhatDoWeKnow?
A rich economic literature has studied the interaction of migration and globaliza-
tion, and evaluated whether the networking of migrants abroad helps to facilitate
the access of their less-developed home countries to the global economy.On behalf
of GLM|LIC, a thorough literature survey (Rapoport, 2016) summed up recent re-
search findings and offered an idea of how migration may explicitly support LICs’
efforts to catch up with globalization trends.
Heated public debates in Western developed societies on ‘mass inflows’ of im-
migrants may lead to the impression that the twenty-first century is experiencing
migration of an unprecedented intensity. In reality, however, we are a long way
from the level of global migration of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury, which saw amassmigration of poor Europeans emigrating in search of better
living conditions elsewhere.During this episode, the share ofmigrants in theworld
population had been up to three times higher than it is today, with a remarkably
stable share of around 3% sustained over several decades.
As Rapoport (2016) pointed out, the role of migration as part of ongoing
globalization has changed since the 1960s. More than half of the current total
worldmigration takes place as South–Northmigration, fromdeveloping countries
to the highly developed world. It does not—as during the European emigra-
tion episode—substantially reduce population growth in the origin countries, but
it is a crucial factor in building links between LICs and the world’s most ad-
vanced economies. An increasing number of migrants are highly qualified—as
of today, more than 40% have passed tertiary education. While earlier literature
argued that a resulting brain drain could severely delay a developing country’s
economic progress, more recent research contradicts this with the argument that
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Fig. 5.1 Intensity of the Brain Drain (as Share of Human Capital Stock) by Region,
1975–2000
Source: Rapoport (2016)
the prospect of migration could act as an incentive for countries to provide ad-
ditional education that could balance the brain drain effects. In fact, brain drain
intensity has been decreasing in some global regions during the last decades, with
only a few—mainly sub-Saharan Africa and Central America—experiencing a
slight increase (see Figure 5.1).
Qualified emigrants help their origin countries connect to advanced societies by
establishing their own networks, sharing their economic success with their fami-
lies at home, returning homewith newly accumulated human capital and finances,
and by overcoming cultural and informational barriers to further economic inte-
gration. As a result, the prospects of less-developed countries better participating
in international trade, and of attracting the inflow of capital and technologies into
their markets, may rise. According to Rapoport (2016, p. 1211), ‘These are the
growth ingredients brought about by globalisation that developing countries need
themost, and skilled emigrants have a strong comparative advantage in “shipping”
them to the home country.’
The literature review clearly underlines the trade-creating effect of migration—
that is, of migration networks. Emigrants establish new information channels,
know about the market and institutional environments in both the home and
host countries, create trust among negotiating parties, and accumulate foreign
language skills that enable them to develop business activities in both direc-
tions. Another relevant trade-stimulating effect results from their own interest in
consuming goods from their home countries, and their ability to affect natives’
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preferences. Most recent studies (for example Parsons and Vézina 2018, studying
the trade-effect of Vietnamese immigrants in the USA) have enriched earlier find-
ingswith natural experiment insights showing thatmigration networks—and their
contribution to removing information barriers—are indeed stimulating bilateral
trade.
As seen by Parsons andVézina (2018), similar effects have been observed by var-
ious studies with respect to foreign direct investments (FDI) and other financial
flows into the home countries of migrants. Skilled migrants at their destination
countries may help reduce uncertainties about the profitability of FDI in their
home countries, as they share information about the labour force at home, local
logistics, procurement, and regulations. Migration fosters new networks that dif-
fuse business information, making a strong impact on FDI intensity. At the same
time, better information on a developing country’s specific financial and institu-
tional framework may lead to lower transaction costs and risk premiums, thus
enhancing financial transactions between migrants’ host and home countries. For
LICs these migration effects are highly relevant, as FDI plays a much larger role in
developing economies than advanced economies.
The diffusion of knowledge and technology adoption is another highly rel-
evant aspect of migration. Recent studies have explored to what extent migra-
tion networks drive innovation in their origin countries, by studying aspects
including: networks of inventors; co-authorship of patents; the evolution of ex-
port baskets; and international knowledge flows. In sum, similar factors come
into play here: to overcome information asymmetries, create trust, and stim-
ulate collaborations is an obvious prerequisite for knowledge diffusion. New
studies (for example Miguelez 2018) also found that, in the field of scien-
tific knowledge and technology migration, networks help establish important
contacts that enable host country partners to take the initiative in knowledge
transfer.
In light of this recent empirical evidence, the role of migration and migrant
networking as a stimulus of further integration of low-income countries into the
world economy—and thus a generator of brain gain—should not be underes-
timated. Migrant networks improve access to foreign markets, foreign invest-
ments and global knowledge networks—essential ingredients for growth and
development.
Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten just howmultifacetedmigration is, from
the perspective of a low-income society: while labourmigration of the better qual-
ified may help to spur economic progress, brain drain effects cannot be ruled out
completely, and other migration forms pose huge challenges. The remainder of
this chapter addresses these challenges, and ways of coping with them, in the field
of international development policies.
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5.2 Rural–UrbanMigration: Learning
fromMobile Phone TrackingData
According to a recent study (De Brauw, Mueller, and Lee 2014), migration rates in
sub-Saharan Africa have been remarkably low in several countries with high pop-
ulation shares in rural areas—despite the clear rural–urban wage gap and other
benefits of migration, such as enabling urban–rural financial transfers or better
risk sharing among household members. Possible explanations for relatively low
rural–urban migration rates include policy restrictions for land owners renting
their properties, an absence of members of the same ethnic group in the destina-
tion area, and a lack of household networks to replace migrants’ labour. This may
create a challenge for economic development, since studies suggest that significant
income growth at the national level is difficult for developing countries without a
shift of jobs from agriculture tomanufacturing and services sectors (seeMcMillan,
Rodrik, and Verduzco-Gallo 2014).
An innovative GLM|LIC research project (see Blumenstock and Donaldson
2017 for a summary of the initial results) builds on these findings by looking
deeper into internal migration flows in a number of LICs. Given the lack of reli-
able survey data, the authors innovate by using tracking data from mobile phones,
which are widespread on the African continent (see Blumenstock 2018 to learn
more about the method of using phone data). This ‘big data’ method allows the
authors to identify migration patterns and observe how migration affects labour
markets in LICs. Based on a terabytes-large data set covering four years, the re-
search project tracks the daily location of several million individuals—among
them tens of thousands of internal migrants. For the LIC of Rwanda, the results
have already been quantified ‘at a spatial and temporal resolution that has not been
achieved in prior research or policy’ (Blumenstock andDonaldson 2017, p. 1f)). To
enrich their ‘big data’ and allow for further assessment, the authors combine data
on changes in local weather, commodity prices, and agricultural yields, that help
identify spatially differentiated shocks to local labour demand—and themigration
response.
According to the analysis, the majority of migrations take place between ru-
ral areas and are not targeted towards larger urban regions. Furthermore, most of
this internal migration lasts less than three months, suggesting a rather cyclical
mobility—driven by demand, season, and weather—of rural workers who return
to their origin at the end of a season. However, the research project reveals that a
substantial share of migrants move on in a circular manner, staying at one or more
other locations before returning home.
These findings indicate that internal migration, on the one hand, responds di-
rectly to seasonal changes in labour demand: workers are ‘pushed’ and ‘pulled’,
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in that they decide to temporarily leave their home region due to local negative
demand changes, or they choose a destination based on expected positive demand
in that destination. On the other hand, the findings underline the limited spatial
range of labour mobility in many LICs, and give policymakers reasons to focus on
rural–urban migration incentives once again.
Further research within the project aims to better understand the root causes
of internal migration by investigating the value of social networks in migration
decisions (Blumenstock, Chi, and Tan 2019). The social network acts not only in
the form of a conduit of information, but also as a source of social and economic
support. According to Blumenstock, Chi, and Tan (2019), the average migrant
benefits more from ‘interconnected’ networks that provide social support than
from ‘expansive’ networks that could act more efficiently in terms of transmitting
information. The paper finds evidence of rivalry in information transmission, es-
pecially in settings where amigrant’s direct contacts have a large number of ‘strong
ties’ in the destination (where tie strength is defined by the frequency of com-
munication). This suggests that there may be rivalry in information sharing in
networks, which suggests that the probability that two people share information
is roughly inversely proportional to the (square root of the) size of their social
networks.
This innovative research approach can be further used to better understand how
internal migration responds to wage differences in labour markets and generates
an optimal allocation of a low-income country’s resources. Innovative research of
this kind is highly relevant in learning more about the causes and dynamics of
national migration flows in LICs, and the types of migration that respond to
different labour market interventions, in order to inform effective policy.
Until now, there has been little empirical knowledge on the short- and
long-term effects of internal migration, and the characteristics of migrants in
LICs. Future studies using the same innovative approach and tools to explore
anonymized mobile phone records will help answer open questions and add to
our picture of LICs’ internal migration patterns, as well as other issues relevant
when tailoring development and labour market policies.
5.3 CircularMigration: Remittances, HumanCapital
Accumulation, and LabourMarketOutcomes
The dynamic spread of mobile phones and phone-based payment services
facilitates international remittances and contributes to a substantial reduction in
transaction costs, thus overcoming barriers and speeding up processes. Empir-
ical evidence indicates that emigrants respond to these trends by sending more
remittances to family members and other recipients back home, while further fi-
nancial service innovations enable them to diversify the nature of remittances and
direct them to savings or investments in human capital and businesses (see for










































Fig. 5.2 Remittances vs. Other International Financial Flows to Developing
Countries, 1990–2009
Note: Billions of constant 2005 USD in total across developing countries (low- and middle-income as
classified by World Bank). Variables displayed are: ‘Net official development assistance and official aid
received (current USD)’, ‘Foreign direct investment (FDI), net inflows (Balance of Payments/BoP,
current USD)’, ‘Workers’ remittances and compensation of employees, received (current USD)’, and
‘Portfolio investment, excluding LCFAR (Liabilities Constituting Foreign Authorities
Reserve/LCFAR; BoP, current USD)’. Data for all flows except Official Development Assistance
(ODA) from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 2010. Data on ODA up to 2008
from WDI 2010, for 2009 from OECD.
Source: Yang (2011)
example Yang 2011). These technological advances will presumably even increase
the importance of emigrants’ remittances as a means of stimulating economic and
social development in their countries of origin.
Remarkably, international remittances have surpassed total official development
aid transactions and total portfolio investments in developing countries since the
late 1990s, and almost reached the level of total foreign direct investment flows
in 2009. More importantly, while portfolio and direct investments are the results
of strategic decisions, and respond immediately to the business cycle, remittances
have been rising continuously. Even in 2008–9, in the wake of the global financial
crisis, remittances have been almost stable—in contrast to sharply falling amounts
of foreign direct investments (see Yang 2011, p. 129f and Figure 5.2) andmirroring
similar stability seen during other economic slowdowns in the recent past (see for
example World Bank 2016).
Remittances represent a substantial share of many migrant workers’ earnings,
revealing a highmotivation to insure their families against economic risks and nat-
ural disasters, support their education, or enable savings, entrepreneurship, and
small business survival (see Yang 2011 for details on the motivations behind re-
mittances). Some studies (for example Ashraf et al. 2011) have emphasized that
new financial services boosted by technological progress may serve the need of
emigrants to better control the use of their remittances.
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However, mobile money technologies are still very unequally distributed
worldwide—with sub-Saharan Africa still facing a large backlog, despite the dy-
namic spread ofmobile phones in the region.This backlog results in high costs and
risks when sending or receiving remittances. Sub-Saharan Africa represents the
most expensive corridors for remittances, while also struggling with substantial
deficits in terms of uptake of bank accounts.
5.3.1 Does Access to Mobile Banking Impact Remittances?
In a recent research project supported by the Growth and Labour Markets in Low-
Income Countries Programme, Batista and Vicente (2017, 2018, 2020) conducted
a behavioural experiment to understand: (1) mobile money adoption patterns; (2)
fundamental outcomes related to welfare, such as consumption and investment;
and (3) the patterns of remittances and savings as mediators for the impact on
the more fundamental economic outcomes. The experiment took place in 102
rural Enumeration Areas (EAs) of southern Mozambique. In half of these loca-
tions, randomly chosen, a set of mobile money dissemination activities took place.
These activities included the recruitment and training of agents, community the-
atres, and community meetings where mobile money services were explained to
the local population, as well as a set of individual dissemination activities includ-
ing registration and experimentation of several mobile money transactions with
trial e-money provided by the campaign team.
Using a combination of administrative and household data, the project shows
that the adoption of mobile money tends to be positively self-selected. Early
adopters are better educated and often already have a bank account. This posi-
tive self-selection raises the question of whether mobile money is an effective tool
for financial inclusion. Indeed, if those who first adoptmobile money and keep us-
ing this technology over time are disproportionately those who already had bank
accounts, this could be an effective tool for financial deepening but may be less
effective for financial widening. New approachesmay be needed to promote finan-
cial inclusion together with strategies for organic technology adoption following
its initial dissemination (Batista and Vicente 2020).
The overall results over the three years following the initial introduction of the
programme indicate significant levels of adoption of mobile money, which substi-
tutes for traditional alternative methods to send remittances and save (Batista and
Vicente 2018). The treatment also improved consumption smoothing given that
treated households became less vulnerable to both adverse geo-located weather
and idiosyncratic shocks. However, mobile money led to reduced investment,
especially in agriculture. These findings suggest that mobile money facilitated
rural outmigration by reducing the transaction costs associated with migrant
remittances and thereby improving insurance possibilities.
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The availability of mobile money in treated rural areas also increased the will-
ingness of targeted individuals to send transfers. The overall increase relative to
the control was 11 percentage points over three years according to experimental
games. The magnitude of these effects increased over time, presumably as trust
in the mobile money system improved. The authors also found a positive effect
on the willingness to use mobile money to conduct transfers instead of alternative
transfermethods. Given the very poor remittance channels available before the in-
troduction of mobile money, namely making in-person visits to the rural receivers
or using bus drivers as expensive and risky transfer carriers, it is not surprising that
the marginal willingness to transfer increases—in particular using mobile money
as a substitute for traditional remittance channels.
The findings of this research project provide central banks in low-income coun-
tries with substantial evidence on the effects of mobile banking technologies
on economic development and social welfare. The findings illustrate potential
approaches for implementingmobile banking structures by using tailored dissem-
ination strategies and shaping supportive regulation that also takes into account
how to facilitate remittances from one country to the other.
5.3.2 Do Remittances Induce Structural Change?
From this perspective, understanding whether emigration and remittances have
persistent impacts on origin communities, or if these effects collapse at the end
of labour migration, becomes even more important. New research supported by
GLM|LIC (Dinkelman and Mariotti 2016; Dinkelman, Kumchulesi, and Mari-
otti 2017) looked in depth into the economics of capital accumulation via labour
migration, in the specific case of the low-income country of Malawi.
Two studies have focused on the temporary and thus later return-migration
(circular migration) of Malawians to South Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, and
explored long-term effects in terms of capital accumulation, restructuring of ru-
ral labour markets, and human capital formation of the next generation. Both
studies presented an analysis covering several decades following a significant mi-
gration shock triggered by the opening and closing of the labourmarket of a nearby
‘pulling’ country for the first time. This long-term evaluation built on existing
studies documenting the positive short-term impacts of circular migration and
remittances on the income and well-being of migrant families (see for example
Yang 2008; Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 2013); Kosac, 2015), and delivered
important insights for development policies.
Dinkelman, Kumchulesi, and Mariotti (2017) studied whether receiving mi-
grant capital may stimulate structural change in regional labour markets. While
the influence of new, labour-saving agricultural technologies, trade liberalizations,
and environmental change on labour reallocation towards higher productivity
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non-farm jobs is rather well studied by recent analyses (see Hornbeck and Naidu
2014; Bustos, Caprettini, and Ponticelli 2016; McCaig and Pavcnik 2018), thor-
ough empirical evidence on the role of capital is rare.
In the absence of present data covering an extended period, Dinkelman,
Kumchulesi, and Mariotti (2017) explored unique historical data from a ‘natu-
ral experiment’, allowing insights into the lasting effects of circular migration and
remittances. Sub-Saharan Africa has a long tradition of circular migration, with
Malawi serving as a traditional supplier of unskilledmale workers to the goldmin-
ing companies in South Africa since the 1930s. The Witwatersrand Native Labour
Association (Wenela)—South Africa’s Chamber of Mines’ centralized labour re-
cruitment organization—coordinated local recruitment stations in Malawi. The
jobs they offered provided annual earnings around 2.5 times higher than the aver-
age for agricultural jobs inMalawi (seeDinkelman andMariotti 2016 for a detailed
account of this migration episode).
The Malawian government, however, brought in strict emigration quotas that
by the end of the 1950s accounted for 20,000 workers per year (around 2% of
the working-age male population), mainly in response to lobbying from Euro-
pean plantation owners inMalawi and Zimbabwe wanting to recruit cheap labour.
Contracts with the Wenela company were tailored towards the economic interests
of Malawi. Contracts were typically limited to two years (with each contract re-
newal including a standard earnings raise) and forcedMalawiansworking in South
Africa to accept so-called deferred pay, whereby two-thirds of miners’ earnings
were withheld until their return to Malawi. This institutional circular migra-
tion setup ensured a large share of the additional income earned would be saved
and returned to the country as compulsory remittances along with the workers
themselves.
This arrangement changed drastically in 1967, when all quotas were officially
abandoned due to shrinking employment prospects in other neighbouring re-
gions. The number of emigrants exploded from 40,000 in 1967 to 120,000 in 1973,
while the labour contract standards remained in place. In some Malawian com-
munities during this period, up to 20% of the male working age population was
working in South Africa.
The next drastic change took place in 1974, when the crash of a plane carrying
Malawian miners led the Malawian government to stop all recruiting and order
all miners to return home from South Africa. Although this policy was in place
for just three years, a change in the recruitment policies of mining companies
(see Figure 5.3) meant that Malawian southbound labour migration never again
reached pre-1974 levels.
Against this historical background, Dinkelman, Kumchulesi, and Mariotti
(2017) analysed the capital flows back to Malawian districts, and their struc-
tural impact on rural labour markets, over three decades. The authors highlight
the relevance of migration-driven capital accumulation for sub-Saharan Africa,


























































1974 miner plane crash
Removal of labor ban
end of 1977
Fig. 5.3 Annual Employment of Malawian Miners on South African Mines, 1950–94
Note: Number of workers contracted by Wenela to work on South African mines in each year; dotted
lines represent (from left to right) the abolition of labour quotas in August 1967, the moratorium on
migration after the April 1974 Malawian plane crash, and the legal resumption of mine migration
in 1978.
Source: Dinkelman, Kumchulesi, and Mariotti (2017)
given its potential for structural change. Controlled circular migration that is
combined with the channelling of labour earnings back to home regions ‘may
present a practical tool for boosting structural change in communities where in-
dustrial, agricultural, and trade revolutions have been slow to arrive’ (Dinkelman,
Kumchulesi, and Mariotti 2017, p. 7).
Flows ofmoney to home regionsmirrored the significant rise inmigration from
and to Malawi between 1967 and 1975, and underline the crucial importance of
capital accumulation strategies for LICs. During this period total deferred pay
inflows represented almost 90% of all money flowing from Malawian migrants
working in South Africa, totalling 53 million USD (1975 exchange rate).
When migration peaked in 1973, the average monthly money transfer to
each Malawian district was 115,000 USD, totalling 2.75 million USD nationally
(Dinkelman, Kumchulesi, and Mariotti 2017; see Figure 5.4). The distribution of
capital flows across the districts was uneven: some districts benefited more due to
having: more migrants; different migration timing (mine wages were increased by
over 200% between 1966 and 1974); more migrants closer to the end of their con-
tract in 1974; or a higher share of repeat contracts with higher earnings. The study
combines these data with district-level differences in the composition of migrants.










Month and Years: June 1966 to November 1974
total money returning total deferred pay
Fig. 5.4 Migrant Capital Flows over Time, 1966–75
Source: Dinkelman, Kumchulesi, and Mariotti (2017), archival material
collected by the authors
From a theoretical perspective, what outcomes should we expect these substan-
tial remittances to have in terms of driving structural change in relatively closed
economies such as many Malawian districts? Additional capital in the form of
remittances and deferred pay transfers should offer households significant help
to break out of poverty traps and invest in more than mere daily living (see for
example Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Lewis 1954; Kuznets 1955). The supply of finan-
cial capital may stimulate investments in better housing, better quality farming
equipment, and more land, seeds, and fertilizers (if available), allowing farmers
and their families to either work more efficiently or reduce their labour input.
Excess labour can then be orientated towards non-farm sectors with
additional—and better—earnings prospects. As a consequence, another channel
of structural change may be encouraged: the higher local incomes generated by
returning migrants may increase the demand for small non-farm businesses and
service providers. Alongwith the easing of credit constraints brought by additional
capital, this may enable workers to enter the non-farm sectors as entrepreneurs,
and increase the viability of new businesses (see Banerjee and Newman 1993;
Buera, Kaboski, and Shin, 2013). Last, but not least, a positive income shockmay be
an incentive to invest in human capital accumulation for the next generation. Edu-
cational progressmay then strengthen productivity and employability in non-farm
sectors, and hence promote structural change in the labour market.
Dinkelman, Kumchulesi, and Mariotti (2017) thoroughly explored these chan-
nels for long-term changes in their empirical work. A first look at census data
revealed that, for male workers, different trends in districts with low and high mi-
grant capital inflows occurred rather soon after all migrants returned to Malawi in
1975. For female workers, these trends started some years later. For both men and
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women, those districts that received more migrant capital transitioned more
quicklyoutof agriculture and into themanufacturingand services sectors,with
the effects clearly persisting, increasing over time, and not being the result of
internal migration between districts (see Figures 5.5 and 5.6).
Further investigation revealed that this impact of migrant capital on the real-
location of labour lasted for at least thirty years. A higher number of returning
migrants within a district reinforced the effects of the capital inflow, although to a
lesser extent over time. ‘In an average district, with 58,000 women and 57,000men
in the economically active population, each additional one million USD received
created 1,402 more jobs in the non-farm sector over three decades. This translates
into a cost of 713 USD per non-farm job created’ (Dinkelman, Kumchulesi, and
Mariotti 2017, p. 21).
The authors concluded that overall migrant capital accounted for around 5% of
male labour reallocation into non-farmwork, while at the same time being respon-
sible for 17% of structural changes of female labour. Non-farm jobs were mostly
concentrated in construction, retail sales, transport, and communications, with
men more likely to be self-employed and women more likely to take over unpaid
family enterprise jobs.
These persistent effects also caused amoderate growth in population and an
urbanization trend of rural districts in response to migrant capital. Roughly
three decades after the end of returningmigration from South Africa, districts that
had receivedmore capital were around 15%more urbanized than districts that had
not experienced any shock to migration capital. At the same time, urbanization
may have accelerated structural changes in rural labour markets.
Economic theory suggests that remittances and migrant capital should increase
farm-specific investments. Interestingly, this does not hold in the Malawian case
study: there is no evidence that districts with more capital invested in more
farm-specific capital over time. Instead, there was an increase in households with
durable walls and roofs, indicating investments in better housing quality and prop-
erty security—which is also a prerequisite for retail trade and service-orientated
jobs.
5.3.3 Remittances Affect the Upgrading of Human Capital
The long-term impact of migrant capital on education and human capital accu-
mulation is of crucial importance in terms of any upward shift of low-income
countries’ labour markets. Do remittances and other capital transfers raise the
average number of years spent in school? Does having more money affect the
education investment behaviour of parents, and does this result in higher long-
term levels of education in communities with high(er) migration? Dinkelman
and Mariotti (2016) provided empirical evidence that persistent migration does
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Fig. 5.5 Sectoral Shifts in the Labour Market: Women
Notes: Share of employed women working in agricultural (top) or services
(bottom) sectors over time and by type of district.High capital inflow
districts are the districts receiving above median levels of migrant deferred
pay before 1977. Low capital inflow districts are those receiving below
median levels of deferred pay. Means are weighted using census weights.
Source: Dinkelman, Kumchulesi, and Mariotti (2017)
indeed lead to substantial gains in human capital, although the effects shrink over
time Their study confirmed and broadened the findings of Edwards and Ureta
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High capital inflow districts Low capital inflow districts
Share of workers in service sector by decade and
size of deferred pay shock to district: men
Fig. 5.6 Sectoral Shifts in the Labour Market: Men
Notes: Share of male workers in agricultural (top) or services (bottom)
sectors over time and by type of district. High capital inflow districts are
the districts receiving above median levels of migrant deferred pay before
1977. Low capital inflow districts are those receiving below median levels
of deferred pay. Means are weighted using census weights.
Source: Dinkelman, Kumchulesi, and Mariotti (2017)
(2003), who also found—in the context of the low-income country of El Salvador—
that remittances have a large impact on the schooling decisions of poor rural
households, even if parents themselves have low levels of schooling.
Dinkelman and Mariotti (2016) used a difference-in-differences strategy to es-
timate gaps in the education level of individuals who were age-eligible for primary
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school immediately after the expansion ofminingmigration inMalawian districts,
with and without migrant recruitment. Control cohorts of children above primary
school age were also studied, to factor in any differences in educational attainment
across districts.
The main finding was that, two decades after the migration expansion, primary
schoolcohorts inmigrant-recruitingdistrictswere4.8%to6.9%moreeducated.
This was a result of more children attending school, and of a longer average stay
in school between 1967 and 1977—it was a remarkable effect given the very low
average level of just two and a half years of completed education in this adult
population.
Asmight be expected, the effect on human capital formation was greater during
the periodwhen labourmigrationwas prohibited (asmoremigrants returnedwith
their earnings) compared to when migration was ongoing and more workers were
leaving their households. Districts without agricultural estates, and hence with a
lower value of child labour, saw the largest positive impacts on education. Further-
more, the study finds no difference in the education impact on men and women.
This shows that, although only men were recruited to work in the gold mines, in-
creases in education were not driven by the expectation of higher returns as future
gold mine workers.
Dinkelman, Kumchulesi, and Mariotti (2017) quantified the structural shift
of work towards services, based on additional human capital, for the period
1998–2008. According to these estimates, roughly 17% of the shift of women away
from agriculture (men show lower rates) in the third decade after labour migra-
tion had stopped can be traced back to an upgrading of human capital via circular
migration and remittances. These rates are lower in earlier periods, which can be
explained by the long time-frame that is needed to create human capital.
These results enrich our picture of the long-term effects ofmigration-driven hu-
man capital accumulation beyond the end of amigration episode. Earlier research,
mostly studying a shorter period and not covering African countries (see Dinkel-
man and Mariotti 2016 for a brief discussion of the literature), has found mixed
evidence on the effects of labour migration on the formation of next-generation
human capital. These showed positive effects from relaxing credit constraints and
expected higher wages, as well as negative effects from children dropping out
of school to replace a migrant and as a potential consequence of changes to the
bargaining power of households in the absence of a migrant. Overall, migra-
tionandremittanceflowsmaygeneratepositiveornegative educationeffectson
non-migranthouseholdsbyaffecting levels ofwages, prices, and infrastructure.
Dinkelman and Mariotti (2016) underlined that—in their studied scenario—
the positive long-term effects of migration and remittances on the demand for
education clearly surpassed any negative impacts, making it possible to ‘gen-
eralise the patterns of positive short run results to the long run in an African
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setting, despite the different context for schooling and child labour decisions’
(Dinkelman and Mariotti 2016, p. 4). Better access to jobs and labour incomes
abroad through circular migration could help poor, rural regions to escape
poverty, reduce child labour, and invest in the education of their children as
a first step towards future economic growth. As a prerequisite, remittances
should be further facilitated throughmodern technologies that allowmigrants
to better control their investments and savings. From a development policy
perspective, the historical case of Malawi provides some important lessons for
shaping future—time-limited—guest-worker programmes in LICs to stimulate
positive, long-term effects on human capital acquisition in migrants’ home re-
gions.
5.4 The Impact of ForcedMigration on Education,
Skills, and Employment
Besides rural–urban and circular migration, many low-income countries face
large-scale forced migration of both refugees from neighbour countries and in-
ternally displaced persons due to natural disasters, civil wars, violence, or other
external shocks. Most of the world’s refugee flows are not directed towards de-
veloped regions—indeed the poorest countries often bear the greatest burden.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR
2018), there were 20.4 million refugees in 2018, with 31% of them in Africa, com-
pared to only 14% in Europe (excluding Turkey), and a mere 3% in the Americas.
There were also more than 41.4 million internally displaced people, with 17.7
million (42.6%) of them in Africa. Astonishingly, there is still little empirical
evidence on the circumstances of forced migration in low-income countries
and the effects of refugee inflows on host regions and their labour mar-
kets.
A comprehensive study by Alix-Garcia and Saah (2010) studied the impact of
refugee flows into Tanzania in the 1990s following ethnic conflicts in neighbour-
ing Burundi and Rwanda, focusing on price and general wealth effects.While food
aid only partially compensated for a substantial price increase resulting from the
rise of refugee numbers, the wealth effects were split in two opposite directions:
rural regions apparently benefited from nearby refugee camps due to increases
in the prices of goods needed to nourish refugees. The increased income enabled
rural households to invest in more durable goods. Meanwhile, the opposite oc-
curred in urban areas, with people suffering from higher price levels that reduced
their spending power. The authors conclude that host governments and inter-
national development aid programmes should make every effort to mitigate the
negative effects of hosting refugees in poor countries, to avoid a domino effect of
humanitarian crises.
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5.4.1 How Does Hosting Refugees from Neighbour Countries
Affect Low-Income Labour Markets?
New research supported by GLM|LIC (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2015, 2016) has
contributed important insights to this picture by studying the immediate labour
market consequences in Tanzania of hosting refugees from Burundi and Rwanda
in the 1990s. The research project pursued a natural experiment based on the
fact that the distribution of refugees was extremely uneven. This disparity was
due to the geographical barriers between western and eastern regions, and logis-
tical aspects that caused most UNHCR refugee camps to be placed in the western
region of Kagera, close to the Rwanda and Burundi borders. Overall, more than
1 million people were received as forced migrants in Tanzania between 1993 and
1998, with some parts of Kagera far more affected than others. In some regions,
refugees outnumbered natives by a factor of five.
Longitudinal data from the Kagera Health and Development Survey allowed
the authors to study households affected by forced migration, from prior to this
external shock (1991) up until 2010. From a theoretical perspective, an inflow of
refugees may increase competition for jobs, generating wage pressure as labour
supply rises, depending on whether refugee labour is able to substitute for na-
tive workers (see Braun and Mahmoud 2014). At the same time, new jobs may
emerge in the context of government and non-government institutions engaging
in refugee aid programmes. As the broad literature on unforced labour migration
shows, additional migrant labour may also push natives towards jobs that need
higher qualification or specific skills (see for example Peri and Sparber 2011). The
increase in populationmay stimulate native production of goods related to refugee
aid and boost productivity in rural regions. This could also give some momentum
to human capital acquisition among young people.
Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2015, 2016) focused on the direct labour market out-
comes and found that, for those aged 16–46 in 1991 (first survey), the probability
of working as an employee outside their own household (instead of being self-
employed or engaging in rural subsistence work) shrank significantly as the
intensity of the forced-migration shock increased. In particular, these cohorts
were less likely to be formally employed in the agricultural sector, indicating a de-
gree of refugees substituting for natives. There is also hardly any evidence that the
external shock resulted in a tendency to change the types of crops cultivated and
increase rural productivity.
The studies controlled for changes in population due to movement of people
to other regions, finding no indication that the refugee inflow resulted in a di-
versification of economic activities; subsistence activities still dominated at a very
high 80%. Temporary workers exposed to the refugee inflow and job competition
showed a reduced probability of being employed in the non-rural sector, but were
more likely to move to self-employment after the shock. For the younger cohorts
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(those younger than 16 in 1991), exposure to a forced-migration shock tended
to increase the likelihood of being employed. However, only those from wealthy
households were more likely to be employed in non-agricultural jobs—others ap-
peared to be stuck in the rural sector. A possible explanation may be that exposure
to the forced-migration shock prevents households from acquiring human capital.
These negative labour market impacts are accompanied by limited positive out-
comes for those recruited for jobs in the field of refugee aid. Natives already
employed regularly in regions with a high inflow of refugees partly benefited from
taking over better jobs that included substantially better social security standards.
Nevertheless, the overall results underline the crucial importance of policy strate-
gies that account for the impact of forced migration on the host societies, and for
potential substitution effects in the labour markets. Policies need to be informed
by the risks to the well-being of the natives who aremost likely to compete with
refugees in agricultural labour markets or casual wage jobs. Given that by far
the most refugees stay in the region of origin, migrating from one poor country to
another, a better understanding of how labour markets and native workers react
to forced-migration shocks is a prerequisite for any targeted development pro-
gramme. The research supported by GLM|LIC provides important new insights
that should help policy makers tailor future programmes.
5.4.2 Returning Refugees Are Highly Disadvantaged
While many LICs experience significant inflows of refugees, others face problems
resulting from massive return migration of refugees into post-conflict home re-
gions. Overcoming civil war and other conflicts does not necessarily raise the
economic chances of returning refugees, and it is important to understand that
the well-studied positive effects of voluntary migrants returning home do not ap-
ply here: refugees heading towards poor neighbour countries’ crowded camps are
hardly accumulating human capital, sending remittances, or enriching their home
regions with new capacities when they return years later. The acute conflicts and
violence driving refugee migration reduce subsequent options to a minimum and
most often leave no choice other than to move to a region deemed more secure,
even in the absence of any favourable economic prospects.
Depending on the destination country’s laws around labour market activities,
some refugees may join the host labour market while others take the chance to
establish some trade (for example, of food aid products) between refugee camps
and neighbouring host communities (see Enghoff et al. 2010). But since massive
refugee inflows tend to overstrain many host countries, the economic prospects
for refugees remain rather limited and host countries may even prohibit refugees
from accessing the labour market or conducting economic activities within camps
(see Harild, Christensen, and Zetter 2015). The resulting forced inactivity may
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then lead to behavioural effects in terms of work ethics (Lehrer 2010). Also, an
acute conflict forces many refugee households to leave behind their only assets,
livestock and land, which are then difficult to reclaim after returning home (see
Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2013). The situation of many refugees is further compli-
cated by them being typically unable to choose when they return—voluntary
return when violence decreases may result in different outcomes to involuntary
repatriation.
Against this high-risk background, a recent case study of Burundi supported
by GLM|LIC (Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017) revealed substantial nega-
tive economic effects for returning forced migrants compared to non-migrant
households: overall, returnee households showed lower subjective socio-economic
well-being (slightly reducing over time) and were in most cases set back to lower
levels of economic activities as a result of an extended period of inactivity during
their displacement.
Burundi experienced a large-scale emigration to Tanzania due to violent civil
war conflicts between 1993 and 2000, followed by a massive post-war refugee re-
turn triggered by the Tanzanian government stopping refugee aid and closing all
camps step by step. Between 2001 and 2009, roughly 500,000 refugees returned to
Burundi, mostly to their region of birth, with the most recent peak in 2012 due to
the closing of the last large refugee camp (see Figure 5.7). Initially, many refugees
had found casual agricultural employment in villages near their camps. Over the
years however, the government of Tanzania imposed strict limits on movement
and economic activity, making many refugees fully dependent on international
aid programmes for their entire stay.
The study explores rich panel data collected in 2011 (total 1,500 households)
and 2015 offering detailed information on the economic activities of non-migrants
and refugees before, during, and after their displacement. A thorough analysis
controlling for exposure to conflict, time abroad, time since return, geographi-
cal proximity to Tanzania, and costs of migration shows that returnee households
suffer from a large livestock gap compared to remaining households (fewer and/or
lower-level livestock per adult) and are more likely to engage in mere agricultural
subsistence work or similar employment activities.
The results further suggest that returnees have lower chances to be self-
employed—in contrast to returning ‘traditional’ economic migrants from
abroad—while boosting the likelihood of being stuck with agricultural-worker
status. Both findings—dependency on agricultural subsistence and low chances
of self-employment—emphasize that returning refugees face ahigher riskof pre-
carious incomethantheirnon-migrantneighbours. According to the study, legal
and practical restrictions on economic activities inTanzaniawere themain reasons






















































Fig. 5.7 Returnees from Tanzania to Burundi
Source: Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva, 2017, based on UNHCR data
behind this obvious gap between former refugees and non-migrants. While re-
turnees showed no higher vulnerability to crime and health complications, and
loss or theft of property left behind does not seem to have played a relevant role, it
appears that a clear disadvantage was posed by forced inactivity and the potential
deterioration of skills and motivation to work. This is consistent with the finding
that those refugees who stayed abroad longer and were then forced to return have
worse economic outcomes after coming home.
Given these effects only began to diminish over a long period, the study offers
clear lessons for development policies: to avoid long-term setbacks and a loss of
socio-economic perspectives for sending and receiving low-income societies, it
is critically important toallowrefugees to engage inemploymentandother eco-
nomic activities while displaced, and to support them continuously after their
return. Initiatives that aim to stimulate an early return of refugees need to take into
account that such measures, while possibly easing the host country’s burden, may
also invoke a new cycle of tension and violence in the origin/home country which
is likely already struggling for stability. International policy efforts will be needed
to support host countries to establish labour market opportunities for refugees,
and to reintegrate returning refugees more successfully. Right now, remedying
these issues is still an underdeveloped topic in both research and policy.
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Key Takeways from this Chapter
• South–North migration makes up more than half of current global
migration.
• While migration may cause a ‘brain drain’, it can also stimulate growth
and development by improving access to global markets, investments, and
knowledge networks.
• Remittances help accelerate the transition from the agricultural to the
manufacturing and service sectors.
• Voluntary migration along with remittances can have a positive effect on
human capital accumulation in the origin countries.
• The positive effect of remittances can be increased with modern
technologies that allow migrants to better control their savings and
investments.
• Forcedmigration to low-income countriesmakes natives less likely to find
a job outside their own household.
• Allowing refugees to work while displaced, and supporting them upon
return, is important to prevent long-term income losses due to forced
inactivity and deterioration of skills.
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6
The Interrelationship of Growth, Formality,
Informality, and Regulation
Low-income countries often face huge challenges in building up formal labour
market structures that allow labour supply and demand to balancemore efficiently.
While it is widely accepted that the formal sector is a driver of economic growth
and additional social security, in a number of developing regions there is no al-
ternative to the informal sector, since this accounts for the majority of available
jobs.
Recent economic growth in many developing countries, far from contributing
to a decline in the informal sector, has actually done the opposite.This is a concern
not only for rural areas but also—and possibly evenmore so—for congested urban
centres with dysfunctional labourmarkets.The absence of stable formal structures
may put people at risk and increase uncertainty, while premature policy strategies
to reduce informality may result in undesired outcomes and aggravate the living
conditions and socio-economic prospects of disadvantaged households.
Governments in LICs, as well as international development aid agencies, need
to accept that informality will remain a central feature of the economic landscape
for the foreseeable future. There is substantial evidence that informality does not
prevent countries from developing. Furthermore, since there does not seem to be
an impermeable barrier between the two sectors, transition patterns need the full
attention of research and policy advice. However, the role of informality in the
process of economic growth and sectoral transformation, and its link to the formal
sector is not yet well established by economic research.
Economic development has nevertheless contributed to a slow increase of for-
mal employment in some developing regions in the recent past. This calls for
careful, measured regulation of emerging formal labour markets—even more so
if the trend is negatively impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Policy interven-
tions such as minimum wages and other wage regulation, or mandatory social
insurance, may help to organize vulnerable labour markets and aid individuals’
economic success, but could also have the opposite effect.
GLM|LIC research has addressed these topics in a number of insightful projects
that show the relevance of the informal sector in the process of development.
These projects have shed new light on sectoral transformation between formal and
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informal employment, and investigated the relationship between trade, employ-
ment, regulation, and productivity. This chapter presents some core findings and
connects them to other studies in the field.
6.1 IsThere a Close Link between Sectoral Transformation,
EconomicGrowth, and Employment?
Given the high prevalence of informal employment in the developing world, a
thorough understanding of itsmechanisms is central to any evidence-based labour
market and economic policy. While definitions can vary, informal employment
is generally characterized by the absence of legal contracts and limited protec-
tion schemes for workers such as minimum wage, sick leave, paid holiday, or
unemployment insurance. The classic one-dimensional view of informality is still
present in ongoing debate: less-educatedworkers, unable to find jobs in the regular
market, are forced to look for informal employment or engage in self-employment.
Without written contracts, paid leave, and any other social security, they are
at high risk of being locked into informality and poverty, as the sector seems
stagnant and unproductive. It offers only precarious employment at the lowest
wages with poor working conditions, or small-scale self-employment, and fails
to contribute significantly to economic growth. From this perspective, the infor-
mal sector merely provides a subsistence fall-back option for the disadvantaged,
but has no long-term benefit to offer other than to pool surplus labour. At best,
economic development will crowd out informality and dispense with it over the
long run.
A study by La Porta and Shleifer (2014) mostly confirmed this pessimistic
view of informality, arguing that the formal and informal sectors are too discon-
nected to expect any transition in between, or any contribution from informality
to economic growth. From this point of view, neither policy strategies to support
the sector nor interventions to regulate it seem feasible. Instead, policies would
need to focus strictly on empowering the formal sector and enhancing educated
entrepreneurship.
However, this perspective is not without controversy among economists, and
statistics reveal that reality is more complex: quite a number of developing coun-
tries experienced substantial growth rates in recent years, with hardly any change
in the share of informal (self-)employment. Although this is in part due to de-
mographic change driving many young workers into informality in the absence of
formal jobs, it is doubtful that informality necessarily inhibits economic growth,
or that development can be induced by formalization only.
This raises the provocative question of whether the informal sector should even
be supported by acknowledging voluntary informal self-employment, and pro-
viding better opportunities for disadvantaged groups outside the regular labour
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market. A GLM|LIC study emphasized this argument using the example of the
youth employment challenge in sub-Saharan Africa (Fox 2016; see also Chapter
7 in this volume). This challenge is not likely to be solved without the ‘help’ of
informal employment since the rate of growth of formal jobs is unlikely to keep
up with the growth of the working-age population. Hence organizing informal
employment better, and raising its productivity, could serve as a byway to empow-
ering population groups at risk and strengthening their labour market attachment
and welfare. Specifically, supporting informal agricultural self-employment and
entrepreneurship among the young may provide a way to overcome extreme
poverty and drive inclusive growth, by reducing the welfare gap versus private
sector employment.
This recommendation deserves full attention, even if research has so far found
only small potential gains from interventions that aim to improve productivity
among informal businesses. Strategies towards more formal registration among
informal entrepreneurs do not inevitably lead to significant productivity gains (see
Bruhn andMcKenzie 2014), while providing business training and better access to
microcredit does not necessarily promote growth (see Karlan and Zinman 2011;
McKenzie and Woodruff 2014).
6.1.1 Informal Employment Is not Always the ‘Last Resort’
To further assess the economic rationale of the approach suggested by Fox (2016),
it is essential to know the permeability between the formal and informal labour
market segments, and what this contributes to aggregate productivity. Only if in-
dividuals can choose which sector to engage in, and not have their hand forced
entirely by necessity, should sustainable positive outcomes be expected. Gelb et al.
(2009) addressed this topic by investigating the internal barriers—in terms ofman-
agement quality andproductivity—that prevent firms from taking advantage of the
wider opportunities provided by the formal sector. The study revealed the high
opportunity costs of switching to formal employment as one main reason why the
informal sector has a high share of ‘survivalist firms’.
These findings raise the question of whether transition will promote or discour-
age upward mobility that brings higher returns to labour, and of which factors
are most important in attracting workers to the formal labour market. These is-
sues have been investigated by two GLM|LIC studies that surveyed workers in
Bangladesh on their de facto transition activities. The studies used a choice exper-
iment to identify the aspects of formality most valued among workers (Gutierrez
et al. 2019; Mahmud et al. 2021, see also the summary of the main results in
Kumar, Nataraj, and Gutierrez 2017). The survey-based study found evidence for
a dual role of the informal sector: on the one hand, it fosters segmentation with
limited upwardmobility or even a risk of downwardmobility; on the other hand, it
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Fig. 6.1 Growth in Exports and Shares of Formal, Casual, Unpaid, and
Self-Employment, Bangladesh
Source: Kumar et al. (2017)
provides an entrepreneurial alternative to paid jobs in the formal sector. According
to the choice experiment, the average worker ranked the promise of job stability—
gained through a longer-term formal job contract—as the most attractive feature
of formal labour compared to other work.
Bangladesh is a good example of a low-income country experiencing signifi-
cant economic growth at a stubbornly low (though increasing) rate of regular paid
work in the formal sector. A clear rise in per capita GDP and an even stronger
increase in export growth have not yet overcome the predominance of informal
self-employment in the country’s economy (see Figure 6.1).
Against this background, Gutierrez et al. (2019) conducted a large survey of
2,000 adult workers in themetropolitan areas of Dhaka and Chittagong, collecting
rich data on their current jobs and their job history over the past fifteen years.This
unusually long survey period allowed for extensive analysis. To measure trends of
formality and informality, the survey included questions focusing onworking con-
ditions, training, reasons for job change, and total job satisfaction, as well as the
take-up of job benefits (sick or casual leave, holidays, maternity leave, bonus pay-
ments, retirement benefits) and the design of job contracts (written work contract,
timely termination notice).
Roughly 18% of participants were female, while more than 20% of the sam-
ple workers were aged 25 or below. More than 40% were self-employed or family
workers in household businesses; 40% had paid jobs in the private sector; 12%
were casual workers (including seasonal workers, day labourers, domesticworkers,
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apprentices, trainees, and interns). Government workers made up some 6% of
the sample. Around 40% of the workers reported low education (primary or
less), while 20% had some secondary education, and about 25% reported hav-
ing completed high school or higher education. The garments industry was the
most frequent sector of employment (20%), followed by manufacturing (15%)
(see Table 6.1).











Pre-school or less 16.6%
Some primary (Class 1–5) 22.7%
Some secondary (Class 6–9) 19.6%
Class 10 or SSC 15.9%
HSC or Diploma 9.6%
Bachelor’s degree or higher 15.4%
Missing 0.3%
Vocational Training
No vocational training 89.0%
Vocational training without certification 3.2%





Self-employed alone/with family 25.8%








Note: Summary statistics from sample of 1,966 working adults who completed the
survey. Employment type and industry are based on current employment type at the
time of the survey. Sampling weights are applied.
Source: Gutierrez et al. (2019)
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Table 6.2 Reasons for Informal Self-Employment
Reason %
Because I was unable find other work 18.2%
Because I wanted independence/be my own boss 45.3%
Because I wanted to have flexible working hours 4.5%
Because I wanted higher income 12.2%
Because I wanted to be close to home 3.3%
Because parents, relatives, or friends have their own business 6.4%
Because I wanted do grow professionally 1.8%
Because I wanted to have job security 0.3%
Because family members wanted me to work in the business 3.6%
Other 4.4%
Total 100.0%
Note: Reported reasons for self-employment among self-employed individuals. Sampling weights are
applied.
Source: Gutierrez et al. (2019)
With regards to overall self-employment, owners of businesses both with and
without additional employees were surveyed (see Table 6.2). The data reveal that
self-employment is mostly chosen voluntarily—only 18% said they were unable to
find other work, whereas independence (45%) and better income prospects (12%)
were reported as the decisive factors in choosing it.
The clear distinction between wage workers in the private and public sec-
tors, and casual workers, with respect to benefits received, seems self-descriptive.
However, it should be emphasized that only a minority of private market wage
employees, according to the survey, had written work contracts—48% of them re-
lied on verbal contracts, reaching almost the same level as casual workers, where
51% relied on such contracts. Maternity leave and paid overtime were particularly
rare among casual workers, whereas a majority reported being offered sick leave
(see Table 6.3).
Monthly and daily labour incomes showed government workers earning the
most. The self-employed reported the next highest income, resulting from their
business profits, with a higher income among those who employ non-family
workers. This finding aligns with workers’ expectations when deciding to be self-
employed. Private sector wages rank only third, according to the survey, while
casual and family workers reported the lowest incomes (see Table 6.4).
Furthermore, and stunningly, a majority of survey participants across all groups
reported being fully satisfied in their jobs, with government workers most likely to
be fully satisfied (95%) and the self-employed (92%) following closely behind. The
survey also revealed, though, that poor working conditions are widespread across
all forms of employment with regard to exposure to hazards or physical violence,
being highest among casual workers (78% and 40%, respectively). Conversely,
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Table 6.3 Work Benefits by Type of Employment
Government Employees Private Employees CasualWorkers
Written contract 91.9% 25.0% 1.6%
Verbal contract 5.0% 48.1% 51.3%
Sick leave 98.5% 87.8% 63.7%
Casual leave 96.6% 61.2% 26.0%
Holiday leave 87.9% 83.0% 17.0%
Maternity leave 93.8% 85.1% 27.0%
Paid overtime 19.3% 33.5% 7.3%
Bonus 95.8% 86.1% 26.1%
Provident fund 93.5% 12.6% 0.6%
Gratuity 72.6% 6.4% 0.6%
Pension 82.8% 0.7% 0.8%
Termination notice 73.6% 45.2% 14.4%
Note: Reported benefits by employment type, based on current employment type at the time of the
survey. Casual worker category includes day labourers, seasonal workers, domestic workers, and
apprentices, interns, or trainees. Sampling weights are applied.
Source: Gutierrez et al. (2019)
Table 6.4 Earnings by Type of Employment
Employment Type (a)Monthly Earnings (2016 Taka)
25% percentile 50% percentile 75% percentile
Government employee 15,200 25,000 35,000
Private employee 7,000 9,500 15,000
Casual worker 6,000 7,500 12,000
Self-employed (alone/with family) 7,500 15,000 20,000
Self-employed (with non- family) 15,000 20,000 35000
Family worker 2,500 7,500 15,000
(b) Hourly Earnings (2016 Taka)
25% percentile 50% percentile 75% percentile
Government employee 303 480 837
Private employee 114 166 267
Casual worker 111 143 222
Self-employed (alone/with family) 111 222 370
Self-employed (with non- family) 222 370 519
Family worker 91 178 286
Note: Monthly earnings (panel (a)) and hourly earnings (panel (b)), by employment type. Hourly
earnings are calculated based on reported monthly earnings and working hours. Earnings
information is based on current job at time of survey. Casual worker category includes day labourers,
seasonal workers, domestic workers, and apprentices, interns, or trainees. Sampling weights are
applied.
Source: Gutierrez et al. (2019)
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Table 6.5 Working Conditions by Type of Employment











I am exposed to
hazards at work
35.5 53.2 77.9 47.1 47.4
I have been exposed
to threats of physical
violence
11.3 21.6 39.8 20.4 14.2
The hygiene in my
workplace is good
91.4 76.6 57.4 72.2 76.0
My employer gives
the benefits I am
supposed to get for
my work
97.7 86.7 86.2 88.1 95.0
My employer always
pays me on time
97.5 92.9 90.9 89.7 100.0
I have the training
opportunities to
perform my job well
87.7 60.0 31.6 42.2 31.0
I have the opportu-
nity to progress/get
promoted
92.0 80.9 58.4 91.8 91.8
I am fully satisfied
with my job
95.3 87.3 76.4 92.1 89.1
Note: Reported working conditions by employment type, for current job at time of survey. Casual
worker category includes day labourers, seasonal workers, domestic workers, and apprentices,
interns, or trainees. Sampling weights are applied.
Source: Gutierrez et al. (2019)
above 80% or even 90% of all workers stated that—besides being paid in a timely
way—they received their benefits as agreed, whichmay explain the high level of job
satisfaction. However, few casual workers reported training opportunities (32%)
(see Table 6.5).
The study also reported calculations of the median time workers had spent
in their current job, at the time of the survey (see Table 6.6). These numbers
showed that the self-employed had a rather high median duration of eight to ten
years in their current business, which was surpassed only by government em-
ployees (fifteen years), possibly contradicting the more classical perception of
self-employment as a temporary necessity for those unable to obtain a formal
employment (see, for example, Harris and Todaro 1970; Fields 1975). However,
as the calculated figures obviously cannot reveal future job duration, they need
to be complemented by information on the number of jobs actually held over the
survey period.
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Self-employed (with no employees or with family employees) 8.3
Self-employed (with non-family employees) 10.1
Family worker 6.3
Note: Calculations of median employment duration by employment type, based on current job.
Casual worker category includes day labourers, seasonal workers, domestic workers, and apprentices,
interns, or trainees. Duration for casual workers measures type of work, although not necessarily for
the same employer. Sampling weights are applied.
Source: Gutierrez et al. (2019)
According to Gutierrez et al. (2019), around 57% of all workers across all types
of employment had only one job (their current one) in the last fifteen years. When
combined with workers reporting two jobs (32%), they make up roughly 90% of
the spectrum (see Figure 6.2, first panel). Rather high job stability appears to have
been driven by government employment and the self-employed.
This finding is confirmed by the authors’ further investigation, which—by es-
timating the ‘survival curves’ of jobs for all types of employment—revealed the
longest duration for these two groups (see Figure 6.2, secondpanel). Self-employed
individuals were the second most likely to ‘survive’ in their job in the short and
long term, with only a marginal difference from government employees over
the first five years. Just 5% of government workers had left their job within five
years, while the rates for the self-employed were 6% (for those with external em-
ployees) and 9% (for those with only family employees or no employees at all).
Despite an increasing gap between both groups over time (15% of government
employees and 24–29% of the self-employed left their job after fifteen years),
the self-employed stayed second in terms of job survival, and even increased
the gap with respect to private, family, and casual workers. This appears to be
a clear signal that voluntary informal self-employment lasts for an extended
period.
In a next step, Gutierrez et al. (2019) explored whether worker or job char-
acteristics affect employment duration and the probability of switching jobs
(see Table 6.7), finding that:
1. private sector employees were the group most likely to change their job,
with the main reasons being finding a preferred one or choosing self-
employment, and thus switching voluntarily;
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Fig. 6.2 Frequency of Job Turnover and Survival Curves
Note: Panel (b) shows Kaplan-Meier survival curves by employment
type. Calculations are based on all observed jobs. Casual worker
category includes day laborers, seasonal workers, domestic workers, and
apprentices, interns, or trainees. Sampling weights are applied.
Source: Gutierrez et al. (2019)
2. self-employed individuals had a low likelihood of turning to wage em-
ployment if their business failed; they mostly decided to stay self-employed
and start a new business;
3. among the self-employed, a voluntary move from a wage job to another
type of employment was much more likely than a voluntary move to wage
employment;
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Table 6.7 Main Reason for Leaving Previous Job
(a) AmongGovernment Employees, Private Employees, andCasualWorkers






Terminated 0% 5% 12%
Firm closed 5% 8% 2%
Job completed 21% 2% 3%
Found preferred job 32% 38% 26%
Dedicated to start my own
business
5% 18% 16%
Dedicated to work for family
business
0% 2% 2%
Retired 11% 2% 0%
Still work at this job but it is no
longer the main activity
0% 1% 8%
Other 26% 23% 31%
Don’t know 0% 0% 0%
Refused 0% 0% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100%
(b) Among Self-Employed and FamilyWorkers










Firm did not make enough profit 39% 55% 10%
Found preferred job 13% 2% 10%
Decided to start another
business
19% 11% 25%
Decided to work for another
family business
2% 0% 5%
Retired 2% 0% 0%
Still work in this business but it
is no longer the main activity
9% 11% 15%
Other 13% 21% 20%
Refused 3% 0% 15%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Note: Reported reason for leaving previous jobs, for wage workers (panel (a)) and workers in
household businesses (panel (b)). Casual worker category includes day labourers, seasonal workers,
domestic workers, and apprentices, interns, or trainees. Sampling weights are applied.
Source: Gutierrez et al. (2019)
4. shorter job duration was associated with higher levels of education for
wage workers (government, private, casual), reflecting increased demand
for skilled labour;
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5. women showed lower job mobility than men in both wage and
household business employment, due to constraints in taking over a
new job (time-conflicting family and household responsibilities, travel
restrictions);
6. higher earnings and access to social transfers such as retirement bene-
fits were associated with an extended job duration for wage employees
(mainly driven, of course, by the high prevalence of retirement benefits
among government workers);
7. upwardmobility was revealed by the changes in earnings and job benefits
among private wage employees who transition to another job, but the risk
of downward mobility was rather high among those workers moving into
casual employment.
Turning to the most prevalent transition patterns, the study presented some
instructive results. Most importantly, the majority of workers stayed in the
same type of job. This pattern was most pronounced among the self-employed
(60%), followed by private employees (58%), government workers (47%), and
casual workers (42%). Only family workers were more likely to move on to
self-employment. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there was a substantial
amount of (voluntary) transition between private sector employment and self-
employment. More than one-quarter of self-employed workers who left their
business decided to take up jobs in the wage sector. Conversely, almost one-
third of wage workers who left private employment chose entrepreneurship or
joined a family business. Of those leaving casual work, almost one-quarter en-
tered the private market (see Table 6.8). There are many interpretations to this:
self-employment or a family businessmay givemore contentment thanworking in
an enterprise (see Fajnzylber, Maloney, and Rojas 2006), while for others a higher
cash income may be more attractive than job benefits (see Maloney 1999).
Some additional findings further underline the conclusion that job and worker
characteristics matter. Higher private wage income and longer tenure seemed to
raise the probability of moving on to another sector, with a high preference for
self-employment among wage employees with longer tenure. At the same time,
educated workers leaving the private sector were less likely to start their own busi-
ness. Access to retirement benefits—of a sufficient level—reduced the likelihood
of moving into types of work that lack these benefits. Casual workers were more
likely to transition towards formality—by moving on to private wage jobs or self-
employment—if they were better educated or had been working casually for a
longer period of time, thus gaining work experience. Interestingly, there seemed to
be no correlation between gender and transition to certain types of jobs, while con-
trolling for age effects reveals that older self-employed workers were more likely
to start a new business after ending previous self-employment.

























47.37% 47.37% 5.26% 10.53% 0.00% 100%
Private
employee
3.59% 57.57% 8.96% 28.09% 1.79% 100%
Casual workers 0.00% 22.54% 42.25% 30.99% 4.23% 100%
Self-employed 0.60% 26.51% 12.05% 60.24% 0.60% 100%
Family worker 0.00% 30.00% 20.00% 45.00% 5.00% 100%
Note: Rows show previous type of employment, while columns show current type of employment. Each cell shows the
probability that a worker who leaves a previous job of a certain type (given by row headings) transitions to a new job of a
certain type (given by column headings). Casual worker category includes day labourers, seasonal workers, domestic
workers, and apprentices, interns, or trainees. Sampling weights are applied.
Source: Gutierrez et al. (2019)
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Change in number of benefits after job transition
All job transitions Only transitions from government, private and casual employment
Fig. 6.3 Change in Number of Benefits after Job Transitions
Note: Change in the number of benefits between the previous job and current job. Sampling weights
are applied.
Source: Gutierrez et al. (2019)
Studying earnings outcomes reveals large variation in wage changes after tran-
sition. In most cases—corresponding to voluntary transition from this sector—
private employees gained additional income when they moved on to other types
of employment. This effect is especially pronounced for private wage workers who
started a business and employed non-family workers (42% increase in median
monthly earnings). At a far lower level (2–10%), those casual workers who turned
to self-employment also saw a rise in earnings.The observation that replacing self-
employment with other types of work does not lead to income gains, but instead
induces significant losses, is consistent with the general finding that the majority
of self-employed workers stayed business orientated, even in the event that they
needed to terminate a business.
Does moving between types of employment lead to workers acquiring more
job-based benefits? The study shows this was largely not the case. Most often,
benefits were retained at the same level, while the probability of increasing them
was outweighed by a higher risk of losing benefit entitlements when moving (see
Figure 6.3). This finding is not surprising, given the abovementioned results that
transition from private wage employment to self-employment was rather frequent
(higher risk of losing benefits), while transition from self-employment and family
work to private sector employment drove benefit effects in the opposite direction
(higher likelihood of gaining benefits).
In an accompanying study, Mahmud et al. (2021) introduced a choice exper-
iment that aimed to identify the values of wage employment seen as the most
beneficiary among those surveyed. Participants were given two hypothetical job
offers with different levels of job benefits ranging from zero to a maximum level
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(short-/longer-term written contract, timing of advance termination notice,
amount of paid holidays, number of working hours, and access to retire-
ment funds). The monthly income offered was varied, up to a 50% increase above
current labour earnings. This allowed the authors to examine the notional ‘price’
that workers would pay for receiving single benefits, and put a monetary value
on their willingness to substitute between the benefits offered. Furthermore, it
allowed them to capture the preferences of the self-employed about benefits not
available in their current type of employment.
According to the experiment, job stability was the most valued attribute across
all types of worker. Compared with receiving no job contract, average workers
would waive 44% of their earnings for a permanent contract. While this could
be explained by the scarcity of permanent work contracts in many low-income
countries, the figures for shorter contracts are the more revealing: workers would
sacrifice 27% of their earnings for a one-year contract and 19% for a half-year
contract. Early contract termination was another attribute highly welcomed by
average workers (12% of monthly income).
When distinguishing between types of workers it becomes obvious, accord-
ing to Mahmoud et al. (2021), that private sector employees place lower value on
long-term contracts. Meanwhile casual workers have the strongest preference for
higher-paid jobs, and the self-employed are more likely to value a broad range of
benefits, but do not greatly prefer long-term contracts. Loss aversion and sorting
effects may explain these preferences. For policymakers, these results imply that
increasing job stability could yield positive labour market outcomes.
Summing up these intriguing GLM|LIC studies, the authors investigated a topic
that is underdeveloped in economic research and provided some important in-
sights for future development policies. The formal and informal sector do not
face off irreconcilably, but allow transition to happen voluntarily to a signifi-
cant extent. Also, transition is a two-way street: almost one-third of the surveyed
Bangladeshi workers moved from private wage employment to self-employment
and household businesses, accepting a loss of employment benefits but gaining
earnings. Most of the self-employed stayed in the sector even after termination of
a business, but a significant minority moved to wage employment.
By and large, the informal sector—at least in an urban and peri-urban set-
ting such as that being studied here—appears to consist of two elements. Firstly,
employment segments that provide only limited upward mobility while putting
some groups at risk of downward mobility, and secondly, a significant share
of voluntary entrepreneurship serving as a true and stable alternative to wage
employment.
According to Gutierrez et al. (2019), ‘Self-employment is not always an activity
of last resort’. Hence the informal sector should no longer be viewed (and stigma-
tized) as a dead end for workers whose distance from ‘regular’ employment is too
far. Informal self-employment seems far more driven by entrepreneurship and
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choice than often thought. Gutierrez et al. (2019) provided convincing evidence
on the permeability of, and transition patterns between, the formal and informal
sector under the conditions of low-income urban settings. The resilience of the
findings deserves to be tested for other regions and (rural) settings also.
6.1.2 Formality and Informality across and within Birth Cohorts:
the Case of Vietnam
Another study supported by GLM|LIC (McCaig and Pavcnik 2015) widens the
perspective and adds some important findings on the permeability of the informal
and formal sector in Vietnam, and the characteristics of those informal workers
who are most likely to move on to formal employment. The study showed that
rapid economic growth and shifting demographics in Vietnam have led to a faster
transition to the formal sector than in other low-income countries, and some de-
cline in informality that nevertheless left the share of the sector at an extremely
high level. The results of the study suggest that focusing on productivity gains in
the formal sector are the best strategy for improving working conditions among
the poor.
Vietnam is an ideal setting for investigating these complex relationships, as it
has experienced high growth rates from 1999 to 2009, with GDP per capita ex-
ploding by 78%, and 35% growth of the labour force. At first sight, this remarkable
development has not allowed the country to reduce its share of informal employ-
ment substantially. Informality fell by 7 percentage points, but aggregate informal
employment still made up 79% of total employment in 2009.
Further examination reveals, however, that this moderate trend masks a clear
shift of employment. Agricultural employment saw a significant decline, while
manufacturing and services expanded; even more importantly, as McCaig and
Pavcnik (2015) noted, the share of informal jobs within the manufacturing sector
dropped by 15 percentage points.
This confirms a generally decreasing trend in informality as economies grow
(see La Porta and Shleifer 2014). However, it should be noted that cycli-
cal fluctuations or severe global crises may dramatically alter these trends,
given the high vulnerability of labour markets in LICs to fundamental exter-
nal shocks. In such circumstances, informality will prevail and may even—in
light of the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic—increase in
many developing countries. Policymakers are thus confronted with the dual
challenge of increasing productivity of the informal sector while also facilitat-
ing transition to higher-productivity formal employment. The potential con-
tribution to aggregate productivity from the transition of individual workers
between the informal and formal sectors remains an understudied research
area.
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Starting from this baseline, McCaig and Pavcnik (2015) enriched the literature
by investigating these interrelations based on representative data from the Viet-
namHousehold Living Standards Surveys (VHLSS: 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008), which
allowed the tracking of working-age individuals over four years, and the Vietnam
Population Census (1999, 2009). These data sets cover all industries, including
formal and informal employment. They were used to identify the characteristics
of informal workers most likely to formalize when low-income economies grow
rapidly, and to analyse whether the job tasks of workers change as they transition
to formal employment.
The study found that demographics are a crucial determinant of transition
by examining the aggregate decline in informality across different birth cohorts.
Young workers who entered Vietnam’s labour force during the growth period of
1999 to 2009 (aged 10–19 in 1999) were substantially less likely to work in the
informal sector than workers in older birth cohorts (55–59, 60–64 in 1999) that
entered the labour force in earlier years with lower economic growth rates. In
fact, the young cohorts contributed the most to the aggregate decrease in infor-
mality in Vietnam between 1999 and 2009. With an average informality level of
roughly 70% in 2009, they ranked more than 20 percentage points below older
workers. The share of informal workers rather consistently increased with the age
of the cohorts (see Table 6.9). According to the calculations given by McCaig and
Pavcnik (2015), this demographic effect accounted for 69% of the decline in total
nationwide informality during the study period.
Informality within cohorts confirmed this trend, accounting for another 31%
of aggregate informality decline: workers of older cohorts (over 40 years of age
in 1999) experienced an increase of informality over the ten-year period of up to
8 percentage points, whereas the younger birth cohorts aged 20–24 and 25–29 in
1999 saw a clear drop by 11 and 5 percentage points respectively.
The rise of the manufacturing sector in Vietnam was accompanied by a 14.5%
decrease in informality over the decade.Thus, it should not surprise that the young
birth cohorts’ contribution to informality decline was even larger in manufactur-
ing than it was economy wide. The share of this group employed informally was
about 30% in manufacturing in 2009, while cohorts above the age of 40 showed
rates of 67% and higher. Analysing by gender did not reveal strongly deviating
results—only that the gap in the share of the informally employed across female
birth cohorts appears to be larger than for males.
Manufacturing in developing countries is usually clustered in urban areas and
their peripheries. Vietnam is no exception to this ‘rule’, with five provinces ac-
counting for 63% of formal employment in this sector in 1999. Moving from
informal employment to formal jobs in manufacturing may thus involve (tempo-
rary) labourmigrationwithin the country.The study found that internalmigration
in fact has a key function in increasing formalization in Vietnam, and that young
internalmigrants were far less likely to be employed informally.The growth decade
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Table 6.9 Informality across and within Age Cohorts






1999 2009 Change 1999 2009 Change
1985–9 10–14 0.716 0.287
1980–4 15–19 0.687 0.325
1975–9 20–24 0.873 0.761 −0.112 0.569 0.440 −0.129
1970–4 25–29 0.864 0.816 −0.047 0.585 0.527 −0.059
1965–9 30–34 0.868 0.843 −0.025 0.590 0.586 −0.004
1960–4 35–39 0.850 0.835 −0.014 0.561 0.61 0.049
1955–9 40–44 0.838 0.849 0.011 0.545 0.669 0.123
1950–4 45–49 0.844 0.906 0.061 0.587 0.762 0.175
1945–9 50–54 0.872 0.956 0.083 0.605 0.858 0.253
1940–4 55–59 0.924 0.723
1935–9 60–64 0.967 0.866
Total 0.864 0.790 −0.074 0.580 0.435 −0.145













Decomposition −0.023 −0.051 −0.074 −0.014 −0.131 −0.145
Note: Authors’ calculations based on Vietnam Population Census data for 1999 and 2009 on workers
aged 20–64.
Source: McCaig and Pavcnik (2015)
clearly stimulated migration to the manufacturing areas, particularly among the
young cohorts, while the effect declined with age. Between 2005 and 2009 around
12% of workers aged 20–24 migrated, according to the survey data, while the
share of manufacturing workers in the same age and migration cohort rose
to 29%.
The informality gap between migrants and non-migrants in the same cohort is
striking: the share of informality amongmale and female migrants in the youngest
cohort (33% and 31% respectively) was over 40 and 35 percentage points be-
low the average rate for all male female workers in this cohort respectively. Just
42% of all workers who recently migrated were employed informally, with an
even lower share of 14% among recent migrants in manufacturing—a stark con-
trast with the figure for workers overall (79%). These results suggest that younger
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workers may transition from informality to formality more quickly if they have
a greater willingness and readiness to migrate. In other words, the decision to
migrate substantially increases the probability of being formally employed.
6.1.3 Who Is More Likely to Transition between the Formal
and Informal Sectors?
The study further examined the actual transition of workers to the formal sec-
tor within birth cohorts and the duration of these switches. Learning more about
the underlying patterns is important in order to better target potential policy
approaches. A close look at the shares of workers who were always employed for-
mally or informally, or who moved between the sectors between 2002 and 2005,
gives a rather clear picture: although most workers stayed in one sector, younger
cohorts were more likely to move sectors or to stay longer in the formal sector
(see Table 6.10).
Using cross-sectional analyses to account for individual attributes that may in-
fluence transition behaviour, McCaig and Pavcnik (2015) concluded that workers
who switch into formality, and workers already working formally, share similar
observable characteristics: they were more likely to be younger, better educated,

















20–29 0.698 0.151 0.151 0.652 0.443 0.217
30–39 0.795 0.111 0.094 0.572 0.533 0.174
40–49 0.785 0.13 0.085 0.528 0.597 0.136
50–64 0.868 0.057 0.075 0.444 0.64 0.14
All 0.784 0.116 0.099 0.569 0.536 0.173
Manufacturing 0.606 0.182 0.211 0.57 0.467 0.187
Notes: The sample of manufacturing workers is defined based on working on manufacturing at either
the start or the end of the period. A worker is defined as permanently moving to the formal sector if
they were initially working in the informal sector and subsequently working in the formal sector in
the surveys two and four years later
Source: McCaig and Pavcnik (2015)
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male, non-minorities, and urban. In contrast, older, low-educated, female, and ru-
ral workers were relatively less likely to move to the formal sector. The opposite
seems true as well: those workers moving to informality had a similar education,
age, and area of residence to workers already in the sector. Women were less likely
to switch to the informal sector but more likely to be employed there. The authors
suggested that this puzzling finding may be explained by occupational sorting and
the higher share of women working in urban, trade-intensive manufacturing that
makes other formal jobs (or informality) undesirable.
It remained unclear, however, to what extent these individual characteristics
actually determine decisions to move sector; they influenced the likelihood of
switching to another sector but did not predict this behaviour. That is, many
surveyed workers, although being likely to move sector according to their char-
acteristics, actually did not move at all. Additional research may be able to explore
these findings further.
6.1.4 Is There Occupational Upgrading along with Transition?
In a final step McCaig and Pavcnik (2015) asked whether transition between
the informal and formal sector helps workers to upgrade their occupation. The
data revealed that elementary occupations were the most prevalent among infor-
mal workers (85%) and ‘switchers’ (67%), but were low among formal workers
(11%). According to the study, those switching from the informal to the formal
sector actually increased their employment—and thus their earnings—in skilled
occupations (for example manual workers, skilled handicraftsmen, skilled service
workers) and in assembly, mechanical, or professional occupations over time.
Even those workersmoving to low-skill manufacturing jobs experienced a skills
and earnings upgrade compared to their former jobs in agriculture or informal
manufacturing and services. However, workers already in formal employment
at the start of the period kept their leading position in terms of higher-skilled
occupations (for example machinists, assemblers, professionals).
In summary, McCaig and Pavcnik (2015) presented a number of findings that
should give cause for reflection, since they paint a more optimistic picture of
the informal sector than does mainstream economic thinking. While the study
confirmed the importance of policies that promote growth in the formal sec-
tor, as a prerequisite to enabling informal workers to upgrade occupation and
earnings by moving sector, it also highlighted another aspect: the combination
of demographic trends, educational progress and economic growth may in-
crease permeability and accelerate transition dynamics, as the young cohorts
appear to be more likely to step into formality. Over two-thirds of the decrease
in informality in Vietnam appeared to be due to changing labour force cohorts.
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Upward job mobility by moving sectors may be viewed as an important contri-
bution to further economic growth, as it raises sectoral and aggregate productivity.
This leads us back to the interrelationship between economic growth, trends in
informality and formality, and the observation that Vietnam appears to have tran-
sitioned towards the formal sector more quickly than other developing countries.
McCaig and Pavcnik (2018) provided evidence on the impact of additional ex-
port opportunities in Vietnam on transition between formality and informality,
showing that reallocation was more frequent in more trade-orientated regions
of the country and among younger workers. This finding adds neatly to the re-
sults presented and discussed above. Exposure to globalization and international
trade—as well as repeated setbacks that may occur in the longer term—will cer-
tainly affect transition trends, since it expands formal employment opportunities
and occupational quality.
6.1.5 Poor Prospects for Non-Farm Microenterprises in Vietnam
In a further study supported by GLM|LIC, McCaig and Pavcnik (2017) drew at-
tention from the individual to the firm level of transition. Given that non-farm
microenterprises—mostly operated on an informal, small, single-person level—
employ roughly 60% share of the Vietnamese labour force, better knowledge on
the entry, exit, hiring, and transition behaviour of these household businesses is
highly valuable. A lack of large-scale, representative data on non-registered mi-
croenterprises restricts this field of study.TheVietnamHousehold Living Standard
Survey, also used in the studies presented above, allows the dynamics of non-farm
microenterprises to be investigated and linked to characteristics of the business
owner over almost a decade. The core findings can be summarized:
1. The decreasing share of informal employment during Vietnam’s period
of growth between 1999 and 2009 is not linked to formalization of infor-
mal microenterprises but can instead be explained by the new entry and
expansion of private sector firms offering wage employment.
2. Since the largemajority of non-farm household businesses do not transi-
tion from informality to formality, their expansion prospects are rather
limited.
3. Successful non-rural microenterprises are the exception to the rule. They
adapted different characteristics of formality, and were more likely to hire
external workers and increase their workforce, or even to register formally.
But while only 10% in this group hired workers overall, less than 5% of
those who did not hire at baseline changed their hiring behaviour over
time.
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4. There is no positive correlation between the age of a household business
and firm growth. Small businesses with a longer market presence did not
perform better than younger firms on average.
5. When poorly performing enterprises leave the market, they are largely
replaced by new firms with similarly poor market prospects.
6. Business entry and exit, productivity, hiring, and transition probability
are strongly correlated to the owner’s education. While many individu-
als with lower levels of education operated non-farm household businesses,
only the better-educated hired employees. Even this group had lower levels
of education than formal sector employees.
7. Thebusiness skillsneeded tooperatea successfulmicroenterprise are rare
among owners.
8. Most owners ofmicroenterprises enter themarket fromself-employment
in agriculture. Private wage workers starting a business were rare.
Overall, the analysis presented by McCaig and Pavcnik (2017) suggests that, in
the case of Vietnam, there is only very limited potential for sustained growth
and employment expansion among non-rural household businesses.This was true
even during the period of remarkable growth experienced in the first decade of
the twenty-first century. This hints once more at the urgent need to enhance
(business) education among workers in the informal sector, to either improve
their business and entrepreneurial skills or to facilitate a move to formal em-
ployment. A lack of business education appears to be the most relevant constraint
(see La Porta and Shleifer 2014).
6.2 HowDoLow-Income LabourMarkets Respond to Economic
Crises?
While Vietnam and many other low-income countries saw significant economic
growth in the years before the global financial crisis, this was not the com-
mon pattern across all developing regions. For instance, Zimbabwe suffered a
collapse of its economy in the same period, due to hyperinflation, macroeco-
nomic shocks, and the negative consequences of a land-reform intervention.
Although the Zimbabwean economy slowly recovered, the manufacturing sector
in particular lagged behind and experienced a further fall in employment.
Against this background, GLM|LIC research projects address the specific chal-
lenges posed to the Zimbabwean labourmarket, as an example of how low-income
societies are affected by severe economic crisis. A set of three instructive policy
briefs (Edwards et al. 2018; Oostendorp et al. 2018; Rankin et al. 2018) offered
meaningful policy instructions based on ongoing research activities.
134 labour markets in low-income countries
By studying the performance of more than 200 manufacturing formal sector
firms (with at least five employees), Edwards et al. (2018) examined the effect of
the crisis on firm behaviour and survival. A so-called ‘tracer survey’ exploited rich
2015 data on the further business history of firms initially surveyed under the
Zimbabwean Regional Programme on Enterprise Development (RPED) between
1993 and 1995. Combining data from trade directories, business associations, firm
registers, tax clearance certificates, and other sources with the RPED data, allowed
the research group to detect initial firm-based attributes that determined firm
performance over time.
The composition of the sample hints at a rather low survival rate of the surveyed
firms: out of a sample of 203 firms initially surveyed in the 1990s, seventy-eight still
existed in the same market segment, forty were closed, and eight merged, while a
high share of thirty-two firms could no longer be traced. Further investigation
identified three main firm-specific characteristics associated with firm survival
(see Figure 6.4):
1. Firm survival depends on firm size. While the survival rate of businesses
with twenty or fewer employees was just 9%, it was a relatively high 57%
among firms with one hundred workers or more.
2. Firm age is a determinant of survival. Less than five years of market expe-
rience reduced the likelihood of survival to 9%, whereas firms at least fifteen
years old survived at a rate of 55%.
3. Survival rates reveala strikinggap infirmproductivity. Survival probabili-
ties were six times higher in the top third (most productive) than the bottom
third (least productive) of firms.
According to the analysis, other important firm characteristics (for example mar-
ket share, export-orientation, business sector, ownership (foreign or national),
education ofmanager) were surprisingly not systematically related to firm survival
likelihood.
It should be noted as well that Zimbabwe’s firm survival rates are not the lowest
in the sub-Saharan region but rank at a rather average level—despite the country’s
huge economic challenges. For instance, Kenya and Tanzania show lower survival
rates. Following Edwards et al. (2018), this may be explained by the fact that—
given relatively low entry rates—Zimbabwean manufacturing firms were larger,
older and more experienced already in the 1990s when compared to other coun-
tries in the region, and thus were more likely to survive the 2000–9 crisis period.
Also, hyperinflation may have partly offset firms’ cost disadvantages, and the ab-
sence of other economic options led many firms to operate below capacity rather
than close. Further research within this project will reveal whether the surviving
firms will be able to expand in better times, and to weather upcoming crises also.






































Fig. 6.4 Determinants of Firm Survival Rates among Manufacturing Firms in
Zimbabwe
Source: Edwards et al. (2018)
6.2.1 Economic Uncertainty Affects the Reliability of Workers’ Wage
Payments
One important aspect of firm performance is economic volatility and policy un-
certainty. Firms are directly affected by a lack of planning and revenue security,
and pass on risks to their employees. In a LIC, this will result in far more severe
outcomes than in a developed country.
Additional research within the GLM|LIC project (Rankin et al. 2018) investi-
gated the impact of prevalent uncertainties in Zimbabwe on the welfare of workers
employed by firms in formal and informalmanufacturing.The research focused on
the steadiness of wage payments, showing a high share of outstanding pay among
surveyed workers. This finding is highly relevant when examining the transition
between formality and informality, as workers at high risk of going unpaid may
leave formal employment.
Survey data were collected in 2015, from 170 informal workers (131 informal
firms) and over 1,300 formal workers (the same roughly 200 formal firms, with at
least five employees, that were examined in Edwards et al. 2018) across six sectors.
A year later, more than 1,000 formal workers were surveyed again. The findings
Rankin et al. (2018) are revealing (see Figure 6.5) and deserve attention:
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Fig. 6.5 Share of Zimbabwean Workers with Outstanding Pay
by Firm Size and Wage Level
Note: 2016 numbers for outstanding pay; 2015 data on firm size and wage
level.
Source: Rankin et al. (2018)
1. Almost half of workers reported outstandingwages in the second wave of
the survey.
2. Roughly two-thirds of small-firm employees were owed wages, whereas
larger firms paid earnings more reliably.
3. Workers earning below themedianwageweremore likely to be owedpart
of their pay. Better-paid employees showed an almost 25 percentage points
lower risk of being owed earnings in firms with twenty to ninety-nine
workers, and an average advantage of 10 percentage points across all firms.
4. Workers who had been at their firm longer were more likely to be paid
reliably.
5. There is no evidence of significant gender effects.
6. These results were widespread across geographical regions and industries
within the manufacturing sector, with only a few exceptions (for example
wood and furniture industries).
The amount of earnings owed to manufacturing workers in 2016 is even more
stunning: according to Rankin et al. (2018), median outstanding pay was worth
almost five months of 2015 wages. More than half of workers were owed at least
a full year’s earnings, regardless of their individual wage level. Compensation
for outstanding earnings was only received by a very small minority of workers
(for example housing and transportation, in-kind payments).
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In better-functioning labour markets, this high wage uncertainty would either:
not occur; induce firms to reduce their workforce; or simply cause workers to leave
their jobs for other options. However, given the severe constraints of many low-
income countries’ labour markets, worker reactions may be quite different.
Rankin et al. (2018) highlighted some reasons why manufacturing workers sur-
veyed in Zimbabwe did not leave firms, despite outstanding wages. Besides just
optimistically waiting for better times to come, regulation appears to be one main
reason. Zimbabwean labour legislation forces firms to pay out to workers in case
of dismissal, depending on their length of service. This regulation gives workers a
significant incentive to not leave voluntarily and thus stay entitled to this claim.
Survey data may confirm this: the average tenure of workers owed wages was
two years longer than the average twelve years of fully paid workers. Further-
more, by exploring additional data collected to measure risk behaviour and time
preferences, the authors indicated that workers with outstanding pay may have a
slightly greater readiness to take risks. Additional labour activities do not seem to
be an explanatory factor, as the data show no differing proportions for fully and
incompletely paid workers; both groups had a roughly 25% share engaged in such
activities.
In the course of this chapter, one other reason for accepting owed earnings
seems particularly important: the informal sector in Zimbabwe is not likely to of-
fer a serious alternative to those facing wage uncertainty in the formal sector. By
estimating alternative earnings through informal employment, based on the sur-
vey data on informalmanufacturing, Rankin et al. (2018) showed thatmoving into
informality was hardly an attractive option for formal workers. On average, work-
ers that were owed formal sector wages still earned around 50% more in 2015 than
their labour earnings would have been in the informal (manufacturing) sector.
Within one single year, however, the formality premium fell to 35%.
If it declines further in the face of persistent economic uncertainty affecting the
manufacturing sector, it will not just increase the share of workerswaiting for earn-
ings payments and the level of owedwages.The gap in earnings between the formal
and informal sectors would then shrink, raising the likelihood of workers mov-
ing into informality. In turn, this would put informal earnings under significant
pressure and enlarge the welfare gap between formal and informal workers.
At least as important are the findings presented by Rankin et al. (2018) showing
that demographicsmay accelerate a process of distancing betweenmanufactur-
ing in the formal and informal sectors. If the trend persists, and if older workers
tend to benefit from their tenure and face a lower risk of being owed wages, while
younger cohorts are far more affected, this could pose a risk of sectoral separation
between age groups thatmust not be ignored. In the case of Zimbabwe, such unde-
sirable outcomes could be tackled best by strengthening the formalmanufacturing
sector, which is particularly exposed to economic instability.
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6.2.2 Productivity Gains versus Allocation Inefficiency
among Manufacturing Firms
Exploring the same combination of 2015 survey data on around 200 formal man-
ufacturing firms in Zimbabwe and the 1993–1995 RPED survey, Oostendorp et
al. (2018) analysed how the unusual frequency of economic shocks and struc-
tural change affected firm characteristics, productivity and allocative efficiency
over a twenty-year period (1994–2014). Sectors covered in the study include
food processing, textile/garment/leather industries, woodworking/furniture, and
metalworking, in selected Zimbabwean regions.
According to the analysis, firm productivity levels increased substantially on
aggregate between 1994 and 2014 (see Figure 6.6), while productivity differences
across types of business widely diminished.However, export-orientated firms even
expanded their clear advantage in terms of productivity over non-exporting firms,
despite a substantial loss in external competitiveness due to the ‘dollarization’ of the
Zimbabwean economy in 2009. Remarkably, half of the productivity gap between
domestic-owned and foreign-owned manufacturing enterprises has been closed
over time.
Notwithstanding these trends, formal manufacturing was exposed to high eco-
nomic pressure leading to structural adjustments and inefficiencies. The decrease
in small-firm market entries indicates that the sector has lost attractiveness and
that entrepreneurs may have turned to informal manufacturing instead. This
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Fig. 6.6 Changes in Aggregate Manufacturing Productivity in
Zimbabwe
Note: The counterfactual aggregate productivity level reported for 2014
keeps allocative efficiency at its 1994 level.
Source: Oostendorp et al. (2018)
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Zimbabwean indigenization policies resulted in the market exit of many busi-
nesses. Low entry rates resulted in a strong rise in the average market age of
formal manufacturing firms, which almost doubled from 1994 (16 years) to 2014
(30 years).
Further analysis by Oostendorp et al. (2018) revealed that aggregate produc-
tivity within the formal manufacturing sector would have substantially increased
(up to 4,600 USD per worker in 2014 prices) if allocative efficiency had been at
least stable. Instead, the allocation of resources towards higher productivity busi-
nessesworsened over the 1994–2014 period acrossmostmanufacturing subsectors
and firm characteristics, leading to a dramatic decline in total allocative efficiency.
Notably, allocative efficiency among exporting firms fell even more sharply than
among non-exporting firms, thus preventing them from gaining an even wider
productivity advantage.
These are rather worrying outcomes; despite raising their average productivity,
more productive firms were unable to grow as fast as their advantage over less
productive businesses should have indicated. Inefficient allocation of resources
has, to a significant extent, dampened aggregate productivity growth within
the manufacturing sector, allowing firms to survive, yet hardly to expand and
contribute more to overall economic growth.
The policy implications of these findings are rather straightforward but all
the more difficult to implement. Given the apparent market entry barriers and
the decline in allocative efficiency, facilitating investment will not be enough. The
functioning of factor markets should be improved in order to increase efficiency
in the allocation of resources. Furthermore, export-orientated subsectors have
shown a remarkable resilience to repeated shocks suggesting that policies stimulat-
ing them and reallocating resources can significantly impact total manufacturing
productivity in Zimbabwe. Last but not least, given the trend towards increas-
ing informality of the Zimbabwean economy, it becomes obvious that, rather
than condemn this sector, policy should seek to improve wellbeing conditions
within it.
Further research should investigate whether the patterns of structural change
identified by Oostendorp et al. (2018) for the formal manufacturing sector also
exist in agriculture and mining—and in the informal economy.
6.3 DoesManufacturingOffer a Chance to Take the
Next Step inDevelopment for sub-SaharanAfrica?
The findings presented above lead to the question of whether low-income coun-
tries, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa, may have a realistic opportunity to
expand their role in global manufacturing and enhance export-orientation of their
domestic formal manufacturing sectors—and whether low labour costs may give
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them an advantage in this respect. If so, corresponding policy interventions could
raise productivity in the (formal) manufacturing sector and benefit from compet-
itiveness growth due to rising labour costs in emerging markets in other global
regions. As a prerequisite, however, labour costs would need to be relatively low,
to compensate for less favourable factors that may affect competitiveness. This is
often assumed to be the case for sub-Saharan Africa, but does this assumption
withstand scrutiny?
Economic research has studied this topic from a variety of perspectives. For
example, Fox, Thomas, and Haines (2017) benchmarked the overall output, pro-
ductivity, and employment performance of sub-Saharan Africa against their
counterparts in Asia, concluding that this region mainly falls short in terms of
manufacturing productivity and employment dynamics, while overall prospects
are better for other (services) sectors. Page (2012) argued in favour of speeding
up industrialization through export-orientated policies and investments to en-
hance education and firm capabilities, rather than focusing on regulation. Gelb,
Meyer, and Ramachandran (2013) showed ‘enclave effects’ to be a potential cause
of higher labour costs in sub-Saharan Africa and observed that firm expansion led
to a stronger increase in labour costs than among low-income competitors in other
regions.
Supported by GLM|LIC, Gelb et al. (2020) enriched the latter study by thor-
oughly examining panel data. The authors explored firm-level data from the
World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys to assess the level of actual labour costs of
manufacturing businesses in a number of low- and middle-income countries in
Africa, while also measuring their hypothetical labour costs if they had been lo-
cated outside of Africa. In summary, the study finds that labour is indeed more
costly for manufacturing firms than expected—and more expensive in most
sub-Saharan African countries when compared to international low-income
countries. Strategies to foster export-orientated manufacturing in the region may
thus not achieve their objectives.
The survey sample covers multi-year periods for each country, comprising a
total of almost 5,500 manufacturing firms with five and more workers in twelve
African and seventeen non-African countries. Around 1,200 firms were located in
Africa (see Figure 6.7).
To account for the imbalance of the sample in terms of total economic perfor-
mance (only two non-African countries had GDP per capita below 1,000 USD,
compared with six African), the authors assigned higher respective weights to
firms in poor non-African countries and controlled for capital cost per worker.
Total labour costs were defined as the total of annual wages and all benefits
(including transport, food, and social insurance).
The study found only modest differences in basic firm characteristics: median
African firms were smaller than their competitors (thirty-eight to forty-seven
employees), younger (14 to 19 years), and more likely to be foreign-owned
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Fig. 6.7 Analytical Sample: Are Labour Costs Lower in (sub-Saharan) Africa?
Source: Gelb et al. (2020)
(17% to 9%), while the share of skilled and unskilled workers was almost the same.
The differences in productivity were huge, however: for non-African firms, the cal-
culated level of median value added per worker was roughly 11,400 USD, whereas
the median African firm reach just 5,200 USD. Although poorer, African manu-
facturing firms faced higher capital costs per worker. In summary, lower values
added, higher capital costs, and similar levels of human capital, hint at lower
productivity levels for African firms.
Furthermore, the data provided byGelb et al. (2020) refute the simplified picture
of generally lower labour costs in African economies.This is true in absolute terms
only—the differences versus other countries were rather small when labour costs
were adjusted by GDP per capita (see Figure 6.8). The general observation that
poorer countries face higher labour costs than those suggested by their income lev-
els is all the more valid for the African countries, where the ratio of labour cost per
worker to GDP per capita was also substantially higher. Most African economies
had a ratio level clearly above 1.0, whilemost non-African economies stayed below
(see Figure 6.9).
The study dug deeper into these striking differences by comparing a set of
countries (Tanzania, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, Bangladesh) that ranked rather
similar in terms of their competitiveness and GDP per capita, according to the
2016–2017 Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum (see
Schwab and Sala-i-Martı́n 2016). The data (see Table 6.11) highlight that even
African countries viewed asmore competitive had far higher labour costs (with
one exception) and capital costs compared to a country like Bangladesh.
As a major manufacturing country, Bangladesh could, in principle, serve
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Fig. 6.8 Median Labour Cost Relative to GDP per Capita in African and Comparator Countries
Note: Data for each country shows values for the median, 25th and 75th percentile.

















































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 6.9 Average Ratio of Labour Cost and GDP per Capita Relative to GDP per Capita in African and Comparator Countries
Note: K/GDP refers to the ratio of logged capital cost per worker to logged GDP per capita.
Source: Gelb et al. (2020)
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Bangladesh 835.31 1,069.84 853.02 106
Kenya 2,118.01 9,775.45 1,116.69 96
Tanzania 1,776.65 5,740.99 1,094.95 116
Senegal 1,561.64 2,421.98 775.45 112
Ethiopia 909.28 6,137.98 471.19 109
Source: Gelb et al. (2020)
manufacturing sector—but the country appears to have much more favourable
firm costs. Labour costs in Kenya, Tanzania, and Senegal were roughly twice as
high as both their own GDP per capita and labour costs in Bangladesh. Only
Ethiopia faced a labour cost per capita comparable to Bangladesh, though its GDP
per capita was only half as high as Bangladesh’s.
Capital cost per capita showed Bangladesh far ahead of the African countries as
well; here the figures are even more stunning and reveal the gap African countries
will have to make up to gain productivity and global competitiveness within their
manufacturing sectors.
Estimates presented by Gelb et al. (2020) further emphasized the disadvantages
of most manufacturing sectors in sub-Saharan Africa. If they were to operate out-
side Africa, their total labour costs would have been just one-third of the actual
costs, whereas non-African firms would face double the labour costs if they were
in Africa. This effect increased with firm size thus clearly signalling the existence
of an ‘Africa premium’: small African firms were roughly 39% more expensive in
terms of labour cost per worker than a small non-African firm.Medium-size firms
in Africa were 52% more expensive, while very large firms were almost 55% more
expensive than their non-African counterparts.
The findings also reveal a pay gradient: across all countries, labour in smaller
firms is cheaper than in larger enterprises. However, comparison between
African and non-African countries paints a mixed picture. The pay gradient be-
tween medium-size and small firms is steeper in Africa; conversely, it is steeper
outside Africa between large and medium-size firms.
Gelb et al. (2020) distinguished three main groups of African countries with
respect to their manufacturing prospects:
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1. Middle-income countries like South Africa and Botswana operate highly
capital-intensive industrial sectors and are rather unlikely to compete in
labour-intensive manufacturing.
2. Low- and lower-middle income countries (for example Kenya, Tanzania,
Senegal)offer relatively stable conditions for foreign investment and an ex-
pansion of the manufacturing sector. Yet their labour costs are presumably
too high and their firms too small to compete with international rivals such
as Bangladesh.
3. Lowest-income countries like theDemocraticRepublic of theCongomay
be suffering from governance failings that prevent any increase of man-
ufacturing. If these failures do not occur and instead, as in the case of
Ethiopia, low labour costs are accompanied by significant progress with
regards to stable administration and easing of transport and logistics con-
straints, then there is a good chance of successfully entering the international
manufacturing market.
Ethiopia is a good example of a sub-Saharan country that could even take the
opportunity to compete with Bangladesh in manufacturing in the long term,
the authors argue. The country’s low labour costs and level of prices were equal
to Bangladesh’s, for the most part. Also, the Bangladeshi economy is enjoy-
ing significant growth, leading to rising labour costs that will in turn encour-
age more foreign-owned manufacturing firms to scour the globe for alternative
low-wage locations. Ethiopia has already appeared on the radar in some early
cases.
In summary, this GLM|LIC study revealed the obstacles in the way of
most sub-Saharan countries’ admission to the export-orientated manufactur-
ing sector. High labour costs relative to GDP per capita hint at market con-
straints and compromise the region’s competitiveness to a significant extent.
Ethiopia aside, the chances that sub-Saharan Africa may follow Asia in using
the manufacturing sector as a launch ramp to further development appear to be
limited.
6.4 Social InsuranceMandates, Compliance,
and Employment in Sub-SaharanAfrica
Ethiopia has also been at the centre of attention of GLM|LIC research in a differ-
ent context that is no less important when evaluating development potential in a
low-income setting: social protection has gained significant importance in de-
veloping countries. Compared with middle-income regions like Latin America,
where social insurance and assistance has a rather long tradition, and covers a
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majority of the labour force, similar programmes are only partially implemented in
low-income sub-SaharanAfrica. Hencemost economic research has so far focused
on the impact of social insurance in middle-income economies.
From a theoretical perspective, implementing mandatory social insurance will
not negatively affect employment if workers’ valuation of the benefits matches the
additional labour costs to firms. This match will result in lower wages, reflecting
the ‘price’ employees are willing to pay to receive the benefits, and in additional
labour supply inducing further wage pressure. A negative impact on employment,
in the form of lower employment growth or rising unemployment, may occur if
firms are not able to pass on the resulting cost of the programmes or to increase
their efficiency to compensate for the cost burden, or if they substitute capital for
labour. Existing wage regulation (for example minimum wages) may further hin-
der employment. At the same time, productivity may increase if firms react to the
additional cost of benefits by adjusting their production.
While thesemechanisms also apply to developed economies, the absence of fric-
tionless labour markets in many low-income countries poses an additional risk of
labour market distortions and other unintended outcomes following social insur-
ance reforms. In particular, if workers value benefits lower than expected, they
may instead choose informal employment to avoid mandatory social insurance
contributions, which may in turn reduce formal employment, tax revenues, and
overall productivity.
This effectmay result either from switching to the informal sector or fromwork-
ing informally in the formal sector (for the same or another employer). It may
also affect low-skilled workers more, given that pension benefits, for example, are
mostly related to work experience and shorter unemployment spells. A lack of
enforcement may lead to uncertainties in terms of benefit receipt among workers,
changing both employers’ and employees’ behaviour, and thus further limiting the
effect of social insurance interventions.
Recent research, though not focused on the poorest countries and sub-Saharan
Africa in particular, has drawn attention to mixed outcomes of social insurance
implementation and the challenge of enforcement. Joubert (2015) noted that a
sizeable informal sector such as Chile’s complicates enforcement of mandatory
pension contributions and may encourage informality. Almeida and Carneiro
(2012) studied the economic effects of mandatory severance benefits in Brazil,
showing the positive effects of more intensive enforcement in terms of rais-
ing the attractiveness of the formal sector among informal workers, while lo-
calities with lower enforcement observed an increase in informality. Jung and
Tran (2012) revealed the positive welfare effects of a pension scheme for older
informal sector workers in Brazil, despite an increase in informal employ-
ment. Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, and Pagés (2011), and Bosch and Campos-
Vazuguex (2014), provided evidence that the provision of public health insurance
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to informal sector workers in Mexico increased informal employment, while de-
creasing the number of small and medium-size firms, and workers, in the formal
sector.
6.4.1 The Mixed Outcomes of a Social Insurance Scheme in Ethiopia
Similar studies for sub-Saharan Africa have so far been lacking. Given the con-
ditions of LICs facing high risk and uncertainty, and high exposure to shocks,
it is even more important to learn more about the impact of social insurance
programmes. To examine the impact of social insurance implementation in sub-
Saharan Africa, GLM|LIC has supported a study by Shiferaw et al. (2017) on the
labour market outcomes of a mandatory social insurance scheme in Ethiopia,
which appear to be rather mixed in terms of employment shifts and resulting
informality.
Ethiopia has undertaken a swift,major pension reform in 2011 (‘PrivateOrgani-
zations Pension Fund’, POPF), for the first time granting retirement and disability
benefits to not only civil servants and those working in the armed forces, but to
all permanent employees in the formal private sector. Self-employed and infor-
mal workers are excluded from the programme, while participation is mandatory
for formal sector workers. If an employer operates a voluntary ‘provident fund’,
workers may choose to either continue this fund or transfer their benefit savings
to the government fund. Employers’ contribution rates to the POPF were raised
in stages, from 7% of the gross monthly wage in 2011 to 11% in 2015. Employee
contributions meanwhile increased gradually from 5% to 7% over the same pe-
riod. The pension benefit was set at 30% of the average three-year wage preceding
retirement. To receive pension benefits at the age of 62, workers need to make
contributions for at least ten years. Since the programme is focused on perma-
nent workers, firms are required by law to give permanent employment status to
all employees after forty-five days.
Importantly, the new pension programme was introduced in the midst of a pe-
riod of substantial economic growth in Ethiopia between 2005 and 2015, when
annual growth rates reached 10%, roughly twice as high as in the decade before.
Hence the timing of the reform seems very appropriate to avoid a decline in labour
demand, by allowing firms to better balance the cost of contributions. Overall,
labour demand in the manufacturing sector has been growing before and after
the 2011 pension reform. It should be further noted that Ethiopia has no mini-
mumwage legislation for the private sector (only for public sector employees), but
guarantees a minimum pension, thus potentially encouraging additional labour
supply from low-wage workers looking to secure pension benefits that go beyond
their contributions. It may thus be in firms’ interest to pass on the cost of pension
contributions by paying lower wages.
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The Private Organizations’ Employees’ Pension Agency (POEPA) operates the
pension programme, registers all employers and workers, and is authorized to col-
lect untimely firm contributions from their bank accounts. Incomplete pension
contributions prevent firms from filing their taxes, thus risking high penalties.
However, whether these enforcement mechanisms are effective in practice, re-
mains unclear. Shiferaw et al. (2017) argued that enforcement is relatively strong in
Ethiopia with respect to workers already registered, while subsequent monitoring
of employment changes and verifying employers’ contributions may be weaker.
Census data provided by the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) of Ethiopia suggest
a compliance rate of under 50%.
The census data further show a clear rise in the number of firms mak-
ing pension contributions in the years after the pension reform was intro-
duced, while employment and sales of the firms also increased (see Figures 6.10
and 6.11). While the first observation is rather self-descriptive, the latter cannot
exclude the possibility that rates may have been even higher without the pension
reform.
Against this background, the study differentiated between firms with pre-
existing voluntary provident funds, and those firms facing mandatory pension
contributions for the first time. While the first group should have exhib-
ited neither low compliance nor a significant increase in non-wage labour
costs, the second group was likely to react to additional costs by adjust-
ing wages and labour demand. To examine this hypothesis the authors used
firm-level panel data collected by the Ethiopian Electric Power Authority for
billing reasons, and CSA census data for the pre-reform (2008–11) and post-
reform (2012–13) periods, to measure the impact of the pension reform on
wage levels, employment trends, the composition of the workforce, and labour
productivity.
A closer examination of the data reveals some interesting findings:
1. Manufacturing firms with pre-existing provident funds were larger and
older, and had higher wage rates, productivity and investment per worker
than those without any earlier pension scheme.
2. Thegapbetween large and smallfirms in termsof employment, sales and
real wage rates decreased in the years prior to the reform, but increased
after themandatory pension systemwas introduced.
3. The panel data support the expected patterns of compliance: about 75%
of firms with provident funds complied with the new scheme and made
pension contributions. In contrast, only 43% of firms without such funds
complied.
4. Pensioncontributions increased significantly forfirmswithpre-existing
provident funds, indicating the mandatory pension scheme was more
generous.
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Fig. 6.10 Proportion of Manufacturing Firms Making Pension
Contributions in Ethiopia
Note: Compliance with the 2011 pension scheme was below 50%. Graph is
based on firm-level panel data.
Source: Shiferaw et al. (2017)
5. Firm size plays a role in this respect: 72% of large firms reported pen-
sion contributions compared with only 45% of small businesses. Smaller
firmsweremore likely to respond to the reformby reducing pre-existing
bonuses.
6. Notably, small enterprises showed the same compliance behaviour re-
lated to the (non-) existence of provident funds. Compliance of small firms
was 64% for those with pre-existing funds, but only around 41% for firms
without.
7. Changes in firm size were an important outcome of the pension reform.
While the average size of businesses with pre-existing pension funds
increased by 5%, firms without funds reduced in size by an average 8%
after the reform.
8. Both the increase and decrease of firm size can be linked to a shift
of the human capital composition of firms in reaction to the pension
reform. In average firms with provident funds, the share of low-wage
workers declined from 58% before the pension reform (2008–11) to
47% after (2012–13), while in firms without funds the shares fell from
72 to 57%. However, this can only be partly attributed to the pension
reform.
9. Real wages increased substantially after the reform, on average—and at
an even higher rate for firms without any pre-existing provident funds.
This is consistent with a decline in low-skilled labour in the average
manufacturing firm.
10. The increase in non-wage labour costs due to the pension reform has
been partly offset by productivity gains in larger firms, whereas small
firms have mostly not experienced such gains.
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Fig. 6.11 Trends in Manufacturing Employment and Sales in
Ethiopia
Note: Graph is based on annual census data (CSA Large and Medium Scale
Manufacturing Survey) including all manufacturing firms with at least ten
employees.
Source: Shiferaw et al. (2017)
11. Adjusting production costs only marginally contributed to offsetting the
pension reform burden across firms.
12. Employment effects were negative for small manufacturing firms or
those without pre-existing pension funds, although overall employment
in Ethiopian manufacturing continued to increase after 2011. Job reduc-
tion reached levels of 23% and 27% in 2012 and 2013 respectively among
firms without funds, while small firms saw almost the same decline in em-
ployment (20% and 24%, in 2012 and 2013, respectively). Combining both
attributes led to only a modest decline, as small firms without funds had
even fewer employees and were the most likely not to complain about the
pension scheme.
13. Firm size is a driver of employment effects. Small firms initially expe-
rienced a significant reduction in skilled labour (and thus an increasing
share of low-skilled workers) after the reform. The overall rise in skilled
manufacturing employment was due to the expansion of larger firms.
14. The pension reform appears to have induced a rise in total labour pro-
ductivity in themanufacturing sector. Capital intensity increased among
larger firms along with increasing non-wage labour cost. Small firms, how-
ever, experienced a decline in their productivity, which may be explained
by the greater difficulties they face in attracting higher-skilled workers due
to lower levels of wages and bonuses.
15. Evasion was a non-negligible factor. The study suggests an increased
number of former formal workers were hired informally by registered
enterprises after the reform.
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In summary, the GLM|LIC study by Shiferaw et al. (2017) provided multifaceted
evidence on the impact of a major social insurance reform (starting from scratch)
on the manufacturing labour market of a sub-Saharan African low-income coun-
try. In a difference from study settings that examine small-level changes to existing
social protection schemes, the findings presented here addressed the quasi-natural
experiment of an entirely new policy intervention, thus showing accentuated
effects and policy implications.
Overall, this Ethiopian case study yielded mixed results. Firm-level employ-
ment declined substantially after the reform, particularly among smaller firms.
Low-skilled formal labour was induced away from larger firms into informality,
while larger firms’ labour forces shifted in favour of higher-skilled workers. Real
wages and labour productivity levels increased, though these effects may in part
be attributed to the period of economic growth.
Positive outcomes should thus not be overlooked—the impact of the pension
reform on workers’ welfare may have been significant and deserves additional
research. Unintended employment effects on the side of low-wage workers and
small firms could be tackled by Ethiopian pension policies, through more flexible
contribution rates.
Last but not least, the example of Ethiopia proves that implementing major
social insurance reforms requires good timing. Introducing them in times of eco-
nomic growth allows firms to cope better with the additional costs, and thus show
more trust and compliance.
6.5 The Impact ofMinimumWages in Sub-SaharanAfrica
The share of formal workers is still small in low-income countries, given the low
rates of formality and urbanization. Recent economic growth has led to a sig-
nificant increase in formal sector employment, but economic shocks may pose
severe setbacks for vulnerable economies in particular. Yet economic growth and
the (slow) rise of the formal sector have enlarged governments’ desire for labour
market regulation. Inmost sub-Saharan African countries, regulation is on the ad-
vance, following up on standards implemented earlier in other developing regions.
Its main focus is usually the issue of widespread poverty, protecting low-wage
workers, and introducing minimum standards for working conditions in a rapidly
changing economic environment.
Wage governance is among the most used regulation tools—almost all sub-
Saharan African countries have now implemented some form of minimum wage
legislation, either aimed at the entire formal economy or at specific industries
or occupations. However, limited enforcement capabilities and low compliance
are serious barriers on the road to more successful and sustainable regulation of
minimum wages and beyond.
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Economic research has extensively analysed regulation efforts in middle-
income regions revealing, among other insights, that enforcement may strengthen
the formal sector, particularly in the presence ofminimumwages (see, for example,
Almeida and Carneiro 2012). Rani et al. (2013) provided evidence for low levels
of compliance with minimum wage laws across a number of countries.
A recent summary of existing literature on the effects of raisingminimumwages
and the impact on poverty reduction (Gindling 2018) captured the limited effect
on overall poverty whereby, on average, only a minority of workers in developing
countries are covered by such legislation. Yet the potential spill-over effects on the
informal sector, in terms of raising wages, should be taken into account. Undesired
outcomesmainly occur when excessively highminimumwages result in job losses
in the formal labour market.
In principle, the prospects of minimum wages in LICs are mixed. The sim-
ple assumption—that introducing minimum wages necessarily induces wage-
employment trade-offs and a decrease in employment—does not hold as a general
rule. However, negative effects beyond potential unemployment may include
reduced work hours and a shift in human capital among firms—both disadvantag-
ing low-skilled workers. Forced moves from formal to informal work may cause
additional negative outcomes.
In contrast, minimum wage legislation may raise the welfare of low-skilled
workers and lead to rising average wages, thus stimulating demand and con-
sumption. The resulting higher prices may have a dampening effect, though.
Behavioural aspects with regards to a rise in reservation wages and education in-
vestments (see Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder 2006) may not only apply in developed
economies but also in low-income settings.
These factors notwithstanding, vulnerable economic and political conditions
are certainly key determinants of policy interventions in the labour markets of
LICs. Exposure to shocks and other issues related to timing, are of the highest
importance when introducing programmes aimed at tackling poverty. The most
decisive factor of minimum wage efficiency in a low-income country setting may
be found in law enforcement and compliance.
The impact of minimum wages and related compliance in sub-Saharan Africa
is still understudied, with limited findings available, for only a few countries.
To thoroughly examine the impact of minimum wages, researchers would need
pre- and post-legislation data, which is scarce on the national level, while data on
wages and levels of compliance do not exist for many countries in the region. The
South Africanminimumwage has attractedmost attention. Studies by Dinkelman
and Ranchhod (2012), Bhorat, Kanbur, and Mayet (2013), and Bhorat, Kanbur,
and Stanwix (2012), largely documented job losses in agriculture as a result of
the minimum wage introduction yet found no employment decreases in other
sectors.
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6.5.1 Comparative Analysis of Minimum Wage Schemes Reveals
Higher Levels in sub-Saharan Africa
Supported by GLM|LIC a comprehensive study by Bhorat, Kanbur, and Stanwix
(2017) aimed to narrow this gap by providing an assessment of minimum wage
legislation, compliance, and economic effects in sub-Saharan Africa and other
countries. The analysis revealed that lowest-income countries in sub-Saharan
Africa operated themost generousminimumwage scheme relative to their regular
levels, while rather low compliance was a common feature across countries.
First, it should be noted again that minimum wage coverage is inevitably rather
narrow in sub-Saharan Africa, since only around 20% of the labour force are
wage employees (see Figure 6.12), while legislation is mostly applied to formal
wage workers only. The variety of minimum wage schemes is the highest of all
global regions, with a share of countries (around 60%) operating sectoral or occu-
pational minimum wages instead of an economy-wide minimum wage. Within
this variety of schemes, the actual determination of minimum wages may be
rather complex. Differentiated minimum wage schedules can be useful to ad-
dress gaps between sectors, geographical regions, or skill levels, yet complexity
may complicate enforcement and compliance.
Furthermore, the levels ofminimumwages vary significantly between countries
in different regions of sub-Saharan Africa, depending on the country’s income
levels. Central African countries (Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Gabon) show higher
levels on average compared to East African countries (Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Tanzania) (see Figure 6.13). Across sub-Saharan Africa and other countries, min-
imum wage levels are positively correlated with gross national income per capita,
with sub-Saharan Africa at the bottom of the scale (see Figure 6.14).
The relationship between economic growth and minimum wage levels ap-
pears to be rather clear—higher levels of GDP per capita are accompanied by
higher minimum wages. Compared to developing countries outside sub-Saharan
Africa, minimum wages in the region appear to be both lower relative to, and less
responsive to increases in, GDP (see Figures 6.15, 6.16).
When looking at country income groups, the positive correlation between min-
imum wage levels and national income becomes obvious again, albeit with varia-
tion across countries within single-income groups. There is no obvious tendency,
on average, towards a more progressive minimum wage policy in sub-Saharan
Africa than in other regions.
However, the ratio of minimum wage to mean wage signals that low-income
countries in sub-Saharan Africa are setting higher minimum wages—relative to
their domestic average wages—than countries in higher-income groups in the
same region (a higher ratio indicates a more pro-minimum wage policy, see Table
6.11), yet lower than most other global regions. While lower- and upper middle-
income countries in sub-Saharan Africa are setting minimum wages at roughly a





























































Fig. 6.12 Wage Employees as a Percentage of Total
Employment in Africa
Note: South Africa: Labour Market Dynamics Study (2013); Kenya: Kenya
Integrated Household Budget Survey (2005/06); Uganda: Uganda National
Panel Survey (2012); Mali: Rani et al. (2013); Zambia: Living Conditions
Monitoring Survey (2010); Tanzania: Integrated Labour Force Survey
(2005/06); Namibia: Labour Force Survey (2012); Bhorat, Naidoo and Pillay
(2016).
Source: Bhorat, Kanbur, and Stanwix (2015, 2017)
third of their average wages, LICs show a substantially higher ratio on average that
appears to be driven by large variation among this group.
As already mentioned, minimum wage schemes in sub-Saharan Africa tend
to be somewhat complex in nature. To assess whether different minimum wages
within a country are properly set, relative to its wage distribution, Bhorat, Kanbur,
and Stanwix (2017) defined a ‘lower floor’ sector (low-paid, unskilled sector such
as agriculture) and ‘upper floor’ sector (higher paid, medium-skilled sector such
as retail trade). Applying these ‘floors’ to the wage distribution in Zambia, Tan-
zania, South Africa, Namibia, Uganda, and Kenya confirms that minimum wages
in these countries were set at a relatively high level, and further reveals that there
was hardly any ‘spike’ in any of the minimum wage schedules (see Figure 6.17).
Considerable tails to the left of the minimum wage schedules in each of the de-
picted economies, however, indicate a substantial share of workers that were not
adhering to the minimum wage.
The study revealed large variations in both the level of minimum wages and
in lower and upper floor earnings within the same country. Lower-floor wages
were 54% below upper-floor wages, on average. This indicates substantial intra-
sectoral wage inequality, resulting from a large gap between average and median
wages. Adding data for Mali, the authors calculate this mean–median gap at an
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Fig. 6.13 Monthly Minimum Wage Levels in sub-Saharan Africa
by Region
Note: Data from ILO Global Wage Database and World Bank World
Development Indicators, with the latest available data for each country used
for a sample of thirty-five countries.











































Fig. 6.14 Monthly Minimum Wage Levels by Country Income
Group
Notes: LI = Low Income, LMI = Lower-Middle Income, UMI = Upper-Middle
Income; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; PPP = purchasing power parity.
Source: Bhorat, Kanbur, and Stanwix (2015, 2017)
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Fig. 6.15 Monthly Minimum Wages and GDP per Capita in sub-Saharan Africa
Note: Data from ILO Global Wage Database and World Bank World Development Indicators, with
the latest available data for each country used for a sample of thirty-seven countries.
Source: Bhorat, Kanbur, and Stanwix (2015, 2017)
average 55% across the seven countries. Conversely, this finding hints at the fact
that, despite frequent variety of minimum wage levels in all countries apart from
Uganda and Mali (national minimum wage), a significant share of workers are
not covered by legislated minimum wages. Overall coverage of sectoral minimum
wages in sub-Saharan Africa appears to be rather low.
The sectoral ratios of minimum to mean and median wages for the lower- and
upper-floor sectors show how high minimum wages were set relative to average
sectoral wages. The average minimum-to-mean ratio was 0.93 for lower-floor and
0.63 for upper-floor workers. That is, within the lower floor, the minimum wage
almost equalled the average wage. Accounting for the mean–median gap reveals
substantially higher minimum-to-median ratios for both sectors, above 1.0 on
average (see Figures 6.18 and 6.19).
These figures show sub-Saharan Africa significantly above non-sub-Saharan
developing countries, where Rani et al. (2013) reported a minimum-to-mean ra-
tio of 0.54 and a minimum-to-median wage ratio of 0.76 (average figures across
Brazil, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines, Peru, Turkey, Vietnam).
In other words: sub-SaharanAfrica appears to setminimumwages that are very
high relative to regular wages, thus risking low compliance.
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Fig. 6.16 Minimum Wages and GDP per Capita in non-sub-Saharan Countries
Note: Data from ILO Global Wage Database and World Bank World Development Indicators, with
the latest available data for each country used for a sample of sixty-seven countries.
Source: Bhorat, Kanbur, and Stanwix (2015, 2017)
6.5.2 Do Relatively High Minimum Wages Lead to Low Compliance?
Tomeasure compliance with theminimumwages operated in sub-Saharan Africa,
the GLM|LIC study examined the share of workers who earned below the min-
imum wage they were entitled to, and the distance between their earnings and
the minimum wages, as an ‘index of violation’. The resulting estimates are highly
instructive (see Figures 6.20 and 6.21).
On average, 58% of workers in the sectors under scrutiny earned below themin-
imum wage in sub-Saharan Africa, with a significant variation across countries—
from 36% (Zambia) to 80% (Tanzania). Developing countries outside Africa
showed an average of 30%. These figures clearly indicate relatively low rates of
compliance with minimum wage legislation in sub-Saharan Africa.
Investigating the average shortfall in workers’ earnings below the minimum
wage alters the picture slightly: while sub-Saharan Africa lags behind in terms of
the share of workers who earn less than the minimum wage, the average shortfall
is higher among workers in developing countries outside Africa. Meanwhile levels
of non-compliance appear to be lower in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Fig. 6.17 Distribution of Wages in Zambia, Tanzania, South Africa, Namibia,
Uganda, and Kenya
Notes: Kernel density estimates. Zambia: Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (2010); Tanzania:
Integrated Labour Force Survey (2005–6); South Africa: Labour Market Dynamics Study (2013);
Namibia: Labour Force Survey (2012); Uganda: Uganda National Panel Survey (2012); Kenya: Kenya
Integrated Household Budget Survey (2005–6).
Source: Bhorat, Kanbur, and Stanwix (2017)
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Burkina Faso 138 210 0.66
Burundi 26 256 0.10
Chad 239 371 0.64
Congo,DemRep 68 53 1.27
Ethiopia 77 175 0.44
Madagascar 128 183 0.7
Malawi 49 368 0.13
Tanzania 149 624 0.24
Uganda 65 464 0.10
Group mean 104 300 0.46
Group median 77 256 0.44
Lower-middle-income economies
Congo, Rep 145 526 0.28
Ghana 128 469 0.27
Kenya 331 979 0.34
Lesotho 242 377 0.64
Senegal 148 983 0.15
Swaziland 94 815 0.12
Zambia 98 252 0.39
Group mean 169 629 0.31
Group median 145 526 0.28
Upper-middle-income economies
Algeria 531 1,003 0.53
Botswana 148 1,287 0.12
Gabon 418 2,356 0.18
Mauritius 218 1,424 0.15
Continued










SouthAfrica 517 1,251 0.41
Group mean 366 1,464 0.28
Group median 418 1,287 0.18
Total SSAmean 188 687 0.37
Total SSAmedian 145 469 0.28
Other regional averages
LACmean 369 937 0.46
(1.24)*
LACmedian 289 859 0.37
(1.32)*
EAPmean 317 884 0.38
(1.03)*
EAPmedian 284 739 0.32
(1.14)*
SAmean 233 386 0.63
(1.70)*
SAmedian 255 368 0.59
(2.11)*
ECAmean 325 1,136 0.3
(0.81)*
ECAmedian 344 1,183 0.28
(1.00)*
Note: Data from ILO Global Wage Database and World Bank World Development Indicators, latest
available data for each country. Aggregate estimates for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) based on
twenty-one countries; East Asia and Pacific (EAP) sample based on eight countries; Latin
America/Caribbean (LAC) sample based on sixteen countries; South Asia (SA) sample based on four
countries; Europe and Central Asia (ECA) sample based on seventeen countries. Monthly wages and
average minimum wage (if variation applies in a country). All estimates are in 2015 USD PPP.
Asterisk (*) indicates ratio of measure to SSA mean or median. Monthly wages in 2015 USD
purchasing power parities (PPP). Column 3 would usually give the minimum-to median wage
(‘Kaitz’) ratio, but data on median wages is rare in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Source: Bhorat, Kanbur, and Stanwix (2017)
In summary, this comprehensive GLM|LIC study provides illustrative evidence
on the specific conditions of minimum wages in sub-Saharan Africa, opening the
field for further research. From a policy perspective, the following aspects deserve
attention:





Uganda Zambia Mali South
Africa
Kenya Namibia Tanzania Average
Lower floor Upper floor
Fig. 6.18 Ratio of Minimum to Mean Wages for Selected
sub-Saharan Countries
Note: Authors’ calculations.





Uganda Mali Zambia Kenya South
Africa
Namibia Tanzania Average
Lower floor Upper floor
Fig. 6.19 Ratio of Minimum to Median Wages for Selected
sub-Saharan Countries
Note: Authors’ calculations.
Source: Bhorat, Kanbur, and Stanwix (2015, 2017)
1. Almost all countries in sub-SaharanAfrica runminimumwage schemes,
while there is a positive correlation between minimum wage levels and
economic growth (GDP per capita) in the region. But the region does not
stand out among other developing countries in this respect.















































































Fig. 6.20 Average Compliance Rates (Violation Index) in
sub-Saharan Africa and Other Countries
Note: Authors’ calculations for sub-Saharan Africa, figures for other
countries based on Rani et al. (2013).






























































































Fig. 6.21 Average Depth of non-Compliance in sub-Saharan
Africa and Other Countries
Note: Authors’ calculations for sub-Saharan Africa, figures for other
countries based on Rani et al. (2013).
Source: Bhorat, Kanbur, and Stanwix (2015, 2017)
2. At first sight, minimumwage levels are lower in sub-Saharan Africa, accord-
ing to broad income levels.
3. What distinguishes sub-Saharan Africa from other developing regions is
the level of the minimum wage relative to countries’ mean wages. This
ratio is substantially higher in sub-SaharanAfrica.
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4. Within sub-SaharanAfrica, countries with the lowest income levels show
the highest absolute levels ofminimumwages.
5. Findings presented for Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and South Africa confirm
that introducing and raising minimum wages has a small negative or neg-
ligible effect on employment.
6. In the case of vulnerable sub-Saharan African countries, variation is a
strong factor—in terms of either labour market structures, variety of wages
and productivity, or minimum wage schemes—which may lead to larger
employment or compliance effects if the reform is not appropriate.
7. Regulation efforts are met with rather low compliance in the absence of
effective enforcement. The variety of minimum wage legislation in favour
of sectoral or occupational minimum wage requirements cannot disguise
this common challenge. Absolute levels of non-compliance are higher in
sub-Saharan Africa than elsewhere in terms of the percentage of workers
earning below the minimum wage.
The topic of how to operate minimum wage schemes in sub-Saharan Africa
will undoubtedly become more important as formality increases with economic
growth. Yet insights on changes to productivity, workers’ welfare, or sectoral tran-
sition as a consequence ofminimumwage legislation, are difficult to reach because
the available data is rudimentary. GLM|LIC research will continue to investi-
gate this topic and the overall issue of labour market regulation in low-income
countries.
Key Takeaways from this Chapter
• Despite the often negative perception of informal labour, it will remain a
central feature of many LICs and does not necessarily inhibit growth and
development.
• Supporting informal agricultural self-employment and entrepreneurship
among the young my help overcome extreme poverty and drive inclusive
growth.
• Policies to increase job stability couldmake formal labourmore attractive,
though not all workers value longer-term contracts.
• There is a lot of voluntary transition between formal and informal sec-
tors, and informal self-employment is often driven by entrepreneurship
and choice rather than by necessity.
• Policymakers are facing the dual challenge of increasing productivity of
the informal sector while also facilitating transition to higher-productivity
formal employment.
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• Demographic trends, educational progress, and economic growthmay ac-
celerate transition dynamics, as the young generation appears more likely
to step into formality.
• Exposure to globalization and international trade expands formal employ-
ment opportunities and occupational quality.
• Improving informal workers’ business and entrepreneurial skills can help
promote sustained growth in informal household businesses or facilitate
a move to formal employment.
• Policies to boost development by promoting export-orientedmanufactur-
ing are less likely to succeed in sub-Saharan Africa due to relatively high
labour costs.
• Differentiated minimum wage schedules can help address sectoral, re-
gional, or skill-level gaps, yet complexitymay complicate enforcement and
compliance.
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7
Child Labour and the Youth Employment
Challenge
Child labour is a core topic in all low-income countries. Given unstable labour
markets and a lack of sustainable economic growth,many families see no otherway
to ensure all family members’ livelihood than to have their children take part in
subsistence work or paid employment. According to recent statistics published by
the International LabourOrganization (ILO 2017)more than 150million children
aged 5–17 were engaged in child labour worldwide in 2016. While these figures
represent a steep decline compared to the year 2000, when more than 245 million
children were working around the globe, it is unclear whether this trend will con-
tinue.The negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is foreseeable: child labour
statistics may rise again as a result of struggling economies, collapsing enterprises,
and a decline in regular employment prospects.
Growth paths are vulnerable in the developing world. Rising productivity and
labour incomes, leading to a fall in demand for child labour and a growing demand
for better education, are not a matter of course. They may instead be exposed to
severe setbacks. Child employment can dampen future economic growth through
its negative impact on child development, schooling, and health, and may depress
current growth by reducing unskilled wages and discouraging the adoption of
skill-intensive technologies. Nevertheless, with a lack of alternatives, child labour
is often poor families’ insurance against external shocks. Hence policy strate-
gies need to address these economic constraints if they are to succeed in further
reducing child employment.
Low-income countries tend to have very young populations and high rates of
population growth. The youth employment challenge will become even greater
in the near future, and to earn the ‘demographic dividend’—that is, the eco-
nomic benefits of a younger society—would need far-reaching policy initiatives
as well. The COVID-19 pandemic may severely affect the living prospects of the
younger generation in developing countries, and further depress their economic
opportunities. This generation, who are already facing a lack of opportunities to
accumulate human capital or find stable employment in frictional labour markets,
need the special attention of international development policies.
Labour Markets in Low-Income Countries. David Lam and Ahmed Elsayed, Oxford University Press.
© David Lam and Ahmed Elsayed (2022). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192897107.003.0007
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Research supported by the Growth and Labour Markets in Low-Income Coun-
tries Programme offers new insights on the patterns of child labour and the
barriers to better youth employment prospects. This chapter provides a brief
overview on the main policy-relevant findings.
7.1 TheLink betweenChild Labour and EconomicGrowth
In the context of developing countries, the existing body of recent literature on
child labour has not yet delivered a clear understanding of how economic aspects
and decisions interfere with children’s labour market presence, their schooling,
and the human capital capacities of the next generation of adults. One line of re-
search argues that child labour may not just signal poverty but in fact cause it,
by disrupting the next generation’s human capital formation—whereas economic
growth could reduce the need for child labour.
This relationship has been doubted, however, in recent studies (see the overview
in Brown, Deardorff, and Stern 2003) based on cross-sectional data within a coun-
try that compare different households and their children’s activities. Following
these hypotheses, households would expand their economic activities if economic
growth leads to higher income, and thus further rely on more profitable child
labour or—more generally—consider child labour part of their cultural norms or
parental preferences that continue, even if family welfare rises.
Edmonds (2005) addressed these contradictory positions by evaluating an iden-
tical set of Vietnamese agricultural households, their income changes, and their
child labour activities over time (instead of comparing households at one point
in time). The period studied was 1993 to 1997, when the country’s GDP grew by
almost 9% per year on average, while child labour declined by nearly 30%. This
seminal study found strong evidence that 80% of this decline can be traced back to
poor households escaping extreme poverty and improving their economic status,
and that cultural norms or preferences were not barriers to reducing child labour.
The results are the more remarkable and policy-relevant since, in the studied en-
vironment, growing agricultural productivity led to rising earnings opportunities
for child workers as well.
Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2006) presented a thorough examination of the re-
lationship between (transitory) household income shocks and child labour. Based
on a household panel survey in Tanzania, the study revealed that unpredictable
crop shocks resulting in a substantial income loss increased a poor family’s use
of child labour and its willingness to disrupt their children’s schooling if available
assets were an insufficient buffer. These findings imply that policies to insure agri-
cultural households against temporary income shocks—needed now more than
any time in the past due to the COVID-19 pandemic—and easy access to credit
will contribute to reducing child labour and increasing family welfare.
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Edmonds (2006) complemented this study by analysing the impact of a fore-
seeable rise in a household’s income on child labour and schooling decisions.
When Black South Africans became eligible for an unconditional old-age pen-
sion, daily child labour of their co-resident grandchildren declined from three
hours to less than two hours, while school attendance strongly increased. Until
then, liquidity constraints prevented higher school attendance rates for children in
low-income households that could not afford direct and indirect schooling costs.
Hence reducing schooling costs and overcoming financial barriers may offer an
effective means to fight child labour, whereas policies aimed at prohibiting child
labour, for example via trade sanctions, may have the opposite effect by imposing
costs on the poorest.
Most countries have a minimum-age regulation in place regarding child labour.
A survey of recent empirical research provided in Edmonds (2014) has empha-
sized that such a policy should not be at the core of a strategy against child
labour in developing countries, even if accompanied by compulsory schooling
laws. An effective minimum-age regulation would need enforcement, which is
not in place in most countries with widespread child labour. Findings from fifty-
nine developing countries reveal that children’s time allocation is, in fact, not
significantly affected by such regulation. Combining enforced minimum-age and
schooling legislation would have a stronger effect, but other policies seem more
appropriate.
The main lesson, as Edmonds (2016) argued in a literature review commis-
sioned by GLM|LIC, is to eliminate potential motives for child labour by promot-
ing alternatives and providing stable social safety conditions for poor families.
Given that child labour is a cause as well as a consequence of a lack of eco-
nomicgrowth,moreattentionshouldbepaid toreducing it throughsustainable
development, in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
Child labour and economic growth (measured as GDP per capita) are closely
connected (see Figure 7.1). The rate of economic activities of children aged 7–14
is significantly higher in poorer countries. According to Edmonds (2016), more
than half of the variance in child labour across countries can be accounted for by
differences in GDP per person.
This striking relationship, however, is not necessarily causal in the sense that
countries would gain immediate economic growth by reduced child employment.
Interactions between economic growth and child labour are far too complex to
allow for such simple causal explanations. Regardless, the literature shows that
economicdevelopmentcanbe impededby intensive child labour. Schooling and
health may suffer from work—with long-lasting consequences for later adult life
and employment that may harm a society’s future economic prospects.
As Edmonds (2016) pointed out, there is compelling evidence that these disrup-
tions persist through generations: former child workers become parents of future
child labourers if precarious living standards do not change. Hence, the economic
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Fig. 7.1 The Economic Activity of Children and GDP
Note: Fraction of children who are economically active at the age 7–14 against GDP per person
adjusted for purchasing power parity (2011 USD). Circle size proportional to a country’s population
under 15. Curve represents average child labour across countries’ national income spectrum.
Source: Edmonds (2016), based on World Development Indicators
disadvantages of child labour, in terms of jeopardizing growth and better em-
ployment prospects, are perpetuated and may end in a vicious circle—all the
more so if more children work, as this will reduce adult labour wages and thus
increase the need for child employment.
If wages for low-skilled or unskilled work come under pressure along with
intensive child labour, then a negative impact on economic growth also arises
through another mechanism: an abundance of unskilled labour encourages in-
efficient production methods that are complementary to unskilled labour, while
discouraging investment in human capital (for example skills) and the adoption
of skill-orientated technologies. As a result, wages are further depressed, and the
efficacy of skilled labour and capital is reduced. Economies will then lag further
behind, and miss opportunities to grow and integrate into world economics.
At the same time, child employment is poor families’ enforced reaction to
poverty traps and a lack of economic prospects. Child employment—mostly in
family-based agriculture—offers a chance to better withstand extreme poverty and
economic shocks. According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
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(World Bank, n.d.), 65% of child labour takes place in agriculture, roughly 20% of
child workers are engaged inmanufacturing, and less than 15%work in the service
sector.
It is important to understand that initial steps towards growth and a better
living could result in additional demand for child labour. This may occur if
an increase in output prices leads families to increase adult labour and rely on
their children working at home, or if increasing child labour wages stimulate
additional child employment outside of the household.
Furthermore, the effect of economic growth in terms of bringing additional
assets into poor households should not be underestimated. Most child labour is
unpaid work on the household level, but with an increasing availability of pro-
ductive assets the likelihood of child labour in family-owned businesses increases
also (Turk and Edmonds 2002). This happens up to a certain point when families’
increased wealth allows them to reduce and then fully cease child labour. Recent
research (see, for example, Basu, Das, and Dutta 2010) has emphasized that rising
income, rising living standards, and a rising demand for goods of higher quality
than households can produce themselves, reduce the incentives for child labour.
There is no doubt that economic growth offers poor societies better chances
to cope with economic setbacks without relying on child labour. For instance, the
existence of a largermanufacturing sector goes hand in handwith less child labour
(see Figure 7.2).
Another interesting effect has been studied with respect to the mechanisms be-
tween urbanization and child labour (see, for example, Fafchamps and Shilpi 2005;
Fafchamps and Wahba 2006). When household specialization increases with ur-
ban proximity, child labour in the household is reduced substantially, without
being offset by a rise in children’s work out of the home.Most importantly, growth
leads to policies that foster social safety nets, insurance, and credit markets—
all reducing the pressure on child labour. When more households climb the job
quality ladder and specialize in production, unskilled child labour is no longer a
useful tool—and educating the next generation becomes themore rational option.
Edmonds (2016) summed up research findings on the effect of child labour
on the accumulation of human capital. Infrequent child employment serves as
a means to cover school costs, whereas evidence from the vast majority of low-
income countries shows that working children are more likely to achieve lower
test scores at school or not attend school regularly due to overburdening or a lack
of time. Some studies conclude that child workers complete up to one or two years
less schooling than non-working children (see, for example, Psacharapoulos 1997;
Ray 2002).
The consequences are obvious: child labour results in substantially lower edu-
cational attainmentandhumancapital formation, thusdowngradingasociety’s
futureprospects.These negative effects aremore acute if educational losses are ac-
companied by health problems. Excessively early work experiences leave children
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Fig. 7.2 The Economic Activity of Children and Value Added in Manufacturing
Notes: Fraction of children who are economically active at the age 7–14 against share of GDP
contributed by manufacturing. Circle size proportional to a country’s population under 15. Curve
represents average child labour across countries’ national income spectrum.
Source: Edmonds (2016), based on World Development Indicators.
more vulnerable: they may not get enough food, and exhausting or hazardous jobs
may affect physical and mental health in the short or long term. In a report, Fal-
lon and Tzannatos (1998) explain that these effects can harm children’s psyche
and future social adjustment, while Foster (1995) finds that child work can affect
children’s growth pattern.
Generally speaking, the world’s poor families face more frequent shocks—
driven by civil conflicts, economic setbacks, natural disasters, or health
problems—than wealthier households. In this context, child labour is an element
of families’ strategies to self-insure against these transitory risks. Child labour sup-
ply as a component of insurance is not limited to rural environments (as studied,
for example, by Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti 2006)—similar mechanisms apply in
urban areas where child employment may compensate for periods of adult unem-
ployment in the absence of unemployment insurance, or other economic shocks.
In the worst scenario, when urban households suffer from lasting adult unemploy-
ment, children may be completely and permanently withdrawn from school (see,
for example, Duryea, Lam, and Levison 2007).
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However, research does not suggest that regulation aiming to ban child
labour is an efficient way to reduce child employment, or that economic
growth would lead to more effective enforcement of existing regulation
policy. On the contrary, recent research shows that imperfectly enforced child
labour regulation (see Bharadwaj, Lakdawala, and Li 2020, a study of the Indian
experience)may result in employers offsetting the risk of a fine by decreasing child
wages—which in turn may increase child labour further.
Even with efficient enforcement, the negative implications of child labour will
continue since regulation is usually based on the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child (UN-CRC) to avoid hazardous or harmful employment
interfering with education. This definition leaves ample room for interpretation.
Also, as Edmonds (2016, p. 21) argues, simply banning child labour would ignore
the fact that most child labour is not voluntary but forced by families’ extreme
poverty. ‘Punishing the poor for being poor’ would be a short-sighted strategy
with inevitable undesired consequences.
Edmonds and Schady (2012) have shown that patterns of child labour may be
overcome by rather simple policies. Avoiding child labour does not require ex-
tensive subsidy programmes. Even a limited—conditional—cash transfer not fully
replacing child labour earnings but serving as a minimum insurance may have a
very positive outcome.That is because families seemwilling toaccepta reduction
in household income, and use the transfer to secure schooling of their children
since adult income combined with the transfer enables them to meet subsistence
needs and avoid illiquidity (for example, as a result of school fees).
In a Kathmandu case study (Edmonds and Shrestha, 2014), a roughly 20% re-
placement of child income with conditional cash transfers almost eliminated child
labour—at least for the programme period. However, lasting impacts are not likely
if these policies are run on a short-term basis only, while an expensive long-term
transfer policy may be beyond many LICs.
Other potential constraints of cash transfer programmes have been highlighted
only recently by a Lesotho case study (Pellerano, Porreca, and Rosati 2020).
This analysis revealed that, while cash transfers may reduce child labour overall,
the effect on the poorest households may fail to materialize. Below a mini-
mum household income—or below a minimum transfer level tailored to the
poorest—even an unconditional transfer does not seem to increase investment
in children’s education. These findings underline the need to carefully design
such programmes—and the importance of strategies in promoting economic
growth.
Economic growth raises the probability of social safety nets emerging and pro-
tecting the poorest households against income losses in the long term. If they
do arise, these social assistance programmes may be an important ingredient
of policies against child labour (see a case study on Indonesia in De Silva and
Sumarto 2015). If they have no health insurance, then illness or disability of adult
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family members may force children into additional or even hazardous employ-
ment in an attempt to secure subsistence (see Dillon 2012). Providing health and
accident insurance for adult family members may thus help reduce child labour
incentives (see the findings in Landmann and Frölich 2015).
At the same time, economic development induces improvements in banking
infrastructure, credit markets, and the spread of bank accounts, whichmay reduce
demand for children’s employment, even in the face of temporary economic shocks
(see the Tanzanian example studied in Bandara, Dehejia, and Lavie-Rouse 2015).
In general, low-income countries with a better-functioning finance sector seem
to experience less child employment (see Dehejia and Gatti 2005). But there is
also some evidence that microfinance projects that aim to help poor families avoid
child labour may actually increase it, depending on the availability and type of
adult employment opportunities (see Islam and Choe 2013).
Obviously, there is no silver bullet against the distribution of child labour since
it can change substantially and quickly in response to different conditions. The
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic are not yet clear but will presumably rein-
force trends towards child labour instead of investment in their human capital.
This would be a severe setback for international efforts to overcome child labour.
Against this background, Edmonds (2016) highlighted the potential of strategies to
raise households’ valuations of child non-labour activities by encouraging positive
actions. Initiatives to improve access to schools, raise school quality, and reduce
school fees,may efficiently raise the net returnof alternative (non-labour) child
time—provided that families do not face lasting liquidity constraints and have
access to at least a minimum of social insurance.
7.2 BetterMeasurement andAccounting forGender Issues
of Child Labour
Despite a continuously growing literature on child labour, its statistical measure-
ment is often rather inaccurate in LICs, thus complicating policy design. Statistics
usually rely on proxy reporting by adults, which may include some bias due to
social and cultural values. Furthermore, data collection may not sufficiently take
account of the seasonality of agricultural child employment, and hence misreport
the actual labour time.
To explore these potential statistical limitations, GLM|LIC initiated a study
on the variation in child labour statistics in Ethiopia (Galdo, Dammert, and
Abebaw 2018). The research team designed a random survey covering 1,200 ru-
ral households fully dependent on growing coffee, and their farm and non-farm
child labour activities during the thirty days before the survey. In one-third of
participating households, children (6–14 years of age) were selected as respon-
dents (treatment group) instead of the adult head of the family and their spouse
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(control group). To allow for seasonal divergence and fluctuating demand for child
labour, the survey was conducted in three different seasons—before, during, and
after harvest—between July 2015 and January 2017.
The main results of the study confirm a clear correlation between the intensity
of child labour and the agricultural calendar:
1. Reported child labour rates swung between 45% in themain rainy season
and76%intheharvest season, with a strong under-reporting of girls’ labour
in families with children of both genders.
2. Apparently, reporting of child employment was not only very sensitive
to agricultural seasons but also to child gender, gendered labour market
segmentation, and the gender of the proxy respondent.
3. If the survey respondentwas themaleheadofhousehold, girls’ labourwas
significantly underreported compared to the rates reported by girls them-
selves, especially in the main rainy season (9 percentage points lower) and
the harvest season (8 percentage points lower). Boys’ labour was meanwhile
reported in line with self-reported rates across the seasons.
4. Female spouses reported higher levels of girls’ employment, roughly cor-
responding to the self-reported rates of girls.
5. The differences between self- and proxy-reported child labour were not
driven by the age of the child and their growing cognitive abilities; younger
and older subsamples report almost identical levels of work on the family’s
farm.
6. Across all seasons, boys were more active in child labour. The boy–girl
gap varied from 20 percentage points during the main rainy season to
5 percentage points in the harvest season.
These findings are highly relevant for future child labourmeasurement and amore
careful accounting for seasonal variation in the demand for agricultural child
labour.The timing of survey also plays a role. Regardless of the type of respondent,
the proportion of children working in farming activities over thirty days prior to
the questionnaire increased from 45% in the rainy season to 52% in the short rainy
season, and to 76% in the harvesting season (see Figure 7.3). The figure also de-
picts important gender gaps in child labour participation with boys having higher
participation rates than girls.
The findings also confirm that the deficiencies in female labour statistics in LICs
(mainly due to male-dominated gender norms) extends to child labour as well.
This may reflect a traditional segmentation of responsibilities and tasks between
males and females in an agricultural environment, whereby younger children
spend most of their time with women learning to help with household chores.
As they growolder, children take on gendered tasks, with girls remainingmore ori-
entated towards household tasks. The study controls for different types of (male)
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Fig. 7.3 Seasonality of Child Labour in Rural Ethiopia: Past
Thirty Days in Farm Work
Source: Galdo, Dammert, and Abebaw (2018)
proxy respondents, revealing that the gap between child labour statements of girls
and male adults decreases significantly when the male is more familiar with the
girls’ tasks (for example if a widower or the only decision-maker) or when no boys
belong to the family.
From a policy perspective, measurement of (girls’) child labour could bene-
fit from female household members playing a more active role in reporting on
girls’ working activities, instead of relying solely on the (male) head of house-
hold. When designing social protection policies to address child labour, the
seasonality determinants of child employment and family incomes are highly
relevant.
7.3 Meeting the Youth Employment Challenge inAfrica
As shown in section 7.2, child labourmay diminish the next generations’ schooling
prospects, have lasting negative effects until and throughout adult age, and inter-
fere with a society’s chances for economic growth. Young people in low-income
countries are thus not only suffering from a potential earlier ‘career’ as child work-
ers, but also from the prevalent inefficiencies of educational systems and labour
markets. The large cohort of young people entering Africa’s labour force is better
educated than all previous cohorts, while African economies have grown at signif-
icant rates in the recent past. However, jobs too often remain elusive in the formal
wage sector, due to the limited success of African economies in transitioning from
low-productivity agriculture to higher-productivity non-agricultural sectors.
child labour and the youth employment challenge 177
A recent comprehensive analysis published by the International Labour Office
(ILO) drew a mixed picture of youth employment in sub-Saharan Africa in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis at the end of the 2000s (Elder and Koné
2014). While the region has been able to weather the crisis and continue on a
path of increased economic growth and educational investment since the year
2000, youth employment prospects did not keep up with these overall positive
trends.
Year after year, a better-educated cohort of young people enters the regional
labourmarkets.Themost likely futureprospects theyfindare: unstable, vulner-
able employment opportunities; risingunemployment riskswith risingqualifi-
cation levels resulting in employment far below qualification; and precarious
self-employment or informal jobs. Reliable written contracts are the exception;
some 40% of employed young people work on the basis of verbally agreed du-
rations of less than one year. More than 50% are undereducated for their jobs,
while around 80% are informally employed. Agriculture and services are the main
sectors, with industry jobs scarce among the young (Elder and Koné 2014).
A lack of prospects for stable and satisfactory employment, despite better edu-
cation, is one of two ticking time bombs inmany low-income societies.The second
time bomb results from a lost generation of youth who have no adequate access to
education, and leave school at primary level or below. More than half of the youth
population in sub-Saharan Africa belong to this disadvantaged group (Elder and
Koné 2014), with hardly any chance to avoid becoming trapped in the poorest-
quality employment. The COVID-19 crisis may even heighten social tensions and
delay successful strategies towards better youth prospects in sub-Saharan Africa.
An extensive World Bank report (Filmer and Fox 2014) further illustrated the
widening gap between prevalent low-productivity jobs and the rising aspirations
of better-qualified young people in the region. To create inclusive growth, the
report concluded that the challenge of sustainable youth employment in sub-
Saharan Africa requires a comprehensive approach targeted at the poor and
the young. Widespread constraints on productivity, business environment, and
earnings growth, should be relieved by improving access to land, agricultural
technologies, markets, and finance for young people.
7.3.1 Supporting the Informal Sector May Help to Boost Youth
Employment Opportunities
A further study supported byGLM|LIC (Fox 2016) emphasized that such strategies
will only succeed (if at all) as part of a broader strategy also targeting the large
informal sector. Its diagnosis is not very encouraging at first sight: transforming
traditional, inefficient labour market structures from low-productivity agriculture
towards higher-productivity sectors has failed on a broad front.
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However, economic growth rates would have given some scope for structural
reforms in sub-SaharanAfrica. Since themid-1990s, the region’s growth rates have
repeatedly exceeded the level in East Asian low-income and lower-middle-income
countries. Nonetheless, sub-Saharan Africa fell back significantly with respect to
output transformation and the share of GDP of the industry sector and manu-
facturing. A large share of non-farm growth took place—and still takes place—in
household enterprises, with self-employment thus generating only few regular
wage jobs.
The youth employment challenge has a gender dimension that should not
be underestimated. Many sub-Saharan African countries continue to have early
marriage, early onset of childbearing, and high fertility rates—factors that limit
educational and economic opportunities for women. As noted in Chapter 1,
continued high fertility rates also play an important role in creating the young
age structures and rapid growth of youth cohorts that exacerbate the youth
employment challenge. Improving women’s education and increasing economic
opportunities for women is an important goal in its own right, and is also
likely to reduce fertility and eventually reduce rapid growth of the youth labour
force.
In a GLM|LIC study by Herrera, Sahn, and Villa (2019) studying the labour
market segmentation in relation to teenage fertility in Madagascar, the authors
find that the common intuition and results from previous studies on the relation
between the informal sector and early childbirth also holds true.Their study design
allowed for the measurement of the average likelihood of entering the informal
sector depending on the age at the first birth. Their results showed that for every
additional year delay in the age at first birth the likelihood of a young woman to
work in the informal sector decreases by 7.2%. Correspondingly, and amongmany
important conclusions, the authors were able to assert that the age at childbirth
plays a crucial role in the human capital formation of young woman and thus their
capacity to improve their conditions through formal and arguably more beneficial
labour.
The rapid growth rate of sub-Saharan Africa’s labour force, the result of con-
tinued high fertility rates, sets the region apart from LICs in Asia, where fertility
decline has been faster. Overall, sub-Saharan Africa still faces rather low pro-
ductivity in agriculture, and a lack of diversity in its non-agricultural (urban)
employment structures, with only some 25% of all new jobs located in the formal
non-farm wage sectors (see Figure 7.4).
As a result, good jobs for young people in African formal labour markets are
scarce, thus consolidating the core role of informal youth employment, particu-
larly for the less educated. The study argued that policies aiming to generate better
prospects for the young generation need to refocus and strengthen the informal
sector of non-farm self-employment—in both rural and urban areas—instead of
trying to restrict it through initiatives of questionable value.



























Jobs by sector Distribution of new entrants by sector
Fig. 7.4 Job Creation by Sector in sub-Saharan Africa, 2010–20
Note: Figures for 2020 projected.
Source: Fox (2016)
While efforts to industrialize, attract foreign investment, and create addi-
tional wage employment momentum should not be abandoned, it would be
naïve to expect a substantial rise in formal jobs in the foreseeable future. From
this perspective, enhancing the informal sector appears to be an obvious ap-
proach that goes to the very root of the problem without taking a defeatist
viewpoint. If the informal sector is to keep its dominant role, then raising its pro-
ductivity and job quality by supporting rural farms and household enterprises in
rural as well as urban regions may offer a way to support the formal sector and
structural transformation. Sub-Saharan Africa would thus follow the example of
Asia and Latin America, where a growing sector of household enterprises initiated
and stimulated structural progress.
In the context of sub-SaharanAfrica, with its rapid population growth and avail-
able land resources, increasing agricultural productivity need not mean reducing
jobs in the farm sector. Supporting informal agricultural employment inhouse-
hold enterpriseswould insteadhelp to overcomepoverty, andmake farmsmore
market-orientated. Itwouldalso encourage youth labourmarket entrants to ac-
cept agriculture as a seriousbusiness for entrepreneurs that will provide a living,
and not feel trapped in their parents’ self-employment conditions. In fact, turn-
ing young people towards agricultural labour markets will only work as part of a
comprehensive strategy to develop the informal sector as a step towards inclusive
growth.
As Fox (2016) illustrated, the scope for initiatives directly targeted at the youth
is rather limited. Traditional programmes addressing general employability and
vocational training of the youth have often had disappointing results relative to
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Table 7.1 Distribution of Donor Projects to Support Youth Employment in Africa
Type of intervention Frequency %
SKILLSTRAINING 366 77.5
Vocational training 182 38.6
On-the-job training/apprenticeships 37 7.8
Life-skills trainings/second-chance education 291 61.7
Financial support 22 4.7
ENTREPRENEURSHIPPROMOTION 281 59.5
Training 241 51.1
Advising (mentoring, business development) 198 41.9
Providing access to microfinance 152 32.2
EMPLOYMENTSERVICES 159 33.7
Job-search assistance 105 22.2
Job counselling 87 18.4
Job placement 95 20.1
Financial assistance for job search 8 1.7
Sanctions for not complying with the
intervention’s rules 16 3.4
SUBSIDIZEDEMPLOYMENT 32 6.8
Wage or hiring subsidies to firms to hire youth
Public works/employment
8 1.7
guarantee/voluntary service programme 30 6.4
REFORMS (LABOURMARKET) 6 1.3
N 472 100.0
Source: Fox (2016) based on data of the ILO’s Youth Employment Inventory accessed in 2016.
their cost. Yet most public and private donor projects still target general employa-
bility in the regular (urban) wage sector—risking counterproductive effects if they
fail to meet their targets, given the lack of available jobs relative to the supply of
young workers (see Table 7.1).
At the same time, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa do not have pro-
grammes designed to stimulate the productivity and sustainability of household
enterprises. A report by the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA
2015) recommended national strategies including focused agricultural educa-
tion, short business training, developing life skills and skills needed by the pri-
vate sector, reforming land tenure systems, and grant financing for low-income
youth.
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Last, but not least, such strategies should integrate young people as ‘change lead-
ers’; for example, through introducing modern information and communication
technologies in agricultural life. Filmer and Fox (2014) showed that projects pro-
viding short business training and (microcredit) finance, thus facilitating new
businesses in the private sector, may be useful tools for young people. Projects
that upgrade household enterprises to small businesses through entrepreneur-
ship training do not seem to be cost effective, however; a lack of scale and
sustainability due to high programme costs are strong constraints in sub-Saharan
Africa.
In the case of youth labour supply exceeding demand, Fox (2016) argued in
favour of programmes encouraging investment in labour-intensive enterprises, for
example through improved management of existing infrastructure services, addi-
tional infrastructure investments, and lower levels of taxes and costs for business
registration. These programmes should take an educational approach, to develop
the business and financial skills, and networks, necessary to establish successfully
in the informal sector, and provide thorough information about existing oppor-
tunities instead of raising expectations to unrealistic levels through long-term
vocational training.
Such a strategy would apply to both rural and urban environments. In the ur-
ban context, frustration of the (better-educated) young people needs to be tackled
in particular. Here the gap is the widest between the expanding educational op-
portunities and the limited returns to these human capital investments. There are
limited opportunities for the majority of the better-educated urban youth to take
up and keep a regular wage job in the near future. To defuse this time bomb, poli-
cies will need to develop and not hinder informal sector employment in urban
societies, the study concludes convincingly.
Key Takeaways from this Chapter
• Child labour is both a consequence and a cause of poverty as it impedes
human capital formation.
• Strict enforcement of a child labour ban would hurt the poorest.
• Lower schooling costs, better school quality, and conditional cash trans-
fers can make education a more attractive and affordable alternative to
child labour.
• Economic growth may initially increase the demand for child labour, but
reduces it in the long term by fostering social safety nets, insurance, and
credit markets.
• Social protection policies to address child labourmust take the seasonality
of child employment and family incomes into account.
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• Assessing the true scope of child labour should rely more on women’s
reports as male household members tend to underreport girls’ labour.
• Better educational and economic opportunities for young women lead to
lower fertility, thereby also alleviating the youth employment challenge.
• Short business training and microcredit finance can help young people
create new private-sector businesses and become ‘change leaders’.
• Where job prospects in the formal sector do not keep pace with im-
proved education and training, policies should develop rather than hinder
informal sector employment.
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Emerging labour markets in low-income countries are mostly characterized by
rather high levels of discrimination against certain groups of workers. This has
negative implications for the growth potential of these economies. Identifying
mechanisms of discrimination and quantifying the lost economic potential caused
by discrimination is an important step towards unleashing growth. While women
are not the only group facing substantial disadvantages in the labour markets,
they are certainly one of the groups most discriminated against, and hence most
vulnerable to shocks.
Barriers to equal opportunities in early childhood development, schooling,
higher education and vocational training, widespread gender oppression, and
persistent role allocations to women, pave the way for—explicit and implicit—
discrimination that still inhibits most parts of women’s lives in low-income so-
cieties. Notwithstanding some progress that has been achieved more recently in
educational attainment and in building public awareness that fairer opportunities
are needed, releasing the potential of modern women in LICs will take targeted
and sustainable action. This is all the more important since the COVID-19 pan-
demic, which will presumably bring heavy setbacks for women’s progress towards
equal opportunities, and might even reinforce traditional notions of gender roles
that exclude women from regular labour market participation.
The GLM|LIC programme has paid special attention to gender issues since its
beginning in 2011; by 2019 it had increased this focus, with the aim of guid-
ing future gender and labour market policies to enhance equality of opportunity
for women. This chapter summarizes the core findings of selected GLM|LIC
publications alongside a brief review of recent relevant literature in the field.
8.1 Trends inWomen’s Employment, GenderGaps inWages,
and Employment
‘Women in developing countries are disempowered: high youth unemployment,
early marriage and childbearing interact to limit their investments into human
Labour Markets in Low-Income Countries. David Lam and Ahmed Elsayed, Oxford University Press.
© David Lam and Ahmed Elsayed (2022). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192897107.003.0008
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capital and enforce dependence on men’ (Bandiera et al. 2018, p. 1). As a result,
women still lag far behind in terms of educational attainment, formal labour
force participation, and social and political representation. Trends are heavily af-
fected by: how independent women’s labour force participation is from household
economic conditions; how jobs seen as appropriate for more-educated women
are growing relative to the supply of more-educated women; and to what extent
women are able to break down occupational barriers within the sectors where em-
ployed women predominantly work. Strategies for economic growth will certainly
need to be accompanied by other policies to improve the situation of women in
LICs.
An important contribution to this field of research was provided by Duflo
(2012), in a review of the existing research on the link between economic devel-
opment and the empowerment of women. The study suggests that the interrela-
tionship is too weak to allow policy to simply focus on one or the other, based
on the assumption that either (a) economic growth would be sufficient to foster
equality or (b) tackling inequality would necessarily go hand in hand with positive
effects on growth. As the study emphasizes, poverty remains a driver of inequal-
ity as it typically limits women to unpaid household work, reinforces stereotypes
regarding the abilities of women, leaves them without any social security net—
for example in the case of divorce—damages the education prospects of girls, and
sustains high fertility.
This does of course mean that successful strategies against poverty will, in gen-
eral, benefitwomenmore thanmen (Duflo 2012, p. 1053) by givingwomen control
over at least a minimum of resources, allowing investments in (financial and busi-
ness) education, enabling female labour supply, and at least providing them with
some basic social security. But the prevailing social and economic structures,
traditions, beliefs, and caveats mean that sustained gender equality will not au-
tomatically result. At the same time, policies that aim to empower women may
have indirect negative economic effects, for example on childcare time of working
mothers or wage levels in the labour market, notwithstanding the positive effects
in terms of creating more equal opportunities. Against this background, it seems
somewhat naïve to forecast a virtuous cycle of development and empowerment,
each stimulating the other to the benefit of an entire society. Instead, as Duflo
(2012) convincingly argued, reaching equality goals in the long run will require
long-lasting efforts to empower women, possibly at the cost of distortions that
may accompany redistribution policies.
This is further emphasized by the findings of Bhalotra and Umana-Aponte
(2010), who studied the dynamics and cyclicality of women’s labour supply,
which is related to smoothing household consumption in the face of income
volatility. The study covered a large number of developing and transition coun-
tries over a time span of two decades. A major finding was a clear drop in
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female non-employment during recessions, with all developing regions showing
an increase in self-employment and some (for example Asia and Latin America)
revealing a parallel rise in paid women’s employment.
For Africa, the study noted a decline of paid employment, which may be ex-
plained by a lack of work opportunities and the fact that households’ income
shocks are tied closely to rainfall variation. In summary, the authors find that
insurance motives are a core driver of women’s labour supply decisions.
8.1.1 Is the Female Labour Force on the Rise?
From a development policy perspective, it is important to learn more about the
puzzling heterogeneity in regional trends of female labour force participation
rates and its determinants. This is because the growth of women’s labour market
attachment has recently not been very large in developing regions, on average.
Starting from this point, a cross-country survey supported by GLM|LIC anal-
ysed the interdependence of female labour force participation, economic growth,
and (in-)equality outcomes (Klasen 2019) focusing on the heterogeneous trends
that have been noted for different low-income regions. The author investigates
the hypothesis that these startling differences in women’s participation rates can
be traced back to causal effects, in terms of societal development, gender norms
and economic conditions—which would underline the need for empowerment
strategies.
In fact, up until the global COVID-19 pandemic, economic development trends
in low-income countries gave much hope for a global rise in female labour par-
ticipation. Overall, educational attainment of women strongly expanded in most
developing countries (see Figure 8.1), increasing female access to labour markets,
while a substantial decline in fertility in most regions should have offered women
additional options to spend time free from childcare responsibilities.
Along with rather steady economic growth rates since the mid-1990s, these
trends should have resulted in a growing demand for, and supply of, female labour,
given that male participation rates were already at a high level. However, this effect
has only been achieved in limited parts of the developing world (see Figure 8.2),
with the relatively positive trend in some countries’ glossing over the general pic-
ture of a very moderate expansion of female labour force participation in recent
years (Klasen 2019).
A look at the group aged 25–54, reveals that—apart from Latin America, the
Caribbean, and sub-SaharanAfrica—developing regions hardly experienced a sig-
nificant rise in the female labour force participation rate. Overall, the gap between
female and male participation rates remained remarkable. At the labour market
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Fig. 8.1 Secondary Education Enrolment Rates: Female–Male Ratio, 1970–2014
Source: Klasen (2017), World Development Indicators
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Fig. 8.2 Female Labour Force Participation Rates, Age 25–54
Note: The participation rate definition used here includes subsistence farming resulting in relatively
high levels for sub-Saharan Africa.
Source: Klasen (2017), ILOSTAT
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‘prime age’ of 25–54, male labour force participation rates were above 90% in all
developing regions, yet for women it stagnated far below 40% in South Asia, the
Middle East, and North Africa, while seeming to converge to roughly 70–80% in
Eastern Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and sub-Saharan Africa.
The high absolute levels for these regions should be interpreted with care,
though, as they include subsistence farming and other production for-own-use,
which plays an important role mainly in sub-Saharan Africa. The participation
rates thus represent a broader definition of labour to better cover widespread fe-
male labour in the subsistence economy. Even when taking these activities into
account, the gap relative to male participation rates remained very large, which
needs an explanation given trends in education and fertility that would have been
expected to increase female labour force participation.
Strikingly, the massive decline of fertility rates in Middle East and North Africa
(Arab states) did not lead to a significant rise in female labour force participation
rates, although they were accompanied by a strong rise in the educational attain-
ment of women. Even more striking is the example of South Asia (mainly India),
with its falling participation rates despite clear improving trends in fertility and
education. An instructive study by Klasen and Pieters (2015) provided detailed
findings for the case of India, showing that even women with completed tertiary
education barely exceeded the 30% level of participation, and that increases in
female wages had little impact on participation rates.
Taken together, these trends rebut the traditional ‘feminization U hypothe-
sis’, as Klasen (2019) pointed out. The story behind the trends of female labour
forceparticipationappears tobemuchmorecomplex than toassumeany longer
that,whenmoving fromanagricultural toan industrial andservices-orientated
economy, participation of women will first fall and then increase significantly
during the next development stages.
Needless to say, shedding new light on this context is highly relevant with
respect to formulating and promoting development policies. Most importantly,
without a rise in female labour force participation, many developing countries
will miss the chance to earn at least some ‘demographic dividend’. Instead of
utilizing the current, but temporary, high share of the working-age population
resulting from declines in fertility rates (see Figure 8.3), they will then suffer from
persistently high dependency rates due to too few women entering the labour
markets. Accordingly, economic growth will be dampened with low savings and
investment rates. These mechanisms again illustrate the importance of focusing
on the labour force participation of women from the economic as well as equality
perspective.
Klasen (2019) highlighted the relevance of historical gender norms and shock
effects that are often underestimated with regard to the causes of different levels
of female labour force participation and gender inequality. External shocks such
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Fig. 8.3 Total Fertility Rates by Region, 1970–2015
Source: Klasen (2017), World Development Indicators
as war (rising female participation rates), civil riots (setback lasting longer for fe-
males), or societal transition—for example from socialism to market-orientated
economies (falling participation rates of women)—may substantially affect how
females act in the economy of different countries.
So-called ‘deep drivers’ may be rooted in the past yet still have strong effects on
participation levels: the longer the history of an agriculturally dominated society,
and the more intense its cultivation methods, the higher the demand for cheap
family labour which gives way to patriarchal structures, and conventions limiting
the role of women to raising children and working in-house (see Hansen, Jensen,
and Skovsgaard 2015).Themore an agricultural systemdepends on the plough and
hard labour, the more male-orientated a society and its cultural norms have devel-
oped until now (see Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 2013). Scarcity of resources may
act as another deep geo-historical driver of gender inequality in the labour market
(see Hazarika, Jha, and Sarangi 2015), whereas the continuous availability of fresh
water throughout the seasons and other climate benefits can be interpreted as a
favourable baseline for better female opportunities (see Santos Silva et al. 2018).
Religion may be an important driver also, though it remains uncertain to
what extent, as studies have shown a rather ambiguous picture (Klasen 2019).
In summary, these drivers may explain to a certain extent why female labour
force participation remains relatively low, for example in South Asia, the Mid-
dle East, andNorthAfrica. However, these barriers are not set in stone butmay
be influenced, weakened, and finally overcome by targeted, sustained policies.
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Trends in female labour force participation and their determinants are not easy
to measure in low-income societies, and research has not yet provided ample ev-
idence for all developing countries. Models need to include a set of variables,
including wage income and other household income, age, education levels of
working-age familymembers, the presence of young children or other dependents,
and local labour market characteristics. Given the high prevalence of subsistence
labour in rural areas, distinguishing women’s contribution to family income may
be very difficult.
Nonetheless, Klasen (2019) synthesized three rather clear findings and policy
implications from the existing literature (see Table 8.1 for country results):
Education matters
A substantial share of low-educated women enter the labour market due to ex-
treme household poverty, but they leave these often precarious jobs when the
household income makes it affordable and corresponding social norms are in
favour of women doing home and care work. Secondary education is often ac-
companied by low participation levels, whereas completed tertiary education
results in high participation. Hence, policies to further expand women’s education
and equality of opportunities could stimulate female labour force participation,
although they will not necessarily change societal views regarding it.
For several countries (for example India, Sri Lanka, or Jordan, see Klasen 2019),
available studies show a rather U-shaped link between female education levels and
the intensity of women’s labour market activities. While low education (no or
few years of schooling) forces women into the labour market to avoid poverty,
mediumeducation levels seem todrivemanyof themout of this forced employ-
ment, resulting in lower employmentbutperhapsbetterwelfareoutcomes, thus
theU-shape. Women with tertiary education show high employment levels; social
norms seem to no longer play a core role at this educational level.
This link between education and labour force participation provides one im-
portant explanation for the different trends of female participation rates across
regions that vary in their educational progress. For instance, in East Asia and Latin
America the expansion of education resulted in a strong rise in the share of women
with university degrees, who mostly enter the labour market (see Gasparini and
Marchionni 2015), while in some countries participation rates of women in-
creased linearly along education levels (for example Brazil, South Africa, Vietnam,
Bangladesh, see Rahman and Islam 2013; Klasen et al. 2020).
As noted by Klasen (2019), international initiatives for better secondary educa-
tion of women, based for example on theUnitedNations SustainableDevelopment
Goals, do not necessarily change families’ views on the labour market activity of
wives and daughters. Thus, they are not necessarily followed by a rising labour
force participation of women in developing countries.
gender dimensions of developing labour markets 191
It should be taken into account that education investments are not only a mat-
ter of individual decisions but are closely related to existing policy programmes.
When households follow incentives and respond to these initiatives, only a thor-
ough evaluation of long-term effects will reveal whether attitudes and behaviour
are changing sustainably. However, a better education of young women is able to
generate returns that reach beyond direct labourmarket effects. Asmentioned ear-
lier, better education in general is accompanied by better health and better living
conditions of dependent children. Educated women’s role in promoting additional
education efforts in their families should be valued highly (see Afridi et al. 2018).
In that respect, future investments in women’s education will certainly see indirect
positive labour market effects as well.
It is not only education that matters with regard to stimulating female labour
market proximity. Rising household income levels are another important cause of
changes in female labour force participation, since a more stable income reduces
the immediate pressure on women to work. Of course, this negative household
income effect on labour market participation can also be observed in developed
regions. But while it has become less relevant in most OECD countries, revealing
a decoupling of female labour market attachment and household conditions, the
effect remains strong inmany developing countries or is falling rather slowly. Only
few developing countries (for example, Brazil and South Africa, see Klasen 2019)
have shown a stronger labour force attachment of women, with the family income
effect disappearing completely over time.
Presumably, a further increase in female education levels in the developing
world will help reduce the relevance of family income as a decisive factor in
women’s labour market proximity. Nonetheless, women’s labour market attach-
ment will likely remain counter-cyclical at lower education levels—bad eco-
nomic times aggravate household conditions and poverty risks, forcingwomen
to enter the labourmarket.
Another aspect should not be overlooked while research findings run contrary
to mainstream thinking: the remarkable decline in low-income countries’ fertility
rates does not necessarily promote a rise in female labour market participation. In
fact, an Indonesia case study by Priebe (2011) has emphasized that work decisions
are driven by poverty rather than fertility. A decline in fertility may thus lead to
lower participation rates, particularly of poor, lesser-educated women in rural en-
vironments. Overall, the decline of fertility seems to contribute less than expected
to an increase in female labourmarket participation. Policy planning needs to take
this into account.
Overcoming social norms against working women matters
Prevalent stigma are among the most relevant factors behind low or stagnating
female labour market participation rates. While they seem to play a limited role
for very poor households of the less educated, higher education levels of women
Table 8.1 Determinants of Female Labour Force Participation across Countries, 1990–2010
EducationU? Head Education Household Income Children
India Strong, more shallow over time Strong negative effect Strong negative effects,
falling slightly over time
Moderate negative effect
0–4, no effect 5–9
Sri Lanka Shallow U, insignificant over time No effect Strong negative effect,
falling slightly over time
Strong negative effect 0–4,
small effect 5–9
Bangladesh No U, linear increase Small negative effect (Sizeable)* Moderate negative effect 04
Jordan Strong U, more shallow over time No effect Small stable negative effect Moderate stable negative
effect 04, 5–14
Vietnam No U, linear increase No effect Moderate stable negative
effect
Rising negative effect 0–4,
no effect 5–14
Brazil No U, linear increase Sizeable falling negative
effect, gone by 2009
Small negative, turning
positive by 2013
Sizeable effect 0–4, small
effect 5–14




Sizeable effect 0–4, no
effect 5–14
South Africa No U, linear increase No effect Small negative, insignifi-
cant by 2014
Sizeable effect 0–4, small
effect 5–14
* The regression does not include household income but number of male earners and assets. Number of male earners has a sizable negative effect, assets a small negative
one.
Source: Klasen (2017)
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and their husbands bring these norms into play significantly. Policymakers should
be aware of the long process that will be needed to overcome these obstacles.
The nature and strength of social norms that prevent women from entering or
re-entering the labour markets in low-income regions is as difficult to evaluate as
it is to overcome through targeted policies. Societal barriers against female em-
ployment may apply in general or focus on market segments only, depending on
regional conditions and traditions. The traditional role of women as secondary
earners has been fostered by recent male wage growth, and is further cemented
by tax provisions in many countries. This contributes to making social norms in
favour of non-working women.
Klasen (2019) used the example of male education levels influencing the accep-
tance of workingwomen inAsia to illustrate the complexity of correctlymeasuring
and evaluating these effects. In India a rising level of male education has an obvi-
ous strong and lasting negative effect on women’s participation rates, and seems
to be the core factor behind the overall low rates among females (see Klasen and
Pieters 2015; Afridi et al. 2016). In contrast, findings from Vietnam show that this
negative effect may decline and almost vanish as an economy grows, while it has
apparently had no effect in Sri Lanka (see Klasen 2019; Seneviratne 2019).
Notably, the sectoral distribution ofworkingwomen differs by education level: it
is significantly wider among lesser-educated women.This indicates that those who
are more qualified may have more difficulty finding a job when labour markets in
white-collar public services (70–80% of secondary-educated working women are
segregated in this sector on average across countries) are competitive or not yet
developed, since social norms mostly bar entrance to other sectors.
Employment of educated women in particular is often viewed as a ‘failure’ of
themale household head to secure the living of his family. India is a country where
these beliefs take full effect (seeKlasen andPieters 2015). If there are labourmarket
bottlenecks, scarce jobs should be given to men—this is still a widespread opinion
in the developing world, as documented in the World Value Survey (see World
Bank 2011) affecting women’s chances in the public sector.
By contrast, lower-educated women are represented in white collar services as
well as domestic services andmanufacturing—the survival needs of poorer house-
holdswidely prevail over the social stigma against workingwomen. Policies should
open up public debate about existing stigmas, and learn from the example of
regions such as the Middle East and South Asia where such discussion takes place.
Economic growth matters
Limited employment opportunities for educated women in many developing re-
gions do not keep up with the rising potential of this group. New cohorts of
working women are better educated than ever, which is an asset for LICs that
should not be wasted. Constraining their employment to white-collar services in
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the public sectors leads to stagnating or even falling participation rates and a loss
of human capital. To avoid this, employment opportunities need to be broadened.
The supply of educated women often surpasses the demand growth in white-
collar sectors of LICs. At the same time, many developing societies experience a
stronger growth rate of a better-educated female labour force in relation to the
overall growth of the working-age population. This feature collides with the pre-
viously mentioned social stigma against working women, and leads to substantial
economic inefficiencies. Economic growth cannot ‘switch off ’ prevalent stigma but
will contribute to better-functioning labour markets and a better allocation of hu-
man capital resources.While this will need long-term efforts, short- andmid-term
strategies to enhance female labour market participation are also needed to help
educated women find appropriate jobs.
Klasen (2019) proposed a twofold strategy for developing countries’ govern-
ments, both needing affirmative action in favour of women:
1. Growing sectors of the economy should be opened systematically for edu-
catedwomen. Learning from East and South Asia, but also from the Middle
East and North Africa, other countries could also utilize the widespread
growth of their labour-intensive and export-orientated manufacturing sec-
tors to increase employment of educated women.
2. Make a virtue out of necessity and lift the glass ceiling in white-collar
services like education, public service, and health that prevents educated
women from entering higher and senior positions. If the sector develops
in this direction, segregation will not diminish but better job prospects for
women will emerge, even in segments traditionally dominated by men (for
example university professors, lawyers, medical doctors). In the recent past,
Latin America has found some success on this road, whereas South Asia
and the Middle East—along with the prevalent norms—have so far missed
this opportunity. Both strategies should be accompanied by clear incentives
for secondary earners’ employment (for example tax reforms) and targeted
programmes for women’s empowerment.
8.1.2 Globalization and the Gender Gap
To achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls is Goal 5 of the
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs). Despite some pos-
itive trends, women still lag far behind men in important social and economic
aspects, while some trends are even negative, as shown above. Most existing re-
search has studied the topic from a country or cross-country perspective, in a
closed-economy setting. Analyses that pay attention to the potential effects of
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globalization and international trade on economic and well-being outcomes for
women in developing regions are still scarce.
A research project supported by GLM|LIC aims to contribute to this important
field of research, by highlighting the effect of open markets on the probability of
rising employment and wages of women, as well as the impact on fertility. The
study by Do, Levchenko, and Raddatz (2016) started with the central hypoth-
esis that, given the extremely variable shares of female workers in a country’s
industries, the effect of globalization on women will depend on whether trade
openness results in a comparative advantage in sectors where women are strongly
represented. If it does, then, women’s wages and labour force participation rates
should rise while fertility should fall in response to increased openness in trade.
By contrast, trade and export focused on male-dominated sectors should have the
opposite effect. In other words, globalizationwill not generate a clear single impact
on the gender gap; instead its direction and magnitude will depend on a country’s
specific comparative advantage in international trade.
The study introduced a theoretical model and provided empirical evidence
based on export data on the industry level for sixty-one manufacturing sectors
in 145 developing and developed countries, over a period of fifty years. The data
reveal stunning variation in the female worker share in developing countries, rang-
ing from under 10% in some heavy industries to 60–70% in textile and apparel
industries.
These data were combined with information on the countries’ export shares
to capture the degree of comparative advantage in female-intensive sectors, and
to understand whether fertility reacts to these globalization effects. To rule out
reverse causality (low-fertility countries exporting in female-dominated sectors
for other reasons), the study controlled for exogenous geographical factors, the
prevalence of child labour, educational patterns, and other factors.
Using this comprehensive approach, the analysis concluded that countrieswith
a trade focus on female-intensive sectors do indeed exhibit substantially lower
fertility, by up to 20% across countries. While this effect is significant, the same
does not apply for female labour supply responses to trade openness. Instead,
the authors’ findings show that the positive labour market participation effect is
mostly limited to countries with higher fertility rates and lower levels of income
and female education. As falling fertility offers chances to invest time in education
and occupations, the restrictions and societal barriers mentioned above come into
effect once more.
One lesson from Do, Levchenko, and Raddatz (2016) should nonetheless be
kept in mind by decision makers: countries engaged in more technological—
and thus more male-based—trade, should not rely on positive globalization
outcomes to empowerwomen. International trade is no remedy for policy inac-
tivity in this respect, as these countries will need initiatives on the issue in other
fields to avoid overly slow progress in women’s empowerment and thus a loss of
the opportunity demographic changes and its dividends have brought about. One
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short- andmid-termoptioncouldbe tobetterpromote those sectorswithahigh
shareof femaleworkers.Whereas in the longrun, educationefforts andaffirma-
tive policies should systematically open up the highly traded sectors for female
employment.
8.2 The Influence of Social Transfers andMigrant Remittances
onWomen’s Labour Supply
Given the low and stagnant labour force participation rates of women in many de-
veloping countries, the impact of social transfers to poor households on women’s
labour supply behaviour is a highly relevant field for policy and research. From
a theoretical perspective (valid for developed societies as well), social transfers
could either lower the probability of female employment by establishing an un-
conditional basic income, or stimulate labour supply, if correctly targeted and
dimensioned so that risks and costs associated with work (for example childcare,
schooling costs) are covered.
In most cases, nationwide anti-poverty and other social transfers in developing
countries are not gender based. Hence, research that aims to inform policy in the
field of women’s empowerment needs to separate the specific outcomes of existing
social transfer programmes on female labour supply, and to address the uneven
gender distribution of care responsibilities within families that potentially prevent
women from entering the labour force, even if social transfers would enable them
to do so. This research is complex and only just starting with respect to develop-
ing countries. Programmes with a maternalistic orientation hence deserve the full
attention of economic research.
For this reason, GLM|LIC supported a study on the impact of the social trans-
fer system of Kyrgyzstan on women’s labour supply (Barrientos and Kudebayeva
2018). Besides the pension, early retirement, and disability insurance systems
and other standard social transfer provisions, which in general do not impact
labour supply decisions of direct beneficiaries (but may influence the supply be-
haviour of—female—dependents or co-residents), the Kyrgyz set of additional
social assistance mainly focuses on mothers. The so-called Monthly Benefit for
Families in Poverty (MBPF) not only covers the distance between children’s
actual per capita income and a minimum income threshold set by the gov-
ernment; it also includes one-time maternity payments and additional monthly
maternity benefits for eighteen months, thus targeting the poorest households in
the country.
The transfer level accordingly depends on the number and age of children—
that is, deciding to work may result in a substantial transfer reduction. The special
significance of this programme stems not least from the fact that the Kyrgyz labour
force working informally has risen sharply during the transition from socialism.
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Informality rates are calculated to be above 50% in urban areas and beyond 90% in
rural environments (data as of 2012 reported in Schwegler-Rohmeis, Mummert,
and Jarck 2013). This further enhances the relevance of the MBPF and its focus
on the poorest households. Though, relative to household incomes, mean transfer
values do not seem large, with social transfers providing less than 20% of poor
families’ income in Kyrgyzstan.
Using data from the Life in Kyrgyzstan survey as well as cross-section data, the
study found rather low labour force participation rates for working-age women,
mostly under 50% in recent years (2010–13). According to the survey, housework
and childcare were the core reasons for not being in the labour force. Against this
background, the authors evaluated whether the receipt of social transfers affected
the labour supply decisions of females in a positive or negative direction.
The results suggest that receiving social insurance or assistance transfers may
matter for labour supply; among working age women it is associated with a lower
probability of participating in the labour market, reduced working hours, and a
marginally rising probability of giving birth to the next child earlier. Remarkably,
these effects seem larger for insurance transfers than for additional social assis-
tance like the MBPF. Causality remains unclear, however; negative responses to
MBPF transfers in terms of labour supply could either be a direct reaction to the
transfer or result from the targeting of the programme itself.
Besides highlighting the need to better adapt social security systems to the needs
and changing conditions of transition economies, the findings rebut the assump-
tion that social assistance cash transfers to poor families with children pose a high
risk of causing low female labour force participation rates. However, to make the
reverse argument would be wrong: in the case of Kyrgyzstan at least, social as-
sistance cash targeted at working-age women apparently fails to stimulate the
employment of women in low-income households, but instead narrows birth
spacing (the gap between pregnancies).
These results are certainly disappointing, in the sense that even tailored so-
cial assistance programmes provide no guarantee of strengthening the position
of women in the labour market. One possible explanation may be that policies in
transition economies face specific challenges with respect to tailoring their social
security systems to changed needs, and that a high level of economic uncertainty
may particularly influence women’s labour supply decisions when labour markets
are partly still disrupted. The study by and large confirmed the existing literature’s
ambiguous findings on the effect of social assistance programmes on the labour
market activities of adult women.
From a theoretical perspective, Doepke and Tertilt (2019) added an important
argument that needs to be further studied: different concurrent policies targeted
at women may have counteracting effects. For example, while targeting transfers
explicitly at women may at first stage have a positive effect, this impact may be
interfered with by other policies aiming at women’s labour market attachment,
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in that for example a shrinking wage gap could limit or deter the effect of social
transfers to women. Research in this direction certainly needs to be intensified.
That anti-poverty provisionsmayworkmore successfully under different condi-
tions has been shown, for example, in Barrientos andVilla (2015).Here the authors
examined the labour market outcomes of a conditional cash transfer programme
targeted at families in poverty (Familias en Acción) in Colombia (2007–10) and
identified significantly positive effects for women. Despite the overall marginal
effect on the aggregate labour supply of males and females, analysing by gender
suggests that the cash transfer positively affected formal women’s employment and
has a strong effect on the female-dominated households with single adults. Over-
all, households seemed to respond to anti-poverty transfers by reallocating the
productive resources of the household, which may benefit women’s longer-term
employment prospects, in particular.
In the absence of functioning social insurance systems, migrant remittances
may replace public transfers—and have similar effects on the likelihood of
women in low-income countries staying employed or entering the labour force,
since migration is usually male-dominated. Remittances may also complement
social insurance benefits and thus reinforce their effects.
The existing literature on these effects largely suggests that women staying be-
hind work less outside the household when they receive additional income via
remittances. This enables them to reduce their own paid work or stay at home,
which is even more likely when strict social norms are against women work-
ing. Many studies have found that women increase unpaid but income-generating
work to substitute the migrant’s work (for example maintaining farms and other
household businesses) thus increasing their labour force participation. Other
studies have revealed that incomes from remittances are directed to savings, con-
sumption, or investments into the education of family members (see the brief
literature survey provided by Kan and Aytimur (2019)).
8.2.1 The Impact of Migration on Women Staying Behind
The effects of migration and remittances on female labour force participation rates
are particularly relevant in poor countries with a high share of labour emigrants
and social norms affecting the labour market attachment of women staying be-
hind. In a project supported by GLM|LIC, Kan and Aytimur (2019) provided
a case study for Tajikistan where roughly 25% of all households are affected by
emigration, while traditional societal structures and gender roles lead to rather
low employment rates and education levels of females. The country is among
the poorest worldwide with over 30% of its population living below the national
poverty line, almost 75% living in rural areas with a significant lack of employment
prospects, and a very high unemployment rate of about 30% (numbers for 2016,
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Kan and Aytimur 2019). Migrant households belong to the poorest in the coun-
try, sendingmostly low-skilled workers to Russia. Notably, roughly 25% of families
staying behind do not receive any remittances (see OSCE 2012).
The study exploited a three-wave panel of representative household survey data
for 2007, 2009, and 2011, and controlled for unobserved factors that could simul-
taneously affect women’s decision to participate in the labour market, as well as
for time-variant and time-invariant variables. Challenging the existing literature,
Kan and Aytimur (2019) found no significant effect of migration and remittances
on female labour force participation in the context of Tajikistan. According to the
analysis, the country’s characteristics neutralize the effects on consumption and
labour participation of increased income (income effects) through remittances
that have been identified by a large body of literature as the general cause of falling
female participation rates in the context of migration. Although lacking prospects
of paid employment, and with social norms mostly preventing women from en-
tering the labour market or expanding any paid employment, remittance effects
do not lead them to reduce their work hours.
Kan and Aytimur (2019) synthesized four main channels of muting or neutral-
izing the income effects of remittances that would usually decrease female labour
force participation rates:
1. A shortage of household labour increases the ‘shadow wage’ of women
working in the household.
2. A lack of employment opportunities outside the home combinedwith finan-
cial constraints forces women staying behind to work at home as a substitute
for male migrants’ work, as ‘unpaid’ workers.
3. High costs ofmigratingmean the poorest households need to work—at least
in the early phase of migration—until they receive remittances.
4. The absence of any remittances increases the pressure on women to work.
While the income effect of remittances on women’s labour force participation
is apparently muted in the case of Tajikistan, the substitution of unpaid labour
by paid labour (substitution effect) is also not straightforward, but is instead
hampered by cultural norms and family structures. Furthermore and interest-
ingly, households with farms as the main source of income increase female labour
force participation independently of migrant status, by 10.8 work hours per week
according to Kan and Aytimur (2019). This may be due to women being dispro-
portionally relegated to farm work given widespread discrimination, role norms,
and the better compatibility of agricultural household work with childcare (see
Short et al. 2002).
In this respect the findings in Kan and Aytimur (2019) fit results from earlier
studies, which at first sight provided an opposite assessment of the impact of male
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migration and remittances in low-income regions. For instance, Lokshin andGlin-
skaya (2009) studied the effect of male migration on the employment patterns of
women in Nepal, showing that female participation rates were partly negatively
affected but that the overall picture remains ambiguous; depending on the house-
hold characteristics and the degree of substitutability of male and female tasks
before migration, the absence of the male migrant and remittances could either
decrease or increase women’s productive work in the household. While a decreas-
ing effect is most likely for landless and urban households, those households that
own land and farms showed aweaker participation effect that could even turn pos-
itive given the complementarities betweenmales’ and females’ work in agricultural
businesses.
Taken together, these results should give reason to policymakers in LICs to
carefully reconsider their approach towards the issue of remittances, and the role
of women staying behind in the labour market, to avoid lasting negative out-
comes onwomen’s economic prospects and the well-being of their families. Due to
migration being mainly male-dominated, inefficient labour markets, a lack of ap-
propriate jobs for women, restricted occupational mobility across sectors, and the
underlying social stigma, there is a high risk of further expelling female workers
out of the labour market and thus into economic dependence.
Existing substitution effects also hint at the need to develop the wage labour
market, allowingwomen to at least partly replacemale labour in rural areas anduse
remittances to pay for education. Even in the event of a rising participation rate,
undesired socio-economic effects may occur with regard to extended unpaid fam-
ily work, as Kan and Aytimur (2019) rightly noted. These risks need to be tackled
by policies aiming to avoid lasting negative well-being effects frommalemigration
and to curb gender inequality.
8.3 Lessons fromTraining Programmes Targeted TowardsWomen
Gender inequality in low-income countries is a topic that requires assorted policy
activities, given the complexity of discrimination, social stigmatization, and other
barriers that cause women to lag behind men. To shatter the ‘unholy alliance’
of educational deficits, restrictions barring access to labourmarkets, repressive
social structures andnorms in favourof economically inactivewomen, and sex-
ual oppression, will take perseverance.The strong increase in youth population
inmany developing countries gives policymakers every reason to be concerned
about this generation’s prospects—and youngwomen’s opportunities in partic-
ular. Multifaceted actionwill be needed, and acceptance of substantial uncertainty
about which measures will be sustainable in the end.
Gender-independent interventions at a very early stage of lifemay generate sub-
stantial long-term benefits for women in their teen and adult years (see Anderson
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2008). Targeted training programmes that address girls’ schooling and life skills,
women’s vocational training, business-orientated skills, or financial constraints,
seem to be a viable road towards an increase in female labour force attachment and
more equal opportunities. Yet a growing literature in this field has provided mixed
evidence on the effectiveness of these interventions. GLM|LIC research aims to
enrich our view of which training strategies are the most promising.
A fundamental contribution to the economics of ‘women’s empowerment in
action’ has been provided by Bandiera et al. (2020). The study focused on a key
aspect of female inequality: the vicious circle between high (and early) fertility of
youngwomen andpersistent low labour force participation.Using the example of a
training programme in Uganda (Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescents—
ELA), implemented by the non-government organization BRAC Uganda), that
offers a combination of vocational and life skills to empower adolescent girls, the
authors convincingly showed that such interventions may prove very efficient and
cost effective under certain circumstances.
The ELA programme started in Bangladesh but has been transferred to a num-
ber of other LICs. In the case of Uganda, it operates in a country where 60% of the
population are under 20 years old. It runs so-called ‘development clubs’ in local
meeting places, led by selected female mentors close in age to the target group of
girls aged 14–20 enrolled in school.
The clubs (more than 1,200) do not only offer training but also serve as a plat-
form for recreational group activities, and a safe place for informal exchange.
Participation in a two-year training period is voluntary. Qualified profession-
als engage in vocational training modules that react flexibly to local economic
demand and the participants’ level of education. Courses on income-generating
activities in small own-businesses (for example tailoring, computing, agriculture,
small trades) are accompanied by modules that provide financial literacy, budget-
ing, and accounting skills.The life skills courses are delivered bymentors or BRAC
staff, and contain information on sexual health and family planning as well as ne-
gotiation and management skills, or basic legal knowledge on women’s issues. In
contrast to many existing training programmes, ELA operates outside of school,
thus offering a more open learning environment. Furthermore, the programme
has a comparatively long term of two years, instead of a few weeks or months (as
in most comparable programmes).
Using randomized control trial methods, Bandiera et al. (2020) selected one
hundred communities as treatment group that opened an ELA club in 2008, and
fifty communities as controls without access to ELA training. Participating women
were observed in two-year intervals over a period of four years, to capture the
immediate course impact and longer-term effects. A first survey was conducted
among almost 4,000 ELA participants and 2,000 individuals in the control groups
at the beginning of the programme. The second survey showed a tracking rate of
over 80%, while about 60% responded in the third survey after four years.
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The ELA club participation rate until the end of the two-year training period
was above 20% and did not drop afterwards, even in the absence of further train-
ing offers. About 50% attended at least one clubmeeting per week during the entire
two-year period. More than half of all participants passed the vocational skills
training, and 85% took part in the life skills courses. Half of the women attended
both training modules, 33% participated in the life skills training only, while 1%
took part in vocational training only. These numbers reveal the high acceptance
of the programme among participating girls and women.
Against this promising background, the rather positive findings of Bandiera
et al. (2020) do not come as a surprise, though the range of effects is impressive.
Four years after the programme was initiated, participating female adolescents
were 48% more likely to be economically active and generate income, mostly by
engaging in self-employment. At the same time life skills training reduced teen
pregnancies by 34% and early marriage or cohabitation by 62%.
Furthermore, the women widely reported as now aspiring to a clearly later
age of marriage and first childbirth, while also reporting a strong decline in
sex against their will. These results more than indicate that extended, voluntary
training in business and life skills may be very efficient in empowering women
and creating lasting effects. With regards to cost efficiency, the study calculates
rather low programme per capita costs—for example, related to unconditional
cash transfers—and notes the easy scalability of ELA.
The outcomes of the ELA programme in Uganda show that it is possible to
transfer and amend existing programmes that have proven successful in dif-
ferent cultural and regional settings (South Asia vs. sub-Saharan Africa) into
another environment. More importantly, they underline that there are means
to overcome the vicious circle of a lack of labour market opportunities leading
to lower education efforts of young women and early family formation. Addi-
tional demand-orientated education and a new awareness of fertility decisions,
enhanced by targeted education, may pave the way to improving the socio-
economic prospects and self-confidence of a promising generation of young
women. However, there is still much room for research on the effects of such pro-
grammes on the attitudes of (young) men and the further weight and acceptance
of social stigma against working women.
A recent GLM|LIC study is closely related to this instructive research.
Brudevold-Newman et al. (2017) compared two approaches that aimed to increase
entrepreneurship among young women at the age of 18–19 in Kenya’s capital
Nairobi through:
(1) an unconditional cash grant without any accompanying support.
(2) a short-term ‘microfranchising’ programme including business as well as
basic life skills training, franchise-specific vocational training, start-up
physical capital, and mentoring.
gender dimensions of developing labour markets 203
Given the high probability that only a minority of youth cohorts entering the
labour force will find paid employment in sub-SaharanAfrica, studies that provide
such a kind of comparative analysis are highly welcome and illustrative. As the
analysis shows, both interventions resulted in significant short- and medium-
term income effects, but this positive impact did not last longer than a year
after the programme, dissipating in the second year after treatment. This lack
of lasting impacts on income suggests that enhancing self-employment may
not be a sustainable strategy for addressing young women’s disadvantages and
underemployment in the labourmarkets of developing countries.
To evaluate the outcomes of the cash programme and the microfranchise train-
ing, the authors conducted a randomized controlled trial. Potential participants
living in one ofNairobi’s poorest neighbourhoods could apply for business training
(the cash grant programmewas not announced in advance) before being randomly
assigned to one of the three groups (cash grant, microfranchise, and control). Two
surveys of the participants were conducted—the first after seven to ten months
and the second fourteen to twenty-two months after the end of the intervention.
Notably, over 40% of all participating young women were mothers already, with
16% married or cohabitating. The education level was low, with only about 40%
having completed secondary education; roughly 35% had some earlier experience
with vocational training. Over 54% of the sample had been involved in income-
generating activities in the past, but only around 15% were generating income
when both programmes started. On the other hand, the women spent a median
twenty-one hours of unpaid housework at baseline. Only around 9% of the sample
reported having a bank account.
The microfranchise treatment was designed by the International Rescue Com-
mittee (IRC) and jointly implemented with local organizations. Three main differ-
ences distinguish it from the ELA programme studied by Bandiera et al. (2020): it
covered only a rather short period (ten weeks at most, with mentoring as a follow-
up); it focused strictly on two specific franchise business models; and it contained
a starter package of physical capital to start the microfranchise. Hence the two
programmes followed completely different strategies.
In partnership with two Kenyan businesses, the franchise programme offered
the participants the chance to self-employ either as a hairdresser or with a food
cart franchise. After two weeks of general training courses, including modules on
the franchise models, the participants were matched with their chosen franchise
partner who took over to complete the training. If assigned to the hairdresser fran-
chise, women completed further six weeks of classroom training and a two-week
internship in a salon, and then received start-up kits.
Those women assigned to the food cart franchise only took part in a one-day
event introducing the brand’s products and preparation methods, before they
were given a mobile cart, logo-branded equipment, and an initial stock of food.
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Mentoring included visits to the business every few weeks, as well as help with
financial management or contacting the franchise partners. The cash grant treat-
ment was organized in a very simple way to contrast sharply with the ‘competing’
franchise treatment: randomly assigned women were informed that a one-off pay-
ment of 20,000 Kenyan shillings (239 USD at the exchange rate at that time) was
unconditional and to be paid back independently from how the grant was used. In
relation to the median savings of all participants of below 9 USD, this cash grant
represented a very substantial boost to income.
The labourmarket outcomes of the cash transfer andmicrofranchise treatments
can be summarized as follows. After seven to ten months, both programmes had
a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of being self-employed, which
increased by around 10 percentage points for the franchise and the grant treat-
ments. The cash grant led to a 38% increase in aggregate work hours, whereas
the franchise approach did not significantly affect the total number of hours
worked. Self-employment hourswere increased substantially by both treatments—
an additional 4.1 hours per week in the franchise treatment and 7.6 in the
grant treatment—while a parallel decline in hours of paid work was insignificant
according to the study.
The increases in income from the treatments are quite impressive at first sight;
they range from a 30% (1.6 USD per week) increase—compared to the mean in-
come of the control group—for the franchise treatment to 56% (3.2 USD) for the
grant treatment. These increases in income stem from the newly established self-
employment and are not offset by any significant loss of income from paid work.
The figures highlight the encouraging short-term effect of both treatments in en-
abling young women to engage in self-employment and benefit from large income
increases.
However, the picture changes almost completely fourteen to twenty-twomonths
after treatment. By the time of the final survey, the impacts on work hours and
income gains had entirely disappeared for both treatments. At this time, neither
themicrofranchise approach nor the grant treatment can boast any positive labour
supply effect relative to the control group.The training component of the franchise
approach seemingly did not help to establish a sufficient degree of productivity
to ensure profitable self-employment in the long run. What remained is a last-
ing effect on occupational choice, as both programmes resulted in a persistently
higher likelihood of self-employment (around 12 percentage points compared to
the control group).
These rather disappointing results raise the question of whether the pro-
grammes may have had longer-term impacts on other labour market outcomes
with regards to, for example, expenditures, living conditions, time use, savings,
household assets, self-confidence, and empowerment. The study’s answer is as
straightforward as it is disillusioning: there is hardly any evidence indicating the
existence of any such long-term impacts. The income effect of the interventions
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disappears soon, and no permanent welfare effect replaces it later on. Even the
assessment of the programme’s cost efficiency does not brighten the picture.
Cash grants seem to be a more cost-efficient way of increasing entrepreneur-
ship in the context of a large poverty-stricken urban area. The franchise model
achieves lower temporary gains in income at higher costs, in comparison to the
simple grant approach that at least appears to stimulate sustainable investments
instead of consumption only. In summary, however, benefits of both treatments
do not exceed the accompanying costs. The absence of long-lasting impacts on
income and labour supply suggests that self-employment may not be the solu-
tion to high underemployment of female youth in poor and competitive urban
regions.
Brudevold-Newman et al. (2017) confirmed findings of other studies in the
field (see, for example, Haushofer and Shapiro 2016) that credit constraints should
not be viewed as the main barrier to sustainable self-employment of women
(and men) in low-income settings. Savings constraints show a stronger impact
on the observed outcomes, which may be traced back to the limited access of the
disadvantaged—poor women in particular—to savings technologies (see Dupas
and Robinson 2013a, 2013b). Given that Brudevold-Newman et al. (2017) did not
find any evidence that women used the cash grant for additional consumption or
decreasing labour supply, cash transfer programmes may have indirect positive
effects. Providing formal or informal safe methods to store money for later invest-
ment would be an important feature in the context of strengthening the economic
position of women, and could thus justify limited one-off cash transfers to this
highly vulnerable target group.
8.4 Women’s Empowerment and Employment
Supported by GLM|LIC, Field et al. (2017) continued from this point with a
comprehensive analysis of whether strengthening women’s financial control and
bargaining power, along with better targeting of benefits payments, could boost
female labour supply in India by countering persistent social constraints. Given
that India is among the countries with the lowest labour force participation rates
of women worldwide (see Fletcher, Pande, and Moore 2018), research to further
decode the barriers in place is much needed. The main result highlighted by the
study is that linking low-skilled women’s labour income to their own bank ac-
counts, and providing basic financial training, may substantially increase female
labour market activities.
The study starts by depicting female and male attitudes to women’s work and
mobility, revealing the extent of the barriers women face in numerous low-income
countries—and notably in patriarchal societies as in India. Based on data from the
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WorldValues Survey (2010–2014) and figures on female labour force participation
reported by the International Labour Organization (ILO), the authors developed
an index of support for female work among women and men. This index illus-
trates the persistence of social norms and their different global levels, where a
higher value indicates more support for female labour (see Figure 8.4 and its notes
for a detailed description of the index). Not surprisingly, participation rates of
women are higher when both genders support an economically active role for
women,while the gender gap in attitudes towardsworkingwomen is highestwhere
women hardly play an active role in the labour market—specifically in regions of
the Middle East, in Pakistan, and in India.
Against this background, the analysis focuses on the federal Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), a workfare programme
that provides members of households in rural communities who work within the
framework of the programmewith a fixedminimumwage. Its level is below the in-
come provided by cash-paid casual wage work, which is the most common labour
besides unpaid household and agricultural activities for both genders in Indian
rural regions. Though generally demand driven in the sense that individuals may
apply and community authorities—‘grampanchayat’ (GP)—are obliged to find ap-
propriate jobs for all of them, it is in practice widely supply-orientated with GPs
planning work projects and looking for workers to take part in them—which does
not necessarily cover all applicants. More than 55 million households in India are
entitled by NREGS to take up minimum wage jobs for a maximum period of one
hundred days per year (in practice covering some 80–95%). This makes NREGS
one of the largest welfare programmes worldwide (see Subbarao et al. (2013) and
Chapter 4 in this volume).
The programme has a rather clear gender component: it mandates equal wages,
includes quotas for female participation (though over-reporting cannot be ruled
out), and widens the job opportunities in rural communities, which is especially
important for mobility-constrained women. Furthermore, the programme has
been modified in terms of its wage payment procedures. Originally starting with
cash payments, it began electronic payments to bank accounts in 2008, followed
by a government decision in late 2012 to refrain from payments to one account
for all working household members and instead prescribe individual accounts in
an attempt to foster women’s empowerment. Implementation of the latter strategy
has been sluggish, though, and shows extreme regional differences, with the aver-
age share of wages paid to female-owned accounts ranging far beyond the 100%
goal (see Field et al. 2017 for further details).
As shown by two earlier studies, the Indian public works programme has in-
deed managed to generate important effects from a gender perspective: NREGS
design apparently managed to raise female participation rates and wages at a level
that significantly increased total rates (see Azam 2012). Afridi, Mukhopadhyay,
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Fig. 8.4 Male and Female Attitudes towards Working Women and the Relation to Female Participation Rates
Notes: This work support index, developed by Field et al. (2017), uses data from 2010–14 World Values Surveys. The index aggregates a dummy variable equal to one if the
respondent agrees that men should have more rights to jobs than women when jobs are scarce, a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent agrees that men make
better political leaders than women, a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent agrees that men make better business executives than women, and a dummy variable
equal to one if the respondent agrees that being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay. These variables are standardized (pooling across countries and years) and
then averaged by country. The index is then multiplied by −1; higher values correspond to more support for female work. Country-wide calculated averages by gender are
correlated with data from the ILO’s estimate of female labour force participation among women aged 15–64 in 2011.
Source: Field et al. (2017)
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and Sahoo (2016) complemented this finding by showing a positive correlation of
increased female NREGS participation and children’s education outcomes.
To enrich this strand of the literature, Field et al. (2017) partnered with the
northern Indian state ofMadhya Pradesh and onemain banking institution to fur-
ther modify the standard provisions of NREGS in a large-scale experiment using
RCT methods. Two regional particularities gave a broad scope for experimen-
tal design: the share of wages paid to women’s bank accounts only reached 30%
according to official statistics, while ongoing state-wide initiatives were about to
expand the network of closely available banking kiosks offering cost-free accounts
and secure authorization via fingerprint.
The experiment took place in 2014 and 2015 among households that had for-
merly worked for NREGS. A sample of 197 localities with functional local banking
kiosks was randomly divided into control and treatment groups of 5,800 couples
with no pre-existing female bank account. Actively participating women were on
average 40 years old with only low education; roughly 90% reported illiteracy.
The surveyed husbands reported four years of schooling on average, while 57%
reported being literate. The study team first informed eligible women about the
option of opening a free bank account, and in a second step helped with the bank
account opening process at the local kiosk.
The treatment strategy included four interventions plus untreated controls:
1. ‘Accounts Basic’’‘ t is s ’cc a c‘ t i ’‘ ’‘ . Participating women were advised and helped to open a
new bank account at their community banking kiosk.
2. ‘Accounts Plus’’‘ t ls s’cc‘ t l ’‘ ’‘ . After opening an individual bank account, eligible women
participated in a short information session to learn more about the local
bank, the functioning of their accounts, and the advantages of safe banking
and savings.
3. ‘Accounts Basic Linking’’‘ t i i is s ’cc a c‘ gt i i i ’‘ ’‘ . The GPs in this treatment group were asked to
update their NREGS data and redirect wage payments to women’s new
individual bank accounts, giving them direct access to the money they
earned.
4. ‘Accounts Plus Linking’’‘ t l i is s ’cc‘ gt l i i ’‘ ’‘ . Women received the same basic financial infor-
mation as ‘Accounts Plus’, while NREGS wages were paid into their new
individual bank accounts.
This experimental design made it possible to distinguish between the effect of in-
creasing women’s access to banking and the effect of increasing control over their
wages, while all household resources remained unchanged. Implementation of the
treatments was later followed by a survey of all participating women, and their
husbands, on the effects of the different treatments.
Building on this survey and an elaborated model of labour supply with social
constraints, the study revealed remarkable findings:
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1. Most importantly, the combined treatment of bank account, linked to
wage payment, along with basic financial information (Accounts Plus
Linking), affected private sector employment in a remarkably positive
way. Sixmonths after the intervention, female labour force participationwas
12 percentage points higher while annual earnings in this sector increased
24%. Women reported roughly 60% higher bank balances. Since private
sector wages are traditionally paid in cash, this trend cannot be explained
by the introduction of bank accounts. Instead, control over earned income
seemed to significantly increase bargaining power for the most vulnerable
and dependent women. In fact, the income gains weremostly seen for the
women furthest away from the labour force and with husbands strongly
opposed to their wives working. Seemingly they find a way to stand up
against social stigma and dependency if allowed some fundamental financial
self-control.
2. The Accounts Plus Linking treatment had a large positive effect on the
take-up of additional NREGSminimumwage work. Fifteenmonths after
the startof the intervention,participatingwomenwere34%more likely to
be engaged in the federal programme compared to those women who re-
ceived the bank account without the additional information package. At the
same time, the average amount of NREGS payments received into the bank
accounts during these fifteen months was relatively large (roughly 25% of
their annual non-NREGS income sources) which rules out the possibility
that women were enrolled in the programme only on a minor level. This
finding further supports the hypothesis that participating women gained
self-confidence.
3. These effects also translated into other improvements. Surveyed women in
this treatment group were more likely to be economically active outside
the household and make household purchases with their own money. They
also reported higher levels of mobility compared to the control group, while
there is no evidence thatmale economic activities declined.This impact does
not seem to simply be due to men finding it increasingly difficult to take
control of female earnings.
4. Out of four treatments, only the most intensive was effective. Although
offering bank accounts almost doubled the share of participating women
with suchaccounts, this alonedidnotwork. Providing information courses
but abandoning direct wage payments to women’s accounts had no ob-
servable impact on female employment or earnings whatsoever. Likewise,
directing wages to bank accounts without enabling low-educated women
to understand, trust, and use them properly, proved a wrong strategy. To
change behaviour, financial resources need to be put into the hands of
women along with some financial literacy. Notably, the saving option of an
own bank account was hardly activated by any programme participant, once
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more showing that the ability to control own earned income is what matters
most.
5. Conversely, this means that norms preventing women fromworking, and
thus keeping them at home, will continue in the absence of female finan-
cial empowerment and independence inmale-dominated societies.
6. The strongest effects were seen for women who had not previously been en-
gaged in NREGS work, and those with husbands strictly opposed to women
working. This contradicts traditional economic thinking that households’
labour force participation decisions only react to wage levels and leisure
preferences.
It should be noted that these results are rather short-term—the last survey so far
was roughly half a year after the completion of the intervention. According to
the study, however, administrative data from the workfare programme and the
banking partners suggest the effects were sustainable. In summary, the findings
illustrate that socialnormsdiscouragingfemaleeconomicactivitiesmaybeover-
comewhenwomen gain bargaining power based on somefinancial literacy and
autonomy frommen, and when active labourmarket policies have a gender fo-
cus.That this approach is apparently successful even in an extremelymale-focused
society like India is a rather promising outcome of this GLM|LIC study. Future re-
search should add evidence on the effects on altering household bargaining power
and work attitudes. It remains to be seen (and studied) whether policies that en-
courage female labour force participation can offer a means to not only influence
but also directly alter social barriers that constrain women on the road to greater
equality.
In this respect, a recent study by Almås et al. (2018) deserves special mention
as it adds interesting results from a laboratory experiment. To capture the inten-
sity of women’s willingness to receive cash transfers instead of their spouses, the
participants in the experiment could take their own decision whether to receive a
full cash payment to be transferred to their husbands or to accept a lower amount
in order to receive payment themselves. By varying the cash reduction in case the
women preferred to have control over the money, and by offering a rise of the
cash if paid to men, to control for behavioural change, the study revealed women’s
trade-off between household income and empowerment.
According to the results (given for Macedonia), disadvantaged women on
average showed a clear willingness to accept a loss of household money to
gain more financial—and thus bargaining—power. This willingness was lower,
though, if the women had already been part of a public transfer programme offer-
ing them a cash grant conditional on secondary school attendance of their chil-
dren. These experimental findings provide an important supplement to survey-
and randomized trial-based studies and clearly indicate that financial control is a
crucial means of empowering women in the developing world.
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It should be noted, though, that effective empowerment will also require con-
certed action in many other fields. Hardly any aspect of development policy is
as multifaceted, and to a certain extent so hard to predict, as the improvement
of female living and economic conditions. Depending on the country context,
to further empower women in developing countries may need action on a very
basic level.
8.4.1 Social Norms even Affect Women’s Mobility
Social norms do not only directly prevent labour market entrance for many
women, but also restrict women’s mobility in many regions. In South Asian coun-
tries such as India or Pakistan, serious safety concerns add to the prevalence of
these norms, preventing independent female mobility outside the household and
use of public transport in urban areas. This reinforces the dependence on male
assistance, even for active women whose ability to attend their jobs or training fa-
cilities is not in their own hands. Policies need to counteract this issue efficiently,
since mobility is a decisive prerequisite to join the labour and education markets,
and thus escape a trap of poverty, dependence, and incapacitation.
In fact, gendered transport has become a policy issue in countries such as
Pakistan (see UN Women Pakistan 2018) and India (see Women in Cities In-
ternational 2011 on the Delhi Gender Inclusive Cities Programme), as well as
in international development aid debate (see for example Kunieda and Gauthier
2007). Various projects at the local level aim to address this issue in these coun-
tries. Thorough research on existing interventions and their impact on women’s
equal opportunities is still lacking, though.
Does the road to empowerment need the scaling up of public transport initia-
tives tailored to women’s needs? To find an answer to this question an ongoing
research project supported by GLM|LIC explores the impact of transportation
initiatives for women in Pakistan (see Sajjad et al. 2018 for early results). A ran-
domized control trial will allow an evaluation of the impact of different transport-
to-work modes on female employment and earnings outcomes and inform a
cost–benefit analysis of alternative transport options.
According to a demand assessment survey, women in Lahore, the second largest
city in Pakistan, are 30% more likely in principle to use public transportation
than men, since social norms exclude independent use of motorbikes or bicy-
cles. Of female respondents, 25% stated that access to safe and reliable transport
would increase their chances in the labour market. At the same time, while 70% of
male survey respondents reported actually discouraging female family members
from using public transport, almost 90% claimed they would approve of female
household members using women-only transport (see Figure 8.5).
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Male opinion on female family members’
use of alternative transport modes



















Fig. 8.5 Male Opinion on Female Family Members’ Use of Alternative
Transport Modes in Pakistan
Note: Authors’ calculations based on a demand assessment survey of 1,000
households in Lahore, Pakistan.
Source: Sajjad et al. (2018)
Despite policy efforts in Lahore (and other urban areas) to facilitate women’s
travel—for example by ‘pink buses’ or separate vehicle compartments for
women—access is still rather limited, as are financial and infrastructure resources.
Thus, the underlying problems of inefficient scheduling and exposure of women to
harassment prevail. These massive constraints may result in women giving up job
opportunities or even leaving the labour force. Surveys showwomen have a strong
interest in improved public transportation and expect to be better protected in
terms of shorter, predictable wait times and the avoidance of overcrowded vehicles
through either tighter schedule or women-only public transport (see UN Women
Pakistan 2018).
Another GLM|LIC project provides evidence on the extent to which travel
that requires a woman to move outside her village could hamper her ability for
skill acquisition (Cheema et al. 2020). In the context of an RCT conducted with
a large and highly subsidized skills development programme in rural Pakistan,
the researchers show that setting up a training centre in woman’s village makes
her two to three times more likely to enrol and complete a skills development
course compared to women who have to travel an average distance of just a few
kilometres.
Strikingly, the authors document that half of the access difference between in-
village and out-of-village is generated simply by crossing the village boundary.This
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strong boundary effect cannot be reconciled with any standard economic or time
opportunity costs, as there is no official village border one has to wait to cross, nor
any toll paid at entry or exit, suggesting that it is likely due to non-economic/social
costs women encounter when temporarily leaving their village.
Cheema et al. (2020) exogenously vary the amount of stipend to quantify
monetary terms for both the boundary and per-kilometre travelled effects. They
compare the increase in take-up rates induced by additional stipend with the
distance penalties and provide an equivalence between the penalties and the
stipend. Using these estimates, the study finds that one would need to receive a
monthly stipend equivalent to about half of monthly household expenditure to
merely overcome the boundary effect.
Before the start of the programme, Cheema et al. (2020) used focus groups to
identify the following key household concerns regarding attending courses outside
their villages: limited information, household and community-level barriers, a
nd perceived safety concerns. This enabled them to investigate the role of
these concerns using additional design variations: (1) more intense course dis-
semination to address informational gaps and trainee/household concerns, (2)
community engagement to discuss societal concerns, and (3) group transport
to address perceived safety and security. The authors find little impact of the
first two interventions but a strong effect of offering group transport: half to
two-thirds of the boundary effect can be compensated for by offering women
group transport from their own village to the training centre outside of their
village.
Cheema et al. (2020) further show the boundary effect is due to social percep-
tions that constrain women’s agency andmobility: it is lower for womenwho enjoy
more influence over domestic affairs, have fewer dependents, higher social status,
and are from more ethnically diverse communities. This suggests that the access
barrier is less likely due to real economic or even (real) safety considerations, but
instead arises from women’s lack of agency within their households and concerns
about perceived ‘status loss’ because of their leaving and potentially being exposed
to outside influences.
The findings of Cheema et al. (2020) suggest that while changing conserva-
tive norms could take time, working within these norms by allaying the concerns
behind them may offer a promising and constructive initial direction towards
improving women’s access to services. In subsequent work, the authors plan to
investigate whether doing so ultimately changes these norms in the longer term.
Further G2LM|LIC research will scrutinize the impact of tailored transporta-
tion on women’s empowerment. Nonetheless, transport separation should be
viewed as an intermediate ‘solution’ only. Gendered transport will hardly offer
a long-term perspective as it reinforces stigmatization effects. In the long term,
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governments need to focus even more on creating awareness and updating so-
cial norms, along with extending public transport, to tackle gender inequality in
mobility.
Overall, policies aiming to empower women will certainly need a shift of
paradigms, from a deficits-based to a rights-based approach, but this will be a
long-term endeavour needing strong societal support. Moving the role of women
and other disadvantaged groups from that of supplicants to drivers of more equal
opportunities will also require better political representation.
Key Takeaways from this Chapter
• High youth unemployment, early marriage, and childbearing limit
women’s human capital investments and reinforce dependence on men.
• Policies to empower women create more equal opportunities but may also
have indirect negative economic effects, for example on wage levels and
childcare time.
• Due in part to historical gender norms, female labourmarket participation
does not necessarily increase with lower fertility and improved education.
• While low education forces women into the labour market to avoid
poverty, medium education makes home and care work more affordable.
• Government policies should systematically open growing sectors of the
economy to educated women and lift the glass ceiling in white-collar
services.
• Countries with a trade focus on male-dominated sectors especially need
affirmative policies and should not rely on positive globalization outcomes
to empower women.
• Rising income of poor households through social transfers or migrant
remittances does not seem to substantially affect female labour supply.
• Voluntary training in business and life skills can be a cost-efficient way to
enhance women’s economic activity.
• Programmes to promote self-employment have failed to improve women’s
income and labour supply in the long term.
• Gaining bargaining power based on some financial literacy and more au-
tonomy from men can help women overcome social norms discouraging
their economic activity.
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9
Lessons about LabourMarket Programmes
and Policies
The research described in the previous chapters provides a number of lessons
about what kinds of labour market programmes and policies can make a differ-
ence in low-income countries. Some of these lessons are about the difficulties
that many well-intentioned programmes face when they are implemented. Voca-
tional training programmes, for example, one of the most widely implemented
labour market interventions, have a disappointing record when subjected to rig-
orous evaluation. Public Works Programmes (PWPs) have also had mixed results
when rigorously evaluated. Other lessons are more positive, however. Some of the
modifications and additions to traditional programmes that have been tested in
GLM|LIC projects have had encouraging results. A number of the key lessons
for programmes and policies, both positive and negative, are summarized in this
chapter, which concludes with an outlook on some new GLM|LIC projects that
have not been included in this book.
9.1 Skills Training Programmes
As discussed in Chapter 3, vocational training programmes and others designed
to build job and entrepreneurial skills are among the most widely used labour
market initiatives by governments and non-governmental organizations. They
have also been among the most extensively evaluated labour market programmes,
althoughmany training programmes continue to runwithout rigorous evaluation.
GLM|LIC’s research projects have produced some important new lessons about
training programmes, with both positive and negative results.
Two GLM|LIC projects in West Africa, one in Liberia (Blattman, Jamison, and
Sheridan 2017) and one in Togo (Campos et al. 2017, 2018, 2020), both added
important new evidence regarding the effectiveness of ‘mindset training’. The
Liberia project provided evidence that cognitive behaviour therapy addressing
anger, impulsivity, depression, and other behaviours can help reduce anti-social
and risky behaviours among a group of former street youth, ex-criminals, and ex-
combatants. The project also showed a positive impact of combining CBT with
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© David Lam and Ahmed Elsayed (2022). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192897107.003.0009
lessons about labour market programmes and policies 219
unconditional cash grants, with the cash tending to reinforce, stabilize, and pro-
long the effects of CBT. The Togo project showed that personal initiative training
focused on teaching skills such as self-starting, innovation, goal-setting, planning,
and feedback cycles had significant effects on outcomes such as innovation and
capital investment, with the entrepreneurs who received the training having 30%
higher profits than a control group of entrepreneurs who receivedmore traditional
business training. The personal initiative training, which cost about 750 USD per
participant, paid for itself within one year, given the increase in profits. The re-
sults of these two GLM|LIC projects suggest that training using techniques from
behavioural psychology may be important additions to traditional skills training
programmes.
Two GLM|LIC projects in the ready-made garment industry in Bangladesh
looked at different approaches to skills training, with quite different outcomes
and diverse lessons learned. A project on professional training for line managers
(Macchiavello, Rabbani, and Woodruff 2015) had disappointing results, with low
take-up rates that appeared to be due to the production pressures within the firms.
The project demonstrates the challenges of trying to introduce within-firm train-
ing of production managers in a fast-paced competitive industry like the garment
industry. Firms are reluctant to give critical line managers the time needed for
training (which was only six days in this particular programme).
A project focused on training new entry-level garment workers (Shonchoy,
Raihan, and Fujii 2017) hadmore positive results, with some lessons that reinforce
those in other GLM|LIC projects. The project, based in a poor northern region
of Bangladesh, found that training alone did not have substantial impact on the
employment outcomes of programme participants, reinforcing the disappointing
results found in many other skill training programmes. However, when the train-
ing was combined with a stipend to cover travel costs and foregone income, along
with a paid internship in a factory, the programme had a substantial impact on
employment. Six months after the programme, those with full treatment had em-
ployment rates of 67%, compared to 6% in the control group, with employment
in the RMG industry accounting for almost all of the employment in the treated
group. One lesson of these two skill training programmes in the garment industry
is that targeting is important. Targeting unemployed residents of poor communi-
ties to give them new job opportunities was much more effective than targeting
firms for a programme to train line managers. Another important lesson is that
skill training alone may not have a significant impact on employment if it is not
combined with direct assistance in finding jobs.
AGLM|LIC project with important lessons resulting from disappointing results
was a programmedesigned to give entrepreneurial training to youngwomen in the
slums of Nairobi (Brudevold-Newman et al. 2017). As discussed in Chapter 8, the
project tested the impact of a microfranchising programme designed by the Inter-
national RescueCommittee. It also included an arm that received anunconditional
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cash grant. While both the microfranchising programme and the cash grant led
to improvements in women’s work and income in the first seven to ten months,
there was no evidence of positive effects when the women were recontacted four-
teen to twenty-two months after treatment. Women in both the microfranchising
programme and the cash grant treatment continued to be more likely than the
control group to be in self-employment, but this did not lead to higher incomes.
One key lesson from this project may be that encouraging young women into self-
employmentmay not be best for them in the long run, when compared to pursuing
additional education or searching for jobs as employees rather than entrepreneurs.
This project, like a number of GLM|LIC projects, also demonstrated the impor-
tance of long-term follow-up in programme evaluations. While short-term results
looked encouraging, longer-term follow-up indicated that the impact had dissi-
pated over time, with little evidence of long-term payoff to the participants in the
programme.
9.2 Information,Matching, and LabourMarket Clearing
As discussed in Chapter 2, many programmes have been developed to improve the
efficiency of labour markets by reducing information barriers and helping firms
and workers find each other. Several GLM|LIC projects have produced important
lessons about what kinds of interventions can work to make labour markets work
better.
A GLM|LIC project on job searching in Ethiopia found positive effects of low-
cost programmes designed to help reduce search costs and improve matching,
including a skills certification programme and transportation vouchers (Abebe
et al. 2017, 2020). Although the programmes did not lead to increases in the prob-
ability of participants being employed, they did lead to increases in the probability
that participants secured a stable permanent job or a job with a written contract.
Importantly, the beneficial effects of the programmes were strongest for more dis-
advantaged groups, suggesting that the initiatives were helping to overcome the
challenges faced by poor workers in financing job search. Taking advantage of the
long-term follow-up used inmanyGLM|LIC projects, this project found that there
continued to be significant positive effects of the skills certification workshop after
four years, with participants in the programme having higher earnings, longer-
lasting jobs, and jobs more closely matched to their skills, in comparison to the
control group. The long-term increase in earnings exceeded the cost of the treat-
ment. The effects of the transportation vouchers, on the other hand, dissipated
over time, with no significant effects observable after four years.
Evidence for a positive role of programmes designed to improve labour mar-
ket clearing was also provided by a GLM|LIC programme on job matching in
Uganda (Bassi and Nansamba 2020). As discussed in Chapter 2, the programme
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included a matching component which gave randomly selected candidates job in-
terviews with a firm, and a signalling component that provided certification of
candidates’ soft skills. The signalling component did not affect overall employ-
ment, but it did increase positive assortative matching in the job market, with
higher-ability managers being more likely to hire workers who were certified to
have high levels of soft skills. This led to an increase of 11% in the average earn-
ings of those in the certification treatment relative to the control group. With a
low cost of 19 USD per worker, the intervention was very cost effective. The certi-
fication did not benefit everyone, however, with those who had low scores tending
to opt out of the matching component of the programme once they learned their
scores.
Overall, it appears that these types of Active labour market policies can im-
prove the kinds of jobs that job seekers are able to get, an important improvement
in labour market outcomes. At the same time, these projects reinforced evidence
from other studies that it is difficult to increase overall employment with these
kinds of programmes.
Another worker–firm information asymmetry that may affect worker pro-
ductivity is information about the relationship between wage differentials and
productivity differentials. A GLM|LIC project on the impact of wage dispersion
in rural India (Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani 2018) found that workers responded
negatively to higher wage dispersion in their work group when that wage disper-
sion could not bematched to observable productivity differentials. As discussed in
Chapter 2, the project found that workers’ productivity and attendance declined
when they perceived that their pay was less than that of their peers. The policy
implication is that firms should consider the impact of their wage structure and
its transparency on productivity and absenteeism.
9.3 The Importance of Access andMobility Constraints
Another important labour market friction comes in the form of limitations on
mobility and access. Several GLM|LIC projects point to potential payoffs to pro-
grammes and policies that help address problems of access and mobility in labour
markets. As noted above, the project providing transport vouchers in Ethiopia’s
capital Addis Ababa found that the vouchers improved the job search outcomes of
recipients in the short term, although the impact dissipated over time.
In addition to transportation costs, other factors, including social norms, may
create barriers to mobility, especially for women. As discussed in Chapter 8,
a GLM|LIC project in rural Pakistan (Cheema et al. 2020) found that women were
much more likely to take advantage of a training programme within their village
than a programme outside its borders, even if the distance to the next village was
only a few kilometres. The results indicated that crossing the village boundary was
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a critical barrier to women’s participation. By varying the stipends given to women
to participate in the training, the research team estimated that a monthly stipend
equivalent to about half of monthly expenditures was required to overcome the
boundary effect, netting out actual transport costs. This provides an important
lesson about the extent to which social norms impose barriers on women’s access
to training and employment, and also reinforces the importance of taking such
barriers into account in the design of training programmes.
Barriers to women’s access to training and employment are not limited to rural
areas. A GLM|LIC project in the city of Lahore in Pakistan (Sajjad et al. 2018)
looks at the extent to which women are more likely to travel to work when they are
provided with safe and reliable women-only transport. As discussed in Chapter
8, a demand assessment survey in the project found that women are 30% more
likely than men to be dependent on public transport, the result of social norms
discouraging use of motorbikes or bicycles, and that 25% of female respondents
said they would be more likely to be active in the labour market if they had access
to safe and reliable transportation.
9.4 PublicWorks Programmes
Another labour market intervention used heavily by governments around the
world is Public Works Programmes. GLM|LIC projects produced some important
lessons about these programmes. One of the most important lessons is that, like
skills training programmes, PWPs do not always work. As discussed in Chapter 4,
a GLM|LIC project analysing the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) (Beegle,
Galasso, and Goldberg 2017) found that the programme was not successful in
meeting its goal of improving food security in the lean season, in spite of sub-
stantial investment in this large PWP. It appears that the programme’s relatively
low wage level and limited number of days of work provided to participants may
have resulted in earnings being insufficient to have measurable impacts on food
consumption. The results are a cautionary tale to those designing PWPs and point
to the importance of rigorous programme evaluation.
A GLM|LIC project analysing India’s famous Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), the largest PWP in the world, pro-
vides lessons about ways in which adjustments to the implementation of PWPs
can increase their effectiveness (Field et al. 2017). As discussed in Chapter 8, the
research team partnered with the state of Madhya Pradesh to randomly introduce
interventions into the way payments were made to women working in the NREGS
programme.The interventions included helping women open bank accounts, pro-
viding basic financial literacy about the accounts, and direct linking of NREGS
wages into their accounts. The project found that women’s labour force partici-
pation was 12 percentage points higher when they received the combination of a
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bank account, financial information, and direct wage deposits. The results provide
important lessons about the impact of women’s financial empowerment on their
labour force participation. Just as norms regarding women’s physical mobility have
been shown to limit their economic activity in both rural and urban Pakistan,
norms that limit women’s control over their earnings also appear to be playing
a role in reducing women’s labour force activity in South Asia.
9.5 Improving Rural LabourMarkets
Since most workers in low-income countries continue to live in rural areas and
work in agriculture, improvements in labour market outcomes require attention
to the functioning of rural labour markets. Economists have long observed a wide
range of imperfections and distortions in rural labour markets in LICs. Several
GLM|LIC projects point to potential ways to improve the functioning of these
markets and improve the lives of rural residents.
Development economists have become increasingly aware of the challenges
posed by the seasonal harvest cycle in Africa. Farm households find it extremely
difficult to maintain their consumption levels during the lean season preceding
the harvest. This leads to food insecurity and potentially inefficient use of labour
as households seek wage income fromworking off-farm rather than investing time
in their own crop production.
A number of GLM|LIC projects have provided important new insights about
this major policy challenge. The project analysing the MASAF, discussed above,
had a strong focus on the problem of seasonal smoothing. The project introduced
several variations in the timing of offering publicworks jobs as away to help house-
holds smooth consumption and avoid food insecurity. As noted, the programme
was unable to significantly reduce seasonal hunger or raise household incomes,
perhaps because it did not provide a large enough increase in income. This has
been an important new piece of evidence demonstrating just how challenging the
seasonal smoothing problem is in poor rural areas.
A GLM|LIC project in Zambia provided some of the most important find-
ings in this literature to date (Fink, Jack, and Masiye 2017, 2020). As discussed
in Chapter 4, the project was designed to test whether credit constraints are re-
sponsible for the misallocation of labour from on-farm to off-farm work (ganyu
labour) in the lean season. The results indicated a high demand for loans to help
smooth consumption, a signal that some kind of market failure is preventing ac-
cess to credit. Households with access to loans through the intervention increased
their total farm output, increased labour used on the household’s own farm, and
reduced food insecurity. The results suggest that credit constraints do play an im-
portant role in the consumption volatility and related adjustments in household
labour supply over the harvest cycle and point to potential interventions that may
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lead to improved ability to smooth consumption and more efficient allocation of
labour.
Another project with important lessons about the seasonal harvest cycle and the
labourmarket is an innovative programme in Rwanda usingmobile phone records
(Blumenstock and Donaldson 2017; Blumenstock 2018; Blumenstock, Chi, and
Tan 2019). As discussed in Chapter 5, this project is important for its method-
ological contributions as well as its policy implications, demonstrating how data
science techniques can be used to convert millions of mobile phone records into
valuable information about internalmigration patterns and social networks. Com-
bining the mobile phone data with data on weather, prices, and yields, the study
shows that labour migration in Rwanda is highly responsive to seasonal variation
in labour demand across regions. While many aspects of agricultural markets in
Africa seem to be characterized bymarket distortions and ineffectivemarket clear-
ing, this novel evidence from Rwanda suggests that the short-term agricultural
labour market is characterized by a high level of responsiveness and fluidity—
factors that may be influenced by the availability of the very mobile phones that
are providing these data.
At the same, time, other GLM|LIC projects point to significant imperfections
in rural labour markets. As discussed in Chapter 4, a GLM|LIC project in Malawi
identified substantial inefficiencies in the allocation of labour in agriculture in
Malawi (Brummund and Merfeld 2016). The results showed that the returns to
an extra hour worked are greater in non-farm activities than farm activities—an
indication the households could increase their income if they shifted labour from
farm to non-farm activity.
This evidence of inefficient allocation of labour in rural Africa is consistent
with the results of another GLM|LIC project that analysed longitudinal household
survey data from Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Malawi (Dillon, Brummund,
and Mwabu 2017, 2019). As discussed in Chapter 4, the project found evidence
of inefficient labour allocations resulting from both too much labour and too lit-
tle labour being used on farms, as evidenced by gaps between the productivity of
farm and non-farm labour. In many regions there appears to be an excess sup-
ply of labour, an indication of constrained labour demand. In Ethiopia, however,
there is evidence of binding labour supply constraints, the result of financial mar-
ket imperfections rather than a shortage of workers. One lesson is that rural labour
markets continue to work imperfectly in rural Africa, with the result that labour
is often misallocated as labour shortages and labour surpluses are created over the
harvest cycle.
Child labour can be another manifestation of inefficient labour markets in ru-
ral areas in low-income countries. As discussed in Chapter 7, there continue to
be relatively high rates in a number of LICs, with levels of child labour falling
sharply as GDP rises and economies shift their reliance away from agriculture.
With high rates of return to schooling, and with negative effects of child labour on
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schooling outcomes, having children working rather than attending school tends
to reduce economic growth. A GLM|LIC project in Ethiopia (Galdo, Dammert,
and Abebaw 2018) found large increases in the use of child labour in the harvest
season, a reflection of the seasonal labour shortages indicated in the other projects
cited above.
The project also found evidence that the work activity of girls was often un-
derreported, especially when males were doing the reporting. Another GLM|LIC
project found evidence of other serious reporting issues in farm household labour
data. A study in rural Tanzania investigated the extent to which reports of labour
inputs on the farm are affected by the method of data collection (Arthi et al. 2017,
2018). As discussed in Chapter 4, the study compared standard recall questions,
in which households are asked to recall labour inputs over the entire agricultural
season, with a weekly face-to-face visit and a weekly phone interview. The results
suggested that the amount of farm labour being used is often over-reported in
standard recall interviews. This has important policy implications, since it im-
plies that labour productivity in rural Africa may tend to be underestimated.
These two projects point to the importance of collecting accurate data on time
use and economic activity in the survey data that is essential for evidence-based
policymaking.
9.6 The Importance of Rigorous Long-TermEvaluation
GLM|LIC set a high standard for rigorous evaluation of the programmes
that were being analysed. Many governments, international agencies, and non-
governmental organizations have come to see the importance of careful pro-
gramme evaluation, and it is increasingly being built into the design of new
programmes. The GLM|LIC projects that had disappointing results were in many
ways as important as the projects that hadmore encouraging results. Not all labour
market programmes are going to work, no matter how well motivated, how well
designed, or how convinced the designers are of their value. The only way to find
out what works and what does not is to subject programmes to rigorous evalua-
tion. In many cases, this means using the kind of RCTs that were at the heart of
many GLM|LIC projects.
An important feature of many of the GLM|LIC projects discussed in this book
was the use of long-term follow-up studies that tracked results well beyond the end
of the programme. This book has included a number of important cases in which
the short-term impact of projects looked quite positive, only to find that the impact
had disappeared when programme participants were followed up later. In other
cases, the positive impact of the programmes was much longer-lasting, with the
long-term follow-up providing valuable information about which interventions
had the biggest impact. An important lesson of these GLM|LIC projects is that
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the best programme evaluations should run well past the end of the programmes,
with long-term follow-up included from the outset in the design of programme
evaluations.
9.7 OngoingG2LM|LICResearch
This book covered only the first three phases of the GLM|LIC initiative. In 2018,
the programme funded a fourth round of projects that are not presented in this
book, with most of these projects still works in progress. The phase covers a wide
range of topics and research ideas. The following subsections offer an insight into
some of these projects.
9.7.1 Advancing Data Capacity for Policy Innovation
G2LM|LIC is funding the first wave of the Sudan Labour Market Panel Survey
(SLMPS), the initial wave of a nationally representative longitudinal study of about
5,000 Sudanese households designed to improve data capacity for policy innova-
tion and labour market growth in Sudan. The focus of the survey is to understand
key relationships between labour market processes and outcomes and other di-
mensions of human development such as education, training, family formation
and fertility, internal and international migration, gender equality and women’s
empowerment, enterprise development, housing acquisition, equality of opportu-
nity, and intergenerational mobility. SLMPS is being conducted by the Economic
Research Forum (ERF), in collaboration the Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics
and theMinistry of Labour and Administrative Reform. ERF hasmade substantial
investments in collecting Labour Market Panel Surveys (LMPS) in Egypt, Jordan,
andTunisia, and inmaking these data sets publicly available to researchers through
the ERF open-access micro-data initiative (OAMDI) portal. The LMPS surveys
are regarded as the most comprehensive publicly accessible and nationally rep-
resentative micro-data source for understanding economic activity and human
development in the three countries. A report published by the United Nations
Development Project (UNDP) and International Labour Organisation in 2014
showed that among employed persons in Sudan, male or female, the vast majority
are in vulnerable employment. Further, by average measures of lower-middle-
income countries, Sudan is about 7 percentage points below average for female
labour force participation and over 15 percentage points below average for female
unemployment rates. The SLMPS project is designed to support policymakers in
Sudan who require rich and reliable data to develop innovative policy solutions
for resolving the nation’s dilemmas of labour market stagnancy and gendered
disparities in labour market outcomes.
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9.7.2 Tackling Information Frictions through a Job Search Platform
Labour markets in LICs experience many frictions that impair efficient firm–
worker matching, harming both workers and firms and potentially reducing
employment.This project is conducting a series of interventions to alleviate search
and matching frictions in the labour market in and around Lahore, Pakistan. The
project builds on the GLM|LIC study on transport and labour markets in Lahore
discussed in Chapter 8. In that project, the team successfully developed an innova-
tive job search platform (Job Talash) to measure job search and labour supply. Job
Talash generates rich, high-frequency data on both the supply and demand sides of
the labour market. The new G2LM|LIC project uses Job Talash to randomly vary
the frictions facing firms and job seekers and quantify the importance of these
frictions. Specifically, the project uses a number of approaches:
(1) It assesses job seekers’ skills and randomly varies the information firms
observe to understand demand for specific skills.
(2) It randomly varies the probability of auditing job seekers’ self-reported
qualifications and whether firms know this probability in order to under-
stand job seekers’ incentives to misreport skills and how firms respond to
the risk of misreporting.
(3) It randomizes the information job seekers observe about job and firm char-
acteristics, such as wages and the gender composition of the workforce to
understand labour supply responses to job prospects.
(4) It randomly varies the information workseekers have about firms’ pref-
erences over job seeker attributes to understand how sensitive workers’
decisions to invest in short-term training and internships are to perceived
demand for these attributes.
(5) It contrasts centralized firm–worker matching that provides explicit rec-
ommendations about matches to decentralized matching that facilitates
communication between firms andworkers but does notmake recommen-
dations.
The project measures the effects of alleviating information frictions on job
search, job offers, employment, wages, turnover, and productivity.
9.7.3 Training, Financing, and Matching between
Workers and Firms
This new G2LM|LIC project uses a cluster randomized control trial to test the
role of credit constraint and information and local labour market friction on
firm growth in the informal sector in Bangladesh. One arm of the intervention
examines the impact of combining access to financial capital and business training,
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while another arm analyses the interaction with access to skilled workforce on
firm growth. The project compares firms that are randomly selected across differ-
ent treatments. The research will provide evidence on the relative importance of
access to financial capital and entrepreneurship training, and local labour market
friction. The project also evaluates workers’ outcomes in the local labour market
using the saturation of trained entrepreneurs in each market to estimate the ef-
fect on labour demand when the quality of labour supply is higher. The research
team is collaborating with the non-profit organization BRAC to implement the
RCT through one of its existing programmes in the light engineering (LE) sec-
tor of Bangladesh. The LE sector plays a vital role in employment generation and
socio-economic development in Bangladesh. The findings will provide policy in-
put for job training programmes and policies related to the development of small
and micro enterprise.
9.7.4 Impacts of Microfranchising on Young Women’s
Occupational Choices
This project builds on an earlier GLM|LIC project, discussed in Chapter 8, which
evaluated a multifaceted active labour market programme intended to encour-
age entrepreneurship—a microfranchising initiative that offered young women in
some of Nairobi’s poorest neighbourhoods a combination of vocational and life
skills training, together with start-up capital and ongoing business mentoring.
The project estimated the impacts of the microfranchising intervention through
a randomized trial, comparing those assigned to the programme to both a pure
control group and a third group that was offered an unrestricted cash grant,
but no other training or support. Both the microfranchising programme and the
cash grant shift women into entrepreneurship, increasing the proportion who are
self-employed by approximately 10 percentage points. These occupational choice
effects are very persistent: the estimated impact after eighteenmonths is no smaller
than the impact observed after nine months. In the short term, both the mi-
crofranchising and grant treatments also increase income substantially; however,
the impacts on income disappear in the second year after the programme as the
women in the comparison group find jobs and ‘catch up’ to the treatment groups.
The new G2LM|LIC project is conducting a long-term follow-up of the women
in the study. Through this follow-up, the researchers hope to provide answers
to three research questions: (1) Are the impacts on occupational choice persis-
tent over the long-term? (2) If so, do incomes in the control group continue to
grow faster than incomes in the treatment groups? Does treatment lead to sig-
nificantly lower income in the long-term? (3) If so, why do women remain in
self-employment?
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9.7.5 Urban Density, Slum Redevelopment, and Labour Markets
Many of the world’s poorest people live and work in dense informal settlements
in Africa’s growing megacities. The existence of these communities has important
implications for the workings of labour markets. Urban labour markets provide
access to formal jobs without long commutes, access to customers and markets,
and access to social networks that support labour markets, particularly in in-
formal economies. Each additional person who lives in the city centre not only
gains from these urban labour markets but also contributes to these agglomera-
tion economies, imposing positive externalities on others. But increasing density
in informal settlements can also have negative externalities in terms of congestion,
health, and poor infrastructure, which could limit the potential of cities to create
high-productivity formal jobs. Estimating the scope and scale of these externali-
ties is an empirical challenge.The government of Addis Ababa recently announced
plans to redevelop large central areas of the Ethiopian megacity, which will lead
to the relocation of 20,000 households out of informal settlements. This presents
a unique opportunity to learn. Building on a sample of 30,000 geo-referenced
surveys conducted in Addis before the announcement, the G2LM|LIC project is
estimating both the direct effect of being relocated out of a dense city centre, as
well as the externalities of the relocations, on labour markets in the surround-
ing areas. The project draws on a variety of empirical techniques from labour and
urban economics to estimate how these spillover effects extend over space. In do-
ing so, the project will develop new methods for studying both treatment effects
and externalities in dense urban labour markets, where they are not defined by
geographically distinct clusters.
9.7.6 Entrepreneurship Education and Teacher Training
This G2LM|LIC project examines how teacher training and support affects the
delivery of Rwanda’s revised secondary school entrepreneurship curriculum, in-
troduced in 2016. For this purpose, a subset of schools was randomly selected
for two years of intensive teacher training on the curriculum. A control group
receives the curriculum only.The studymeasures the intervention’s impact on stu-
dent academic and economic outcomes. Baseline and two midline surveys have
demonstrated compliance of the implementation and most importantly showed
appreciable outcomes (for example, students in the treatment schools know
more about entrepreneurship topics, budgeting skills, and product making—soap,
envelopes—in comparison to their counterfactuals in control schools). An endline
survey will measure outcomes three years after the project began. The results will
inform government efforts to implement curriculum reforms in secondary schools
across in Rwanda, but also in Africa in general.
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9.7.7 Overcoming Constraints to Female Labour Force Entry
Using a randomized control trial this G2LM|LIC project will test the impact of
motivational videos and information in overcoming constraints to female labour
force entry. It focuses on female students enrolled in women-only colleges in ur-
ban Lahore, Pakistan. The project is motivated by a dearth of work on alleviating
psychological constraints to female labour force participation and by its strong rel-
evance in the Pakistani context. Existing literature has shown positive impacts of
aspirational stories from peer groups on a wide range of behaviour, but there is
no prior work that tests the effect of raising aspirations on labour force participa-
tion. Pakistan suffers from a chronically low female labour force participation rate
despite very high enrolment of females at the graduate and undergraduate level
and availability of a large number of jobs in general and for females in particular.
The RCT involves three treatment arms: female students in the first treatment arm
are shown a documentary of educatedwomenwho are employed and satisfiedwith
their jobs; the second treatment involves a video and a facilitated exercise that pro-
vides information on job applications and existing job search sources; and those in
the third treatment arm are shown both the motivational and information video.
The project includes a placebo control group (comprised of female students from
non-treated colleges) and a spillover control group (comprised of female students
from treated colleges). The project tests the impact of the interventions on a se-
ries of input and effort outcomes such as whether the female creates a CV, applies
for a job, reports a subjective improvement in aspirations, self-belief, and sense of
control, as well as general effort exerted by the female to secure a job.
9.7.8 Women’s Earnings, Household Division of Labour,
and Women’s Welfare Outcomes
With rising female educational achievements and labour force participation,
Ghanaian women contribute significant resources to their households. Accord-
ing to economic models, as women increase their participation and earnings in
the labour market, there should be a decrease in the amount of domestic work
that they do. The issue of the division of domestic work has significant implica-
tions for women’s welfare. Women who shoulder a large amount of childcare and
domestic responsibilities often scale down their employment intensity, engage in
less-challenging jobs and usually on a part-time basis. This implies that women
continue to compete unequally with men in the labour market. Indeed, in Ghana,
despite a 70% employment to population ratio among women, over half of these
women are own-account workers, while almost a third are contributing family
workers. The aim of the new G2LM|LIC project is to examine whether greater
earnings by Ghanaian women is associated with increased household bargaining
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power, resulting in a changed division of housework between a woman and her
husband. A more egalitarian division of domestic and childcare responsibilities
between a couple may be indicative of women’s greater bargaining and decision-
making power in the household. Where increased earnings indeed lead to higher
bargaining power by women within the household and a greater say in decisions
relating to her reproductive health, women’s health andwelfare could be improved.
9.7.9 Seasonal Migration and Agricultural Labour Markets
As discussed in Chapter 4, in rural agrarian economies the period between plant-
ing and harvest is most often a lean season when labour demand and wages fall,
and the price of staples rise. The landless poor reliant on agricultural work on
others’ farms are especially hard hit, and many millions of labourers and their
families worldwide suffer from seasonal hunger. This problem is acute in rural
South Asia, where the majority of the world’s poor live, and where the majority
of those poor are landless. A series of studies has generated strong evidence that
in northern Bangladesh subsidies to encourage seasonal migration to more vi-
brant labour markets during this lean period successfully reduce seasonal hunger
for migrants, are five to ten times as effective as traditional food aid programmes
and have positive or null effects on other important outcomes. A new G2LM|LIC
project expands this line of inquiry to rural Nepal, where the rural poor suffer
from similar seasonal deprivation. The potential gains from migration are even
larger in Nepal, because Nepalese workers have access to urban labour markets in
India. A replication of the Bangladeshi programme in Nepal will have immedi-
ate policy impact because several donors and implementers who have supported
a policy scale-up of the Bangladesh programme to reach hundreds of thousands
of households stand ready to expand such a programme in Nepal if research re-
sults warrant it. The project also studies the effects of large-scale emigration on
both labour demand and labour supply, helping to answer fundamental questions
about rural–urban migration and structural transformation.
This brief insight into forthcoming G2LM|LIC research once more underscores
the potential of development economics to provide useful lessons for policymakers
and help low-income societies in the world’s poorest regions to achieve welfare
gains.
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